On Batson and Shaw's
Evidence for Altruism: Toward a Pluralism of Prosocial Motives
FIX!!
Why do we help others? Is it because we have no choice, because it's expected, or because it's in our own best interest?! Daniel Batson says these are the easy answers and,given the empirical nature of the question, we needn't settle for them.
In his study, entitled Evidence for Altruism: Toward a Pluralism of Prosocial Motives, Batson attempts to evidence the altruists claim, that "at least some of us, to some degree, under some circumstances, are capable of a qualitatively different form of motivation, motivation with an ultimate goal of benefiting someone else. "2 This, against the egoists claim, "that we are, at heart, purely egoistic, that we care for others only to the extent that their welfare affects ours."3
This view, which has come to be known as universal egoism, has a long history:
"From Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, through Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham, to Friedrich Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud, the dominant view in Western thought has long been that we are, at heart, exclusively self-interested. And today, when we ask why we care for and help others, the answer provided by all major theories of motivation- Freudian, behavioral, and even humanistic theories--is quite clear: Everything we do, including everything we do to benefit others, is ultimately done for our own benefit.
The assumption of universal egoism is so fundamental and widespread in our culture that it is hard to recognize, like water for fish. It only becomes apparent if we imagine the possible changes if it were not the case.
It is a view held by too many social scientists and psychologists, he says. And what's more, it is a view which can too easily be evidenced, since practically any act, no matter how seemingly selfless, can be argued to provide at least some self-benefit, and this can then be argued to have been the ultimate motivation. But, as Batson says, the easy answers are not always the right ones.
In this especially clear-headed study of what has been for some millennia an extremely nebulous topic, Batson asks "whether anyone ever, in any degree, transcends the bounds of self-benefit and helps out of genuine concern for the welfare of another. We want to know whether altruism is part of human nature."
Batson qualifies universal egoism by distinguishing between the strong form of psychological hedonism/egoism, which claims that people always act for their own pleasure/benefit, and the weak form, which claims only that pleasure/benefit can sometimes follow human action without necessarily being the motivation for it.6 And yet, as Batson points out, "The weak form is not inconsistent with the possibility that the ultimate goal of some action is to benefit another rather than to benefit oneself; the pleasure obtained can be a consequence of reaching the goal without being the goal itself. "7 "[I]f we are to answer the question of the existence of altruism, then we must determine whether benefit to the other is (a) an ultimate goal and any self-benefits unintended consequences or (b) an instrumental means to reach the ultimate goal of benefiting oneself. "8 If we can show that it is not, then a conclusion that human nature is always selfish, which ignores the possibility of altruism, is too strong to accurately describe the evidence.
This strong form of psychological hedonism/egoism is considered the parsimonious
explanation, even by Batson, who concedes that his research indicates a plurality of
motives at work in human behavior. After examining Batson's methods, the results of his
empirical studies, and some implication of his results, we will return to this question and
draw our own conclusions.
Methodology:
Batson's method is straight forward:
Altruism is a motivational state with the ultimaJe goal of increasing another's welfare.
Egoism is a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing one's
own welfare.
Examining each key phrase in both of these definitions, Batson recasts these as goal-directed psychological forces within ao organism (Lewin, 1935) for which that goal is "an end in itself and not just an intermediate means for reaching some other goal. "10 Accordingly. the subject "(a) perceives some desired change in his or her owo world and (b) experiences a force to bring about that change as (c) ao end in itself. "
Batson gives eight implications of these definitions:
1. The distinction between altruism and egoism is qualitative, not quantitative.
2. A single motive cannot be both, altruistic and egoistic, as this "implies two ultimate goals (as long as self and other are perceived to be distinct), "12[emphasis added]
3. "Both egoistic and altruistic motives can exist simultaneously within a single
organism," which can lead to "motivational conflict." 13
4. Reflexive, automatic, and otherwise non-goal-directed behavior is neither
altruistic nor egoistic.14
5. People may be mistaken about their own motivation.15
6. A motive is a force which may or may not lead to action.
7. Altruism may or may not involve self-sacrifice, and may even involve self
benefit, when that is an unintended consequence and not the ultimate goal of behavior.
8. "[T]here may be prosocial motives that are neither altruistic nor egoistic" [such as] "upholding a principle of justice (Kohlberg, 1976)."16 And again, this may benefit both the other and the self by unintended consequence without being motivated by self as
the ultimate end.
Here is a potential that could use more exploration, for it might be that a conception
of selfhood as a dynamic system of interaction would require just such a principle to help balance the complex interaction between self and other.l7
Batson points out in his response to the commentaries, "our definition of altruism requires a self-other distinction. Without such a distinction, it makes no sense to ask whether a helper's ultimate goal is to increase another's welfare, to increase his or her own welfare, or to pursue some other goal. "18[emphasis added]
However, one might wonder whether this distinction is as universal as is assumed. It could be argued that Batson's own definitions leave open the possibility of self and other both being included in self as a dynamic system.
As some commentators and others to whom Batson refers in his manuscript have pointed out (Archer, Hornstein, Lerner, and Krebs), a close relationship might eliminate the self-other distinction, making self and other psychologically one.
For Lerner, the 'identity relationship' is such that "we are psychologically indistinguishable from the other and we experience that which we perceive they are experiencing. "19 In which case, "the question of whether the ultimate goal is to increase one's own or the other's welfare cannot meaningfully be asked; the two welfares have become one."20 Batson rightly points out that, "If this occurs, then as these commentators note, the terms altruism and egoism as we have defined them do not apply. The goals of increasing the other's welfare and increasing one's own welfare are no longer distinguishable. "21
Indeed, from a view of self and other in a system of interaction, "it makes no sense to ask" which is the ultimate goal, for both are combined in the system of one's whole best interest. A self's values might be such that one includes the other into the weighing of ends--which allows the possibility of both self and other being ultimate. We sacrifice our own interest every time we set self aside long enough to put another first.
