On Learning & Unlearning Selfishness Perhaps one sees the effects of selfishness best when on the receiving end of it. From the delivering end, it sometimes seems necessary…defensive. What choice do we have, we might ask, when others take at our expense, but to take back whenever possible, or at least refrain from giving?
Without a dialectic tendency to look from both sides, we scarcely notice that this defense is perceived as offense from the receiving end, just as was the action that provoked our defensive reaction. Self-protection easily becomes other-defection in this way, and actually provokes more of just what we’re trying to overcome.
Such is the slippery slope between self-interest and selfishness – which are not, contrary to some popular beliefs, the same thing – though there is only a fine line between them, and one that is easy to miss. For there is no wrong in doing what is good for us, since what is truly good for us will also be good for others, as the ancients unanimously agreed. But being willing to actually harm others for what we perceive to be our good, not only is wrong (since it isn’t what we would, given the choice, have other do to us), but it is actually not even good for us, since it backfires against us by provoking the other’s defense, which from our view will be received as offense. For this reason alone, true self-interest will not serve us at other’s expense.
And so selfishness begets selfishness – even long before we learn the Christian conception of ‘original sin’ and the ‘economic man’ theory of Capitalism that rationalizes it. The former is (arguably) a misreading of Jesus’ teaching that seemed to serve the Roman Empire better than what he actually taught, and the latter is (arguably) a misreading of Adam Smith’s teachings that has seemed to served the American empire better than what he actually taught. For teaching that no true goodness is possible in this world, and that sin and deception is our nature, ward off much criticism of corrupted leaders, and deferred those who would have leadership be just to the next life or the ‘second coming,’ their only hope. Likewise, the ‘economic man’ theory suggests we might put this natural selfishness to good use to generate a material economy as if by ‘invisible hand’ (or as one astute student put it, by ‘invisible elbow”).
We might want to blame Philosophers themselves for these misunderstandings and the game of telephone that passes these misconceptions through time without justification (that is, a reasoned case for their justice), for so many have written so much more than most people have time or inclination to read. But we can hardly blame well-meaning philosophers who tried their best to teach what we choose not to read and think for ourselves. For if we did, we would hear Jesus teaching us precisely the opposite of selfishness, rather, to “Love thy neighbor as thyself.” Likewise, we would hear Adam Smith, a moral philosopher, teaching an enlightened form of self-interest, one that would not rationalize greed as good and selfishness as an excuse to treat our interest as opposed to others.
We might also object that not all misunderstand or misconstrue these teachings deliberately, for most of us are simply miseducated, often by well-meaning teachers who themselves took the word of their own well-meaning teachers for these interpretations of Christian and Capitalist theory. To which Buddha, Socrates, Jesus and many others would ask – why do we take other’s word for what is real, true, good, and right? Rather than reading, thinking and reasoning for yourself? Believing and trusting in the word of others without thinking these things through is frankly, just lazy, and fails to use the divine gifts we have been given. There was a time, admittedly, when people were put to death for so much as questioning the authority of those who had usurped Jesus’ message, but this is no longer the case, at least in our part of the world. And admittedly, during that time, history was rewritten by the winners, who had every incentive to present truth good as evil, and true evil as good. But while no one but monks in high towers could access these ancient texts then, what excuse have we got in an age when the original voices of so many of the ancient sages are available at our fingertips? Wolves in sheep’s clothing have long won trust by deceit so to have the power to pounce on those who speak truth to power. And for centuries, any and all who dared think for themselves and teach others to do the same were simply put to death, not unlike Jesus, Socrates, and so many others who questioned the official gods of their respective states. All written evidence of ancient wisdom they could get their hands on was destroyed, along with those who dared to seek the truth of the message of Jesus and many other ancient sages. And even the most courageous free thinkers could not access the original wisdom texts. But, fortunately for us, they couldn’t get their hands on all of it, and much is within our reach now that generations past would have given their lives for. Indeed, not only is it available to those who seek, but at our very fingertips with a click, and searchable, no less. So what is our excuse for simply believing what might be understood?