Batson admits to a suspicion that, "except perhaps in some mystical states" the
breakdown of this distinction between self and others is rare in adults.22 "Even mothers, we suspect, have a clear sense of the person of their child as distinct from self. Is this not part of the mystery of motherhood: From one's own body comes another, distinct huma
being?" 23 I think Batson is confusing the perception of the distinction between self and
other with the importance of the distinction between self and other, for one can perfectly
well know that self and other are distinct, and yet, not let that distinction matter in certain regards. In other words, one can see the difference between self and other without seeing that difference as important to whether we care for the other more or less. We see our children as individuals, but not necessarily as individuals who are in competition with our own interests. To say that the distinction between self and others disappears is not to say that it is not recognized at all, but only that it is not seen as important, not recognized as a reason to treat others with any less regard as you would have them treat us.
This sense of self as a unit, with others attached, whether linked or blended24 in such a way that our interests are intertwined, is not so far fetched after all, especially in adults. It is, ideally, what happens to our self-concept every time we take responsibility for another human being, whether as parents, teachers, doctors, politicians, etc.. Some might call this egoistic, since our behaving altruistically in such cases seems to be good for us too, but this is, in an important way, quite irrelevant, since one chooses to begin with to include others within the scope of one's own well-being, such that self cannot thereafter be well without living up to one's responsibilities. It is the reason that we need to evaluate the difference in the strong and the weak form of psychological hedonism/egoism, because the weak form, from which good for self might flow from being good to others, is perfectly consistent with this conception of self as a system, a choice which would seem to require viewing other's interests as ends with which one's own interests are inextricably intertwined, not as means, but as part of the process of mental and moral health.
It is true, as Batson says, that we don't need to bring up morality, but we can,
because, as he notes, "If altruistic motivation exists, then we must broaden our moral horizon once again. We can no longer excuse our callousness and insensitivity to the needs of others by explaining that it is unrealistic to expect more. "25 And the same would be true if such identification of self-interest with the interests of others exists. In his response to commentaries, Batson says that, "To keep motivational concepts distinct from moral concepts, we think it wise to avoid using the moral terms unselfish and selfish as synonyms for altruism and egoism. "26 But, "From a moral perspective (not, we believe, from a scientific one), it is possible to assert that altruistic motivation, it is exists, is morally good. This assertion cannot, however, be reversed: Moral goodness need not be altruistic. "27
Batson also does not "deny that a person can have a goal of meeting the needs of a unit that includes self and others,"28 but he conceives of this unit as being an entity separate from the individuals, like a marriage, which can operate independent of the good of the
individuals involved. Also, he leaves open the question of whether the ultimate goal in
such a case is "(a) the greatest good for the unit as a whole, [or] (b) upholding the principle to avoid feeling guilty about failing to live up to one's principle," which is egoistic, compared to (a) which is neither egoistic nor altruistic.29
At any rate, one cannot help but admire and appreciate the subtlety with which
Batson explores these "conceptual briar patches and tangled thickets of data and alternative explanations. "30 Having recast altruism and egoism as motivational states with the ultimate goal of increasing either another's or one's own welfare as an end in itself and not as a means to some other goal, Batson is able to determine the existence of altruism by discerning between the strong and the weak forms of psychological egoism/hedonism, i.e. whether benefit to another is always an instrumental means to ones own ends, or whether it is sometimes the ultimate goal from which any self-benefits flow by unintended consequence.31 The crucial difference in these motivations then is, whose interests are the ultimate goal ?32
Discerning which is in fact the ultimate goal is puzzling, Batson admits, but this is
no reason to surrender prematurely, for not only can we ascertain people's ultimate goals but that we do it all the time.33 We draw reasonable inferences about other's motives and intentions from their behavior over varying conditions. The specific purpose of such a study as Batson and Shaw's is to vary the conditions in such a way as to "disentangle the relationship between potential ultimate goals. "34 Since "the behavior should always be directed toward the ultimate goal...these two steps provide an empirical basis for inferring the nature of a person's motivation. "35
There are two steps necessary to infer the nature of a person's motivation from his or her behavior, according to Batson; they are, firstly, by a conceptual analysis of the various potential alternative goals. Batson accomplishes this by a three-path model which includes two egoistic routes (reinforcement and arousal reduction) and one altruistic one- "the most commonly suggested source" being empathic emotion, which begins with perception of need, and leads to adopting the other's perspective, which evokes altruisticmotivation, not helping behavior36 and which can be induced by instruction, including self instruction, and may also be the result of prior similar experience and/or attachment.37 And secondly, by systematic observation of the person's behavior, which is accomplished here by sketching the logic and results of some 20 experiments that have been conducted during the past decade to test one or more possible egoistic goals, including aversive-arousal reduction and empathy-specific punishment, both socially and self-administered, as well as empathy-specific reward, another major egoistic alternative to the empathy-altruism hypothesis, and it variations, empathic-joy and negative-state relief.38
The strong form of the empathy-altruism hypothesis, asserted here, "postulates not only that empathic emotion evokes altruistic motivation, but also that all motivation to help evoked by empathy is altruistic, and the weaker form, not asserted here, is that "empathic emotion evokes both egoistic and altruistic motivation. "39 Remembering that to determine the existence of altruism we must determine whether benefit to the other is ever the ultimate goal from which any self-benefits flow serendipidously, or whether it is always merely an instrumental means to the ultimate end of self-benefit,40 we can see why this is an objective which the weak form of the empathy-altruism hypothesis will not help us reach.
It may seem that Batson jumps to a conclusion regarding the relationship between
altruism and empathy in his article with Shaw. However, he explains in his response to
commentaries, that "empathy has been the most frequently mentioned source of altruistic motivation since antiquity. "41 The term empathy was "coined by Titchener in 1909 to translate the German Einfuhlung, which was used to Lipps in a perceptual context to refer to the process of intuiting one's way into an object or event to 'see' it from the inside (see Wispe, 1968, 1986, 1987.n42 "It was llanled as a source--if not the source--of altruism by Thomas Aquinas, David Hume, Adam Smith, Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, and William McDougall.
Adam Smith gave a good account of empathy when he said that:
"I consider what I should suffer if I was really you, and I not only change circumstances with you, but I change persons and characters. My grief, therefore, is entirely upon your account, and not in the least upon my own."44
This account shows how empathy:
"involves more than simply focusing attention on the other. One may focus attention on another's need but maintain a relatively objective perspective, dispassionately observing the other's plight. In contrast, adopting the other's perspective involves imagining how that person is affected by his or her situation (Stotland, 1969).,.45
Batson notes in his response to commentaries that "we view perspective taking as imagining how the other person is affected by his or her situation, not how I would be affected by that situation. "46 Batson thus uses empathy in a way that "is distinct from personal distress evoked by perceiving someone in need, but it is indistinguishable from what many philosophers and early psychologists called sympathy (Smith, Darwin, Spencer, James), compassion (Hume, Smith) pity (Aquinas, Hume, Smith), or tenderness (McDougall). ,.47
Results of empirical tests are summarized which provide strong support for the empathy-altruism hypothesis. In answer to his question "whether anyone ever, in any degree, transcends the bounds of self-benefit and helps out of genuine concern for the welfare of another. ..whether altruism is part of human nature,"48 Batson concludes that, "the evidence to date provides surprisingly strong support for the hypothesis that empathic emotion evokes altruistic motivation. "49 "Improbable as it may seem, the empathy-altruism hypothesis appears to be true. It seems that we are capable of caring for the welfare of persons for whom we feel empathy for their sakes and not simply for our own. "5° In his manuscript, Batson provides quite convincing evidence that altruism, born of empathy, does exist--altruism which need not involve self-sacrifice, and may even involve self benefit as a secondary effect.5 1 As he notes, some self-benefits for helping actually increase as the costs increase, specifically because the costs are so great.52
Thus, as long as sometimes, under some circumstances, at least some people will act toward others as ends in themselves, egoism cannot account for all of human behavior. He concludes that "If altruism as defined here exists, then the widespread assumption that the ultimate goal of all human action is some more or less subtle form of self-benefit must be rejected. ,.53 "[I]f...individuals act, at least in part, with an ultimate goal of increasing the welfare of another, then the assumption of universal egoism must be replaced by a more complex view of prosocial motivation that allows for altruism as well as egoism. "54 Then there is also room here for prosocial motives that are not either altruistic or egoistic, such as Kant's categorical imperative or Kohlberg's principle of justice.55 As Jane Mansbridge points out in her book, Beyond Self-Interest, "when people think about what they want, they think about more than just their narrow self-interest... they often give great weight both to their moral principles and to the interests of others. "56 "In fact," Mansbridge says, "evidence indicates that...people often take account of both other individuals interests and the common good when they decide what constitutes a 'benefit' that they want to maximize, "57 including "long-run self interest, commitment to principle, and genuine we-feeling. "58 These all may be, in fact, in the best interest of the actor, but this fact alone does not qualify the motivation behind them to be egoistic in the narrow sense, as we have come to think of our drives to be. Such benefits may simply indicate what Socrates long ago argued to be the case, that our truest personal interest lies in interpersonal justice, which is nothing if not a proper balance between self and others.
Conclusion: Regarding parsimony, Batson holds the position that:
"Prior to the evidence for the empathy-altruism hypothesis ...parsimony clearly favors an exclusively egoistic explanation. "59 "Advocates of universal egoism have elegance and parsimony on their side in this debate [because] it is far simpler to explain all human behavior in terms of self benefit than it is to postulate a motivational pluralism that allows both self benefit and another's benefit to serve as ultimate goals. "6°
However, "If...the empirical tests of the empathy-altruism hypothesis lead us to conclude the empathic emotion evokes altruistic motivation ...then the situation is changed. Parsimony becomes irrelevant. There is no longer any logical reason to favor an egoistic interpretation of those cases in which the motivation might be egoistic, altruistic, both, or neither. Prudence no longer gives egoism exclusive credit for the large area of overlap of the two explanations."61 "This more complex view of prosocial motives lacks the tidy parsimony of a view that assumes all motivation is egoistic."
He takes this attribution of pluralism from August Compte, who considered egoism and altruism to be "two distinct motives within the individual. "62 However, to pick up on earlier speculation regarding the nature of self, it seems fair to question whether parsimony would not actually be retained by a conception of self as a system, a conception which follows from Batson's evidence, if not from his definitions. Seen this way, from a self-as system perspective, in which an equilibration between one's real and one's ideal self, between one's actual and one's potential, it doesn't look like dualism at all, but monism--in that a system is one whole, single, if complex thing.
Egoism is not more parsimonious than this dynamic conception. I think Batson
actually gives evidence for a more parsimonious explanation for human behavior than egoism has ever been, for parsimony cannot mean oversimplification of the phenomenon by reduction to only certain aspects of it. It must rather mean a single simple explanation for a range of complex behaviors. Viewing self as a dynamic but united system of logical interactions between organisms and their environments provides as simple an explanation as could possibly be hoped for to account for the complexity of human motivation and behavior.