Philo (friends of or searchers for) Sophia (wisdom or truth) had this and many other things in common, but little would we know it, or anything else the ancients taught, given the game of telephone by which there teachings have been passed through time. But passive ignorance of history (which might have been justified when death was the penalty for learning) can no longer be the excuse, at least in an age when so much is so readily available to us. And so many more ancient texts having been found in recent years only makes our willingness to follow others interpretations more deplorable. Given that the verb root of the noun ‘ignorance’ is ‘to ignore’ – there can be no excuse in a good heart for settling for secondary sources, when the original sources are literally at our fingertips. To think…what so many would have given?
Contemplate this, and you may come to see why the ancients considered active ignorance to be the only true source of sin. Not our nature, and not our selfish soul – but our blind belief that let us simply follow fools with ulterior motives wherever they lead. It is lazy learning that lets us be miseducated, b/c we’ve settled for taking others word for what Jesus and other philosopher’s taught, lived, and often died, that we might learn. Miseducation by way of well-meaning but themselves misguided teachers may breed passibe ignorance in our youth, but only active ignorance lets us stay that way in our maturity, especially in a world that makes learning so easy!
So, as Buddha said, “Be lamps onto yourselves.” And you will discover why he added, “There is a path to the end of suffering. Tread it!” For it is our selfishness that is the cause of our suffering. Good reason to unlearn the (both passive and active) lies by which we have been content to live.
Adam Smith, another misquoted seeker of truth, was a moral philosopher who tried to teach us how to actualize our true good (not merely what we want) in interdependent communities where our self-interest could be manifest as good for all. Translated for us by profit mongers (who themselves didn’t bother to read well enough to understand, but only to find what they wanted to hear) have given us a false sense of his message, and letting them think for us has robbed us, not only of a form of capitalism that might have been better for us – one in which our own good as inextricably intertwined with the good of others – but also robbed us of the joy of finding that work we might enjoy so much that we would actually do for free (though needn’t, in a world where trade is fair.) Who wouldn’t prefer a world in which giving of ourselves – our work – what is actually good for others would bring what is good for us back around in turn.
We might wonder how many other great thoughts have been misconstrued in this way. For instance, how might the world be different if we’d understood that Karl Marx was arguing only for the quality of our work-time, that we might find work that we love, rather than merely selling our time for others profit? And what if the Newtonian-Cartesian world view had not been twisted into the materialization of our good, and the mechanization of power and change? How much less selfish would we be if we’d learned from ancient eastern and western philosophy how the concepts of karma and justice really work?
What kind of people would we be if these misunderstandings had not been so prevalent in our education? What kind of people might we yet be if we would rethink the errors of our own learning, and help our young to not learn them to begin with?
Education that makes the most of the original sources of humanities greatest thoughts would (arguably) prevent the kind of selfishness which these days plagues the world. The voices of the great souls who learned and taught of their own good, that we might better learn and teach our young of theirs. For learned selfishness is both self and other destructive, and a belief that it is our nature is as much self-fulfilling prophesy, as would be a better understanding of our potential goodness, from which our true happiness grows. This choice we make is the source of good and/or evil, passively or actively, in our lives and in our world. And it is one purpose of this book, and true philosophy throughout time, to help us see and understand the divine potentials we too often neglect.
Aristotle said of Plato, who said of Socrates, who said of many others from whom he learned, “To be good is to be happy.” But you needn’t and shouldn’t take anyone’s word for this, when the processes by which this happens might be so easily understood first hand (hence, the challenges I presented in my introductory thoughts). It’s the purpose of this chapter to show how all this works, and the value of learning it for any human life.
For there are well reasoned teachings (for which many of the great souls paid with their lives) that can help us ‘see’ how we create both good and evil in the world around us by way of our true power and true self-interest, or the lack thereof. The power that love gives us to bring out the good in others is (arguably) the source of our very divinity…just as the power of our selfishness to bring out the worst in others is the source of so much evil. Either way, we reap what we sew. So it’s in our true interest to learn to actualize the former, and overcome the habits of the latter, and to help others overcome theirs as well.