Batson points out that "Sober expresses concern about our willingness to speak of
'the' ultimate goal of helping evoked by empathy," suggesting that it is "inconsistent with our proposal of pluralism of prosocial motives. "63 Batson response is that "The empathy altruism hypothesis does not assume that the motivation evoked by empathy is the only motive an empathically aroused person is experiencing. As the three-path model...suggests, the conditions that evoke empathy-induced altruistic motivation are likely also to evoke a range of egoistic motives. "64
However, we needn't talk about plurality of motives at all in order to understand
altruism; we need only change the way we talk about the self itself. The person whose
motivation falls within the weak form of psychological hedonism/egoism behaves in ways that are good for both self and others, and so does not necessarily have two opposing ends, but has a single broad goal of well-being. If 'self-concept' is reconsidered in deeper and broader terms, in which self is seen as a system, it is shown to be a single cognitive framework into which both self and other, egoism and altruism, fit--which seems to rival egoism in it parsimonious character. It is as simple in hypothesis, to be sure, and yet it is far more complex in its manifestations. Not dualistic in nature, but an interactive whole.
Thus, we need not "turn our back on the Eden of simplicity provided by the
monism of universal egoism "65 in order to accommodate Batson's findings.
We can do what we will with this proof that altruism is potential, and one wise thing we might do is to recognize that it is as rich in prescription, as in description. Altruism is not only among our choices but, by this evidence, it is a wise choice, meaning, in the best interest, not just of self, but of the ail of whom self is a part.
As Batson notes, "If altruistic motivation exists, then we need to know it, even though this knowledge may play havoc with our assumptions about human motivation and,
indeed, about human nature." 66 Perhaps we would see that it is a mistake to attempt to reduce us all to the same agent, as if we ail have the same motivations, simply because we all have the same potentials to choose from. "We" are, in fact, many individual agents; and, what's more, we even change from time to time. It is futile to ask what people always do when in fact people don't always do anything. The complexity of human motivation and the multitude of our motivational choices makes most questions about so-called 'human nature' relatively meaningless to ask and impossible to answer, at least if we are talking about all as if they are the same. We choose from among many complex potential behaviors on the basis of our understanding of 'the good' as an end which our actions are the means towards. And, importantly, different people make different choices. We are similarly goal-directed and share the universal goals of survival and well-being as our purposes, and we do function more or less properly toward defining our being well and achieving those ends. The problem with human motivation is not that we have this 'nature' which provokes us to be greedy and selfish, it is that too often we simply don't understand what is actually good for us, and choose to act toward our best immediate, rather than our best ultimate good. Immediate good may be compatible with other's expense, but ultimate good, iterated experiences proves, is not.67 Which is to say, our interests are proved to depend upon both the good of self and of others, seen clearly, it can be shown that, in wholistic terms, i.e. in terms of self-knowledge, there is no such thing as profit at someone else's expense. What comes of this intention is anything but 'good,' and it is only confused with good by a misunderstanding of the meaning of the term.
This shift "requires considerable rethinking of our underlying assumptions about
human nature and human potentiaJ,"68 for, in the words of Adam Smith, "there are evidently some principles in [our] nature, which interest [us] in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to [us]."69 The possibility that a "genuine concern for another's welfare is within the human repertoire" has been ignored, he says, and this "valuable untapped natural resource" could cause us "to rethink what it means to be human. "70 He concludes that, "If we are capable of altruism, then virtually ail of our current ideas about individual psychology, social relations, economics, and politics are, in an important respect, wrong. "71 And what's more, they are wrong in a way that has a self fulfilling prophesy effect.72
This is important to remember because, while we are not responsible for what we cannot change (which is to say that, "If we are capable of seeking only our own benefit,
then we can hardly be blamed for doing so"73) we are responsible for what we can change (which is to say that, "If, on the other hand, it turns out that we are capable of altruism, then our moral horizon--and our potential for moral responsibility--broadens considerably"74) most especially to our own potential self. This is why we might choose altruism--not as a moral imperative, but as an opportunity; not from duty, but from inclination. As Batson points out, rather than a source of obligation, this seems a cause for celebration.? 5
"If our belief in universal egoism is wrong and we are actually capable of altruism, then possibilities arise for the development of more caring individuals and a more compassionate, humane society. And in a world so full of fear, insensitivity, suffering, and loneliness, such developments are sorely needed. "76
What's more, Batson quotes another study which concluded that, "There is considerable evidence of various kinds to suggest that doing good may indeed by good for you. "77 One study suggests that the antidote to such life-threatening ailments as heart disease "is the development of a trusting heart. "78 The fact is, it is very easy to be good to others when we understand how bad it is for us to be anything but. And once we learn the lesson, it no longer matters why, whether because its good for us to be good to others or simply that it is bad for us to be anything else, these are the same idea from different points of view. Once we break free of our zero-sum assumptions about what is good, (which are not necessarily materialistic, but simply assumes some quantity of good which one looses if the other gains) then the traditional dichotomy between self vs. other breaks down. Material goods do seem to require some either/or division, meaning, either I get this or you get it, and these zero sum conditions are very restricting. But, learning that these win/lose assumptions are conditions that obtain where they are assumed, that is, self-fulfilling prophesy, we can think again. They are also conditions that can be transcended by wholistic, meaning deeper and broader, considerations of what else, besides the tangible extrinsic rewards and punishments for which we have learned to strive, is lost and gained in the exchange.
The understanding which guides that steering mechanism which brings human
beings to choose certain motivations from among the logical potentials that are all part of so-called human nature might be considerably advanced were the human sciences as dedicated to comprehending the self as a choosing system, with egoism as one potential among many moral options, as it has been dedicated to proving and disproving the truth of universal motivation. Therefore, for my part, at any rate, the question is, What does an individual self have to learnfrom the lessons of egoistic and altruistic dynamics about what actually is and is not in his or her best interest? and, How do we ameliorate our social conditions by the lessons of this research?
The answer to the question asked by Batson, Is altruism potential in human behavior? is that all options are still and always our potential, and the fact of moral
autonomy is that, whether we actually behave one way or the other, altruistically or egoistically, is a matter of choice--choice within the constraints of context, it's true--but a choice, nonetheless. In that different choices have different effects, different karmic consequences, if you will, or call it, different fitness values, we still have much to learn about why we might choose one over the other. Which is to say, What is actually good for us?