On The Evolution of Cooperation and Competition
Robert Axelrod adds to this discussion then in his study of the prisoner’s dilemma, illuminating the power of these ancient ideas to help us heal our relationships with one another, as well as our relationship with nature. His book is entitled The Evolution of Cooperation, and as a political scientist and game theorist, Axelrod’s study provides an excellent examination of the logic and philosophical implications of what game theorists call the prisoner’s dilemma. I provide an exegesis of it here to emphasize a theme that is crucial to an understanding of the practical value of philosophy, and the importance of fairness for the growth of healthy relationships and human happiness in general. In the process, it shows the feedback dynamics by which a bad idea can plant the seed of destruction, not only in a life, but in an entire culture.
Axelrod’s study begins as “an investigation of individuals who pursue their own self-interest without the aid of a central authority to force them to cooperate with each other.”(p.6) In other words, those who are free to do otherwise, so will only cooperate if they choose to.
Because self-interest, as we commonly understand it, is assumed to put one in competition with others, the typical tendency is to take when perhaps we should rather give, or sometimes to give when that too is unwise. The fact is, with little experience in the matter, most of us aren’t very astute when it comes to telling the difference in what is wise and when. And what too often happens, after a few good-hearted attempts to give to takers, our tendency is too often to retreat into a strictly defensive policy of always taking, which seems to guarantee we will never be burned again. But is this really in our true interest?
Given so many such confusing incentives in our development, including a widespread belief in ‘original sin’ or ‘fallen man,’ as well as much incentive to adopt the ‘economic man’ concept of self-interest, from which the good for all will supposedly emerge, as if by ‘invisible hand,’ many of us have had little encouragement to rethink how it is that we ourselves may be planting the seeds of our own unhealthy relationships by way of these attitudes. We see a growing tendency toward competition in our world, without the necessary balance that a better understanding of cooperation would provide. And in the process, we face the challenge to both understand, and teach, the practical reason for treating others fairly – which may mean sometimes cooperating, and sometimes competing.
“The most famous answer was given over three hundred years ago by Thomas Hobbes. It was pessimistic.”(p.4) Indeed, Hobbes “argued that before governments existed, the state of nature was dominated by the problem of selfish individuals who competed on such ruthless terms that life was ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’ (Hobbes 1651/1962, p. 100). So Hobbes assumption was that people would not cooperate out of self-interest in the state of nature. In his view, cooperation could not develop without a central authority, and consequently a strong government was necessary. Ever since, arguments about the proper scope of government have often focused on whether one could, or could not, expect cooperation to emerge in a particular domain if there were not an authority to police the situation.”(p.4)
Arguably, it’s possible Hobbes didn’t actually say this (an issue to which we will return), but what he did do was what all too many philosophers do, he wrote too much! His book, Levaithan, was * pages long! With the result is that people tend not to bother reading it, but either took someone else’s word for what was written therein (making room for the game of telephone effect), or read only enough to allow them to jump to conclusions. And the thing is, what Hobbes did say would be of much more help to those who truly want to understand so-called ‘human nature.’
What Hobbes argued…*
Peter Kropotkin…*
George Herbert Mead recognized, as did Piaget, that individuals are restrained and constrained by both the natural and the social environment, forces which overpower us in many respects in the hierarchical scheme of relative powers. But he also noted that we ourselves exercise a power over those to whom we are environment. This relationship makes self-control over one's growth and development the right and responsibility of the human organism itself -- as is the growth and development of that over which we have power, and thus, responsibility.
B. F. Skinner was quite clear about the determining relationship between the environment and the individual, but he failed to note that we are each other's environments. Thus, as Mead argued, we are not socially determined, as he wanted to conclude, but interactive within the forces that surround us. Skinner conveniently ignored that the world around us consists of other people making choices with regard to one another and us, and therefore that we are conditioned by each other, making our relationships subject to feedback dynamics. In as much as others react to our choices and actions, we are conditioned by the reciprocal effects of our own behavior – which is a process highly conducive to reform, for it is not unidirectional, as if influence flows only one way, but interactive, which allows us to change our environment rather than merely to be changed by it.