Evidence for Altruism: Toward a Pluralism of Prosocial Motives
FIX!!
Why do we help others? Is it because we have no choice, because it's expected, or because it's in our own best interest?! Daniel Batson says these are the easy answers and,given the empirical nature of the question, we needn't settle for them.
In his study, entitled Evidence for Altruism: Toward a Pluralism of Prosocial Motives, Batson attempts to evidence the altruists claim, that "at least some of us, to some degree, under some circumstances, are capable of a qualitatively different form of motivation, motivation with an ultimate goal of benefiting someone else. "2 This, against the egoists claim, "that we are, at heart, purely egoistic, that we care for others only to the extent that their welfare affects ours."3
This view, which has come to be known as universal egoism, has a long history:
"From Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, through Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham, to Friedrich Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud, the dominant view in Western thought has long been that we are, at heart, exclusively self-interested. And today, when we ask why we care for and help others, the answer provided by all major theories of motivation- Freudian, behavioral, and even humanistic theories--is quite clear: Everything we do, including everything we do to benefit others, is ultimately done for our own benefit.
The assumption of universal egoism is so fundamental and widespread in our culture that it is hard to recognize, like water for fish. It only becomes apparent if we imagine the possible changes if it were not the case.
It is a view held by too many social scientists and psychologists, he says. And what's more, it is a view which can too easily be evidenced, since practically any act, no matter how seemingly selfless, can be argued to provide at least some self-benefit, and this can then be argued to have been the ultimate motivation. But, as Batson says, the easy answers are not always the right ones.
In this especially clear-headed study of what has been for some millennia an extremely nebulous topic, Batson asks "whether anyone ever, in any degree, transcends the bounds of self-benefit and helps out of genuine concern for the welfare of another. We want to know whether altruism is part of human nature."
Batson qualifies universal egoism by distinguishing between the strong form of psychological hedonism/egoism, which claims that people always act for their own pleasure/benefit, and the weak form, which claims only that pleasure/benefit can sometimes follow human action without necessarily being the motivation for it.6 And yet, as Batson points out, "The weak form is not inconsistent with the possibility that the ultimate goal of some action is to benefit another rather than to benefit oneself; the pleasure obtained can be a consequence of reaching the goal without being the goal itself. "7 "[I]f we are to answer the question of the existence of altruism, then we must determine whether benefit to the other is (a) an ultimate goal and any self-benefits unintended consequences or (b) an instrumental means to reach the ultimate goal of benefiting oneself. "8 If we can show that it is not, then a conclusion that human nature is always selfish, which ignores the possibility of altruism, is too strong to accurately describe the evidence.
This strong form of psychological hedonism/egoism is considered the parsimonious
explanation, even by Batson, who concedes that his research indicates a plurality of
motives at work in human behavior. After examining Batson's methods, the results of his
empirical studies, and some implication of his results, we will return to this question and
draw our own conclusions.
Methodology:
Batson's method is straight forward:
Altruism is a motivational state with the ultimaJe goal of increasing another's welfare.
Egoism is a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing one's
own welfare.
Examining each key phrase in both of these definitions, Batson recasts these as goal-directed psychological forces within ao organism (Lewin, 1935) for which that goal is "an end in itself and not just an intermediate means for reaching some other goal. "10 Accordingly. the subject "(a) perceives some desired change in his or her owo world and (b) experiences a force to bring about that change as (c) ao end in itself. "
Batson gives eight implications of these definitions:
1. The distinction between altruism and egoism is qualitative, not quantitative.
2. A single motive cannot be both, altruistic and egoistic, as this "implies two ultimate goals (as long as self and other are perceived to be distinct), "12[emphasis added]
3. "Both egoistic and altruistic motives can exist simultaneously within a single
organism," which can lead to "motivational conflict." 13
4. Reflexive, automatic, and otherwise non-goal-directed behavior is neither
altruistic nor egoistic.14
5. People may be mistaken about their own motivation.15
6. A motive is a force which may or may not lead to action.
7. Altruism may or may not involve self-sacrifice, and may even involve self
benefit, when that is an unintended consequence and not the ultimate goal of behavior.
8. "[T]here may be prosocial motives that are neither altruistic nor egoistic" [such as] "upholding a principle of justice (Kohlberg, 1976)."16 And again, this may benefit both the other and the self by unintended consequence without being motivated by self as
the ultimate end.
Here is a potential that could use more exploration, for it might be that a conception
of selfhood as a dynamic system of interaction would require just such a principle to help balance the complex interaction between self and other.l7
Batson points out in his response to the commentaries, "our definition of altruism requires a self-other distinction. Without such a distinction, it makes no sense to ask whether a helper's ultimate goal is to increase another's welfare, to increase his or her own welfare, or to pursue some other goal. "18[emphasis added]
However, one might wonder whether this distinction is as universal as is assumed. It could be argued that Batson's own definitions leave open the possibility of self and other both being included in self as a dynamic system.
As some commentators and others to whom Batson refers in his manuscript have pointed out (Archer, Hornstein, Lerner, and Krebs), a close relationship might eliminate the self-other distinction, making self and other psychologically one.
For Lerner, the 'identity relationship' is such that "we are psychologically indistinguishable from the other and we experience that which we perceive they are experiencing. "19 In which case, "the question of whether the ultimate goal is to increase one's own or the other's welfare cannot meaningfully be asked; the two welfares have become one."20 Batson rightly points out that, "If this occurs, then as these commentators note, the terms altruism and egoism as we have defined them do not apply. The goals of increasing the other's welfare and increasing one's own welfare are no longer distinguishable. "21
Indeed, from a view of self and other in a system of interaction, "it makes no sense to ask" which is the ultimate goal, for both are combined in the system of one's whole best interest. A self's values might be such that one includes the other into the weighing of ends--which allows the possibility of both self and other being ultimate. We sacrifice our own interest every time we set self aside long enough to put another first.