This dynamics of interactive power were better understood in ancient times than they tend to be today, and would certainly need to be understood better, if we would hope to improve our relationships, let alone the human condition. For we can be – and in fact, are, whether we want to be or not – an influence over others, just as they are over us. And just as we are subject to conditioning forces that others set into motion, we are therefore subject to the consequences of our own actions toward those others. Which is to say that, by yesterday’s actions we chose our environments of today, and likewise, by our actions today, we choose the environment we will live in tomorrow. The same ancient idea the Vedic Hindus called karma.
Thanks in part to Skinner's behavioristic legacy, we are in the habit of thinking in terms of big environment and little people, conveniently forgetting that we are environment to those who are dependent upon us, just as they are environment to us. The natural responsibility that comes with this power can be both frightening and challenging. While we may be influenced and even controlled by our environment, we are not altogether determined by it, because we have influence over those in our environment who in turn have influence over us, and we often get back what we give. Our choices of actions and reactions, little as they seem to change our own environment, have powerful consequences as they come to affect the environments of others, which often comes back to us. In effect, we are parent to more than just our own immediate offspring. And in this, we are responsible for the difference we make.
Skinner claimed that the fact that we "feel free" is what disguises control of our operant conditioning. By control of our sense of value, institutions effectively control our behavior, allowing us to feel free when we are choosing between options, that are nonetheless chosen for us --which is certainly true to a point, but not the last word. If certain values and thus the behaviors which follow from them are positively reinforced by various persuasive methods of social conditioning, then so much talk of our freedom is just that, mere talk, rhetoric, designed to deter us from looking too close at the ways that our 'freedom' is co-opted and our behavior coerced. Such that ours is not a free system, but a system of psychological coercion, one that distorts our knowledge, values, and power -- such that in our insecurity we come to "believe" and to trust the false values of those who perpetuate their own power at our expense while claiming to have our best interest at heart. Institutions that purport to guide, direct, and council, but actually "manage" while seeing to their own survival as organisms in their own right. And yet, there is a sense in which our choice remains free, but not true freedom, as long as the artificial value system that guides it, if we can see through the blinding constraints of the materialism we are sold. By simply recognizing this dynamic of coerced behavior through persuasion of value, we begin to undermine its effectiveness.
As we shall see, by the mechanisms revealed in consideration of the Prisoners Dilemma, this force that exploits and prevents our effective "counter-control", actually originates within us. By intelligent exercise of the free-will, which is still and always our potential, we retain the power to choose alternate values. We certainly do have free-will, we simply don't always remember how to use it to our advantage once we have bought into narrowly self-interested values that can ultimately defeat us. It boils down to the fact that, these days, we just don't know our own best-interest. This ignorance, or more accurately, this act of ignoring true value is what cripples our choice.
As Socrates said, “Everybody wants what's good for them, but not every body knows what that is.”
It seems to me that we can reason both empirically and a priori about what is universally good for us, in the broadest possible sense, such as that "objective good" to which Plato and Nagel refer.(p. 127, The Possibility of Altruism, by Thomas Nagel, in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo) Toward this, the PD model is prescriptive. By assuming an initial natural equality among humans (if only an equality of right to fair consideration in decisions by which they are affected, as in the method of deep ecology), and asking What does well-being mean? Or what is good for us? (in much the way that John Rawls does), we quite reasonably come up with something very much like his and other's conclusion of satisfied need compatible with the like need in others. If we still want to talk about desires, we might want to ask about why we have the particular desires that we do, why we sometimes desire what is not good for us, and why we often don't desire what is good for us? These are interesting questions, and they get at the important subject of social conditioning and assumed rationality.
Taking seriously the levels of moral reasoning postulated by theorists from Plato to Kohlberg could contribute significantly to our understanding of the conditioned will in its adaptations, which is more or less reflective as it sees fit, and egoistic when it deems necessary. The dynamics of these motivating reasons have the potential to clear up many a debate over semantics, including that which revolves around the meaning of "rationality," I think, as what we mean when we say this or that about self and ego is going to depend critically on the level of reasoning about which we are talking and how well we understand the assumptions underlying those reasons, which are the actual causes behind actions, and can be talked about in quite universal terms. Understanding the honest motivations that follow from certain needs and assumed values, e.g. pleasure/pain, social approval, or principle of justice and equality, would seem more fruitful and comprehensive than a complex system of preferences between desires and pleasures.
My thesis involves reasoning out which from among our choices are more or less enlightened in certain common survival challenges. We have assumed a form of "rationality" which turns out to be practically irrational, modern paradoxes call into question, and toward resolution of these conflicts of interest we face, replication of the lessons of these paradoxes is toward intelligent evolution.
Pleasure/pain psychology is certainly at work in our motivations, and as theorists from Plato, to Piaget, Kohlberg, and Rawls have elaborated, they are among the strongest of our motivations, if only because they answer to the most fundamental level of need, and are therefore governed more directly by physical laws; which is to say that they are reflexive, and in this, not easily overridden by reflection at the psychological level. We almost can't help but respond to the positive reinforcement of pleasure and the negative reinforcement of pain in our environment; it is simply the self-preservative response. [psychological egoism]
However, we do not exist and behave merely on this level. Because of the continuum of our needs, which stretches from the physical to the psychological, we are not always reflexively reactive to external stimuli, but interactive with it. Which is to say, we are able to exercise our will by intelligent reflection on our choices, a force in the psychological realm of things beyond the physical laws of nature. If human beings come to understand and achieve moral self-control, it is by coming to terms with the limits of our justified rights of taking pleasure and of causing pain.
Hence Kohlberg's next level of moral reasoning, beyond pleasure/pain, which is rule-oriented "good boy/good girl" psychology. This form of reasoning involves a conception of self as nested within and causal toward society. Here, one exercises more reflection in choosing one's actions, reasoning more toward the good of the whole as good for self. Note though that while cooperative, in PD terms, this is not altruistic, since it is still self-interested, just shared interest.
As in Hobbes account that humans choose society for peace, his claim is really one about why people might come to play tit for tat, that is, to scratch the back of those who will reciprocate. While this shift toward the collective is certainly up the ladder of moral reason from pleasure/pain psychology, it is important to see that this reasoning is not, in fact, less self-interested, for in this case the good of society is for the sake of the good of self, only here in a slightly broader sense. One may be less reactive and more active in this self-directed choice (that is, more determined by one's own reflective choices rather than by reflex), but these choices still hold self's own good as the end toward which behavior aims. Following the rules and behaving properly because it is often beneficial to one self do so, or because it is uncomfortable to do otherwise, is still a fairly narrow form of reasoning about one's self-interest.
At yet another higher and broader level of moral reflection in Kohlberg's system, self sees beyond one's own pleasure and pain, beyond reputation among others which drives behavior at the lower and narrower level, even beyond one's own interest in peace and well-being, and comes to act on principle, according to an ideal conception of just response, toward good of the whole on which the individual depends, and so will come to identify with those groups on which he or she depends, which is as broadly as self can possibly identify, perhaps as the stoics held self to be a "citizen of the universe". Which is to say, even when the principle works against self's narrower interests. This reasoning is on the basis of a conception of self as occupying any and all positions in that society (as behind Rawls' "veil of ignorance") free of one's own narrow interests. Right for right's sake yields then a broader conception of self, and with it, a broader conception of one's interests. The choice of actions which follows from this highly reflective moral reasoning are those which conform to Kant's Categorical Imperative, the Christian golden rule, Gandhi's passive resistance, Taoist wu wei, the Stoic natural law, the Socratic dictum, and even the postulates of Zen Buddhism -- call it what you will.