Batson admits to a suspicion that, "except perhaps in some mystical states" the
breakdown of this distinction between self and others is rare in adults.22 "Even mothers, we suspect, have a clear sense of the person of their child as distinct from self. Is this not part of the mystery of motherhood: From one's own body comes another, distinct huma
being?" 23 I think Batson is confusing the perception of the distinction between self and
other with the importance of the distinction between self and other, for one can perfectly
well know that self and other are distinct, and yet, not let that distinction matter in certain regards. In other words, one can see the difference between self and other without seeing that difference as important to whether we care for the other more or less. We see our children as individuals, but not necessarily as individuals who are in competition with our own interests. To say that the distinction between self and others disappears is not to say that it is not recognized at all, but only that it is not seen as important, not recognized as a reason to treat others with any less regard as you would have them treat us.
This sense of self as a unit, with others attached, whether linked or blended24 in such a way that our interests are intertwined, is not so far fetched after all, especially in adults. It is, ideally, what happens to our self-concept every time we take responsibility for another human being, whether as parents, teachers, doctors, politicians, etc.. Some might call this egoistic, since our behaving altruistically in such cases seems to be good for us too, but this is, in an important way, quite irrelevant, since one chooses to begin with to include others within the scope of one's own well-being, such that self cannot thereafter be well without living up to one's responsibilities. It is the reason that we need to evaluate the difference in the strong and the weak form of psychological hedonism/egoism, because the weak form, from which good for self might flow from being good to others, is perfectly consistent with this conception of self as a system, a choice which would seem to require viewing other's interests as ends with which one's own interests are inextricably intertwined, not as means, but as part of the process of mental and moral health.
It is true, as Batson says, that we don't need to bring up morality, but we can,
because, as he notes, "If altruistic motivation exists, then we must broaden our moral horizon once again. We can no longer excuse our callousness and insensitivity to the needs of others by explaining that it is unrealistic to expect more. "25 And the same would be true if such identification of self-interest with the interests of others exists. In his response to commentaries, Batson says that, "To keep motivational concepts distinct from moral concepts, we think it wise to avoid using the moral terms unselfish and selfish as synonyms for altruism and egoism. "26 But, "From a moral perspective (not, we believe, from a scientific one), it is possible to assert that altruistic motivation, it is exists, is morally good. This assertion cannot, however, be reversed: Moral goodness need not be altruistic. "27
Batson also does not "deny that a person can have a goal of meeting the needs of a unit that includes self and others,"28 but he conceives of this unit as being an entity separate from the individuals, like a marriage, which can operate independent of the good of the
individuals involved. Also, he leaves open the question of whether the ultimate goal in
such a case is "(a) the greatest good for the unit as a whole, [or] (b) upholding the principle to avoid feeling guilty about failing to live up to one's principle," which is egoistic, compared to (a) which is neither egoistic nor altruistic.29
At any rate, one cannot help but admire and appreciate the subtlety with which
Batson explores these "conceptual briar patches and tangled thickets of data and alternative explanations. "30 Having recast altruism and egoism as motivational states with the ultimate goal of increasing either another's or one's own welfare as an end in itself and not as a means to some other goal, Batson is able to determine the existence of altruism by discerning between the strong and the weak forms of psychological egoism/hedonism, i.e. whether benefit to another is always an instrumental means to ones own ends, or whether it is sometimes the ultimate goal from which any self-benefits flow by unintended consequence.31 The crucial difference in these motivations then is, whose interests are the ultimate goal ?32
Discerning which is in fact the ultimate goal is puzzling, Batson admits, but this is
no reason to surrender prematurely, for not only can we ascertain people's ultimate goals but that we do it all the time.33 We draw reasonable inferences about other's motives and intentions from their behavior over varying conditions. The specific purpose of such a study as Batson and Shaw's is to vary the conditions in such a way as to "disentangle the relationship between potential ultimate goals. "34 Since "the behavior should always be directed toward the ultimate goal...these two steps provide an empirical basis for inferring the nature of a person's motivation. "35
There are two steps necessary to infer the nature of a person's motivation from his or her behavior, according to Batson; they are, firstly, by a conceptual analysis of the various potential alternative goals. Batson accomplishes this by a three-path model which includes two egoistic routes (reinforcement and arousal reduction) and one altruistic one- "the most commonly suggested source" being empathic emotion, which begins with perception of need, and leads to adopting the other's perspective, which evokes altruisticmotivation, not helping behavior36 and which can be induced by instruction, including self instruction, and may also be the result of prior similar experience and/or attachment.37 And secondly, by systematic observation of the person's behavior, which is accomplished here by sketching the logic and results of some 20 experiments that have been conducted during the past decade to test one or more possible egoistic goals, including aversive-arousal reduction and empathy-specific punishment, both socially and self-administered, as well as empathy-specific reward, another major egoistic alternative to the empathy-altruism hypothesis, and it variations, empathic-joy and negative-state relief.38
The strong form of the empathy-altruism hypothesis, asserted here, "postulates not only that empathic emotion evokes altruistic motivation, but also that all motivation to help evoked by empathy is altruistic, and the weaker form, not asserted here, is that "empathic emotion evokes both egoistic and altruistic motivation. "39 Remembering that to determine the existence of altruism we must determine whether benefit to the other is ever the ultimate goal from which any self-benefits flow serendipidously, or whether it is always merely an instrumental means to the ultimate end of self-benefit,40 we can see why this is an objective which the weak form of the empathy-altruism hypothesis will not help us reach.
It may seem that Batson jumps to a conclusion regarding the relationship between
altruism and empathy in his article with Shaw. However, he explains in his response to
commentaries, that "empathy has been the most frequently mentioned source of altruistic motivation since antiquity. "41 The term empathy was "coined by Titchener in 1909 to translate the German Einfuhlung, which was used to Lipps in a perceptual context to refer to the process of intuiting one's way into an object or event to 'see' it from the inside (see Wispe, 1968, 1986, 1987.n42 "It was llanled as a source--if not the source--of altruism by Thomas Aquinas, David Hume, Adam Smith, Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, and William McDougall.