On the surface these imperatives may seem anything but compatible, but (arguably) they differ in perspective and words only. On the level of such broad reasoning, they are all consistent with the same fundamental principle of justice, which is itself compatible with the law of nature that preserves the conservation of energy -- for the principle by which every action yields an equal and opposite reaction is as true on a psychological level as it is true on the level of the physical. Which perhaps accounts for one of the lessons Aristotle is said to have learned from Plato -- that the truest happiness comes from the most genuine goodness -- happiness being the reaction to the action of goodness, for goodness sake. [reference: Aristotle, from Leatch]
Here, Kant's distinction between the genuine and the egoistic altruist has meaning, because right-for-right's-sake has a fundamentally different reason than right-for-the-sake-of-social-approval, or right-for-the-sake-of-pleasure.[p.16, Milo] It is a difference which shows up clearly in the mature individual whenever these different motivations come into conflict, e.g. when social approval or pleasure and pain reinforce behavior which goes against what is objectively right; it is the choice made in this pinch -- familiar to many of us -- which is the critical choice as far as character is concerned. Whether a given individual is genuinely altruistic -- adhering to the principle even when doing so means self-sacrifice (as in the extreme cases of those martyrs who have given their lives for what it teaches to others, that is, "for our sins"), or only concerned about others when it is easy, useful or pleasurable, and thus are prone to turn against that broad interest whenever it is not socially reinforced or self-beneficial in some way -- seems an important distinction [though not a distinction that should be taken too far in its general application]. It at least makes a critical difference when push comes to shove, as they say; the difference in whether a person can really be trusted to treat others fairly or not, is the line between the egoist and the altruist. That a person gets some personal benefit from doing the right thing by others does not deem their altruism inauthentic; the question is whether they would or would not do it without this personal benefit. Therefore the real test is whether a person will do best by others even at expense to him or herself.
This approach comes at the concept of self in such a way as to render moot the question of the degree to which we are or ought to be egoistic. These questions don't come up in an interactive system of self, because they are explained by a conception of self as potentiality, adapted to given conditions of survival. If self is considered to be consciousness acting toward fit survival of the organism, and flexible in this adaptation as it comes to define survival on the continuum between the concrete self and the abstract other, then the degree to which people actually are or ought to be egoistic or altruistic is largely an effect of the environment in which individuals are required to survive, or at least of the beliefs about that environment and its threats that the individual holds and upon which strategies of survival are formed. Beliefs about what is 'natural', or at any rate, what is necessary to survive well, however accurate or erroneous, are the assumptions upon which reason is formed. And the relationship between them and the behavior that follows from them will take a conditional form --"if... then..."
Such a conception gives us reason to ask what conditions provoke what survival strategies, egoism or altruism, or combinations of these elements. The dynamics of these choices are deep and complex, and certainly worthy of our attention, but the question of which is more the inclination of human nature seems practically meaningless, as all it can really tell us is how humans have seen fit to adapt to conditions so far -- not how humans are inevitably. If we change the conditions of human development, it stands to reason that we will have changed human behavior -- but it is unlikely that by this we would have changed human nature, per se. Human nature is all potential; any particular adaptation is part reflex, and part choice. Seeing consciousness as the tool of survival that it is, with attention at center, with peripheral, future, and hindsight as well, shows self and its reaches to be as broad or narrow as an individual sees fit. (Footnote: Note that to say that human nature is all potential is not to say that all selves are potential for all people, for the interactive effect between the individual and the opportunities presented by the environment will reinforce, one way or another, the individuals intrinsic tendencies, encouraging or discouraging development in some directions more than others.) It is the universal nature of all conscious beings to survive as well as possible, making egoistic/altruistic choices a matter of the particular conditions of opportunity and limitations within the environment in which an organism is nested.
The dynamics of cause and effect in interactive human reasoning are very important, for what an individual consciousness believes about what is valuable and worth acting for will form the very foundations of that persons reasoning; the assumptions about what's important which underly one's motivations. Thus, it seems a potentially dangerous exercise to generalize about whether people are narrowly or broadly self-interested, as the conclusions of such generalized speculation tends to be causally efficacious – that is, beliefs become self-fulfilling prophesies.