Adam Smith gave a good account of empathy when he said that:
"I consider what I should suffer if I was really you, and I not only change circumstances with you, but I change persons and characters. My grief, therefore, is entirely upon your account, and not in the least upon my own."44
This account shows how empathy:
"involves more than simply focusing attention on the other. One may focus attention on another's need but maintain a relatively objective perspective, dispassionately observing the other's plight. In contrast, adopting the other's perspective involves imagining how that person is affected by his or her situation (Stotland, 1969).,.45
Batson notes in his response to commentaries that "we view perspective taking as imagining how the other person is affected by his or her situation, not how I would be affected by that situation. "46 Batson thus uses empathy in a way that "is distinct from personal distress evoked by perceiving someone in need, but it is indistinguishable from what many philosophers and early psychologists called sympathy (Smith, Darwin, Spencer, James), compassion (Hume, Smith) pity (Aquinas, Hume, Smith), or tenderness (McDougall). ,.47
Results of empirical tests are summarized which provide strong support for the empathy-altruism hypothesis. In answer to his question "whether anyone ever, in any degree, transcends the bounds of self-benefit and helps out of genuine concern for the welfare of another. ..whether altruism is part of human nature,"48 Batson concludes that, "the evidence to date provides surprisingly strong support for the hypothesis that empathic emotion evokes altruistic motivation. "49 "Improbable as it may seem, the empathy-altruism hypothesis appears to be true. It seems that we are capable of caring for the welfare of persons for whom we feel empathy for their sakes and not simply for our own. "5° In his manuscript, Batson provides quite convincing evidence that altruism, born of empathy, does exist--altruism which need not involve self-sacrifice, and may even involve self benefit as a secondary effect.5 1 As he notes, some self-benefits for helping actually increase as the costs increase, specifically because the costs are so great.52
Thus, as long as sometimes, under some circumstances, at least some people will act toward others as ends in themselves, egoism cannot account for all of human behavior. He concludes that "If altruism as defined here exists, then the widespread assumption that the ultimate goal of all human action is some more or less subtle form of self-benefit must be rejected. ,.53 "[I]f...individuals act, at least in part, with an ultimate goal of increasing the welfare of another, then the assumption of universal egoism must be replaced by a more complex view of prosocial motivation that allows for altruism as well as egoism. "54 Then there is also room here for prosocial motives that are not either altruistic or egoistic, such as Kant's categorical imperative or Kohlberg's principle of justice.55 As Jane Mansbridge points out in her book, Beyond Self-Interest, "when people think about what they want, they think about more than just their narrow self-interest... they often give great weight both to their moral principles and to the interests of others. "56 "In fact," Mansbridge says, "evidence indicates that...people often take account of both other individuals interests and the common good when they decide what constitutes a 'benefit' that they want to maximize, "57 including "long-run self interest, commitment to principle, and genuine we-feeling. "58 These all may be, in fact, in the best interest of the actor, but this fact alone does not qualify the motivation behind them to be egoistic in the narrow sense, as we have come to think of our drives to be. Such benefits may simply indicate what Socrates long ago argued to be the case, that our truest personal interest lies in interpersonal justice, which is nothing if not a proper balance between self and others.
Conclusion: Regarding parsimony, Batson holds the position that:
"Prior to the evidence for the empathy-altruism hypothesis ...parsimony clearly favors an exclusively egoistic explanation. "59 "Advocates of universal egoism have elegance and parsimony on their side in this debate [because] it is far simpler to explain all human behavior in terms of self benefit than it is to postulate a motivational pluralism that allows both self benefit and another's benefit to serve as ultimate goals. "6°
However, "If...the empirical tests of the empathy-altruism hypothesis lead us to conclude the empathic emotion evokes altruistic motivation ...then the situation is changed. Parsimony becomes irrelevant. There is no longer any logical reason to favor an egoistic interpretation of those cases in which the motivation might be egoistic, altruistic, both, or neither. Prudence no longer gives egoism exclusive credit for the large area of overlap of the two explanations."61 "This more complex view of prosocial motives lacks the tidy parsimony of a view that assumes all motivation is egoistic."
He takes this attribution of pluralism from August Compte, who considered egoism and altruism to be "two distinct motives within the individual. "62 However, to pick up on earlier speculation regarding the nature of self, it seems fair to question whether parsimony would not actually be retained by a conception of self as a system, a conception which follows from Batson's evidence, if not from his definitions. Seen this way, from a self-as system perspective, in which an equilibration between one's real and one's ideal self, between one's actual and one's potential, it doesn't look like dualism at all, but monism--in that a system is one whole, single, if complex thing.
Egoism is not more parsimonious than this dynamic conception. I think Batson
actually gives evidence for a more parsimonious explanation for human behavior than egoism has ever been, for parsimony cannot mean oversimplification of the phenomenon by reduction to only certain aspects of it. It must rather mean a single simple explanation for a range of complex behaviors. Viewing self as a dynamic but united system of logical interactions between organisms and their environments provides as simple an explanation as could possibly be hoped for to account for the complexity of human motivation and behavior.
Batson points out that "Sober expresses concern about our willingness to speak of
'the' ultimate goal of helping evoked by empathy," suggesting that it is "inconsistent with our proposal of pluralism of prosocial motives. "63 Batson response is that "The empathy altruism hypothesis does not assume that the motivation evoked by empathy is the only motive an empathically aroused person is experiencing. As the three-path model...suggests, the conditions that evoke empathy-induced altruistic motivation are likely also to evoke a range of egoistic motives. "64
However, we needn't talk about plurality of motives at all in order to understand
altruism; we need only change the way we talk about the self itself. The person whose
motivation falls within the weak form of psychological hedonism/egoism behaves in ways that are good for both self and others, and so does not necessarily have two opposing ends, but has a single broad goal of well-being. If 'self-concept' is reconsidered in deeper and broader terms, in which self is seen as a system, it is shown to be a single cognitive framework into which both self and other, egoism and altruism, fit--which seems to rival egoism in it parsimonious character. It is as simple in hypothesis, to be sure, and yet it is far more complex in its manifestations. Not dualistic in nature, but an interactive whole.
Thus, we need not "turn our back on the Eden of simplicity provided by the
monism of universal egoism "65 in order to accommodate Batson's findings.
We can do what we will with this proof that altruism is potential, and one wise thing we might do is to recognize that it is as rich in prescription, as in description. Altruism is not only among our choices but, by this evidence, it is a wise choice, meaning, in the best interest, not just of self, but of the ail of whom self is a part.
As Batson notes, "If altruistic motivation exists, then we need to know it, even though this knowledge may play havoc with our assumptions about human motivation and,
indeed, about human nature." 66 Perhaps we would see that it is a mistake to attempt to reduce us all to the same agent, as if we ail have the same motivations, simply because we all have the same potentials to choose from. "We" are, in fact, many individual agents; and, what's more, we even change from time to time. It is futile to ask what people always do when in fact people don't always do anything. The complexity of human motivation and the multitude of our motivational choices makes most questions about so-called 'human nature' relatively meaningless to ask and impossible to answer, at least if we are talking about all as if they are the same. We choose from among many complex potential behaviors on the basis of our understanding of 'the good' as an end which our actions are the means towards. And, importantly, different people make different choices. We are similarly goal-directed and share the universal goals of survival and well-being as our purposes, and we do function more or less properly toward defining our being well and achieving those ends. The problem with human motivation is not that we have this 'nature' which provokes us to be greedy and selfish, it is that too often we simply don't understand what is actually good for us, and choose to act toward our best immediate, rather than our best ultimate good. Immediate good may be compatible with other's expense, but ultimate good, iterated experiences proves, is not.67 Which is to say, our interests are proved to depend upon both the good of self and of others, seen clearly, it can be shown that, in wholistic terms, i.e. in terms of self-knowledge, there is no such thing as profit at someone else's expense. What comes of this intention is anything but 'good,' and it is only confused with good by a misunderstanding of the meaning of the term.
This shift "requires considerable rethinking of our underlying assumptions about
human nature and human potentiaJ,"68 for, in the words of Adam Smith, "there are evidently some principles in [our] nature, which interest [us] in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to [us]."69 The possibility that a "genuine concern for another's welfare is within the human repertoire" has been ignored, he says, and this "valuable untapped natural resource" could cause us "to rethink what it means to be human. "70 He concludes that, "If we are capable of altruism, then virtually ail of our current ideas about individual psychology, social relations, economics, and politics are, in an important respect, wrong. "71 And what's more, they are wrong in a way that has a self fulfilling prophesy effect.72
This is important to remember because, while we are not responsible for what we cannot change (which is to say that, "If we are capable of seeking only our own benefit,
then we can hardly be blamed for doing so"73) we are responsible for what we can change (which is to say that, "If, on the other hand, it turns out that we are capable of altruism, then our moral horizon--and our potential for moral responsibility--broadens considerably"74) most especially to our own potential self. This is why we might choose altruism--not as a moral imperative, but as an opportunity; not from duty, but from inclination. As Batson points out, rather than a source of obligation, this seems a cause for celebration.? 5
"If our belief in universal egoism is wrong and we are actually capable of altruism, then possibilities arise for the development of more caring individuals and a more compassionate, humane society. And in a world so full of fear, insensitivity, suffering, and loneliness, such developments are sorely needed. "76
What's more, Batson quotes another study which concluded that, "There is considerable evidence of various kinds to suggest that doing good may indeed by good for you. "77 One study suggests that the antidote to such life-threatening ailments as heart disease "is the development of a trusting heart. "78 The fact is, it is very easy to be good to others when we understand how bad it is for us to be anything but. And once we learn the lesson, it no longer matters why, whether because its good for us to be good to others or simply that it is bad for us to be anything else, these are the same idea from different points of view. Once we break free of our zero-sum assumptions about what is good, (which are not necessarily materialistic, but simply assumes some quantity of good which one looses if the other gains) then the traditional dichotomy between self vs. other breaks down. Material goods do seem to require some either/or division, meaning, either I get this or you get it, and these zero sum conditions are very restricting. But, learning that these win/lose assumptions are conditions that obtain where they are assumed, that is, self-fulfilling prophesy, we can think again. They are also conditions that can be transcended by wholistic, meaning deeper and broader, considerations of what else, besides the tangible extrinsic rewards and punishments for which we have learned to strive, is lost and gained in the exchange.
The understanding which guides that steering mechanism which brings human
beings to choose certain motivations from among the logical potentials that are all part of so-called human nature might be considerably advanced were the human sciences as dedicated to comprehending the self as a choosing system, with egoism as one potential among many moral options, as it has been dedicated to proving and disproving the truth of universal motivation. Therefore, for my part, at any rate, the question is, What does an individual self have to learnfrom the lessons of egoistic and altruistic dynamics about what actually is and is not in his or her best interest? and, How do we ameliorate our social conditions by the lessons of this research?
The answer to the question asked by Batson, Is altruism potential in human behavior? is that all options are still and always our potential, and the fact of moral
autonomy is that, whether we actually behave one way or the other, altruistically or egoistically, is a matter of choice--choice within the constraints of context, it's true--but a choice, nonetheless. In that different choices have different effects, different karmic consequences, if you will, or call it, different fitness values, we still have much to learn about why we might choose one over the other. Which is to say, What is actually good for us?