On the other hand, with the help of the PD, we might meaningfully consider the conditions of different environments so to understand why different people come to believe and behave in different ways, as well as how these effects are iterated over time. By such self-analysis as this thought experiment involves, we might also recognize the true extent of the individuals part in the whole social dynamic, and thus the answer to the ubiquitous question, which too often these days receives a self-defeating answer, "What can one person do?" In every individual life, the answer to this question is "Everything!" for one lives, not within a purely and objectively selfish world, as the old psychology assumed, but within the part of the world that one literally creates around oneself, reactive to one's actions that it is. If we care what's good for us -- as every theory of human motivation holds that we do -- then what follows from this interactive reasoning should interest us very much.
Perhaps even Thomas Hobbes might have been convinced by it logic, both empirical and a priori, that the fine but critical distinction between the "will to hurt" and the "will to keep from being hurt," which he himself took account of but did not take seriously enough, is the line between "selfishness" and "self-preservation" -- morally, a very big difference. [Perhaps this also accounts for the difference between psychological and evolutionary egoism as well]. If we are going to keep asking ourselves and our students about the tendency toward "egoism" in "human nature," we ought to be clear on these different types of self-interest, on their different ends, different levels of justification, and different consequences. The wholesale reduction of all human behavior to narrow self-interest is a causal force in the further narrowing of that behavior, and prevents our understanding of the subtle dynamics involved in our own moral reasonings. The assumption that we are "guilty until proven innocent" with respect to our underlying motivations, simply assumed to be "sinners," robs us of our choice in the matter, necessitating our unconditional defection, thus violating the natural innocence of reason. Since narrowness is the natural, defensive, and just reaction to such an assumption that others themselves are narrowly self-interested, shouldn’t we assume the best about human nature, since that too can become a self-fulfilling prophesy?
Why does it matter in everyday situations whether behavior is, in fact, action or reaction? It matters because a reaction is justifiable in a way that action is sometimes not. In as much as self-preservation is the right and responsibility of every living organism, so reaction to environmental stimuli is the natural, necessary, and in an important sense fair response to the survival challenges of the world in which one lives. Reaction has its origin, that is, its locus of control, outside of the organism, and is thus, as Hobbes says, determined "by a certain impulsion of nature, no less than that whereby a stone moves downward." (p.22, Hobbes)
"[T]o have a care of one's self is so far from being a matter scornfully to be looked upon, that one has neither the power nor wish to have done otherwise. For every man is desirous of what is good for him, and shuns what is evil, but chiefly the chiefest of natural evils, which is death; and this he doth by a certain impulsion of nature, no less than that whereby a stone moves downward." (p.22, Hobbes) (For an elaboration of primary and secondary defection, see "Justice, Choice, and Interactive Responsibility," Juliana Hunt,1990.)
"It is therefore neither absurd nor reprehensible, neither against the dictates of true reason, for a man to use all his endeavors to preserve and defend his body and the members thereof from death and sorrows...justly, and with right."(p.22, Hobbes)
Action, on the other hand, involves more of choice and discrimination between alternative options of behavior, and is, in this sense, self-determined by one's internal locus of control.( Further distinction is drawn between thinking and unthinking responses, i.e. reflective and reflexive, [in Chapter 11] because, to the extent that human beings have reflective moral control, many reactions are in part action.)
The line between those actions which are toward one's own self-preservation and those which seek more than one's fair share, and thus provoke others to act in their own self-preservative interests, is the line beyond which (defensive) secondary defection becomes (offensive) primary defection. Seeing this distinction helps us talk about the difference between defense and offense, so important, but often ignored, in most discussions of human rationality. It is critical to see this because behaving toward one's own preservation is a right that is justified in a way that behaving toward more than one's fair share of goods or power is not. Between secondary and primary defection is a threshold beyond which one's safety is secured and thus one's rightful freedoms are limited. As Mill argues, my freedom ends where that of another begins – a threshold we scarcely seem to notice.
Clearly, there is a sharp moral difference between the reasoning of the actor and the reactor, for when one's actions threaten another, they create the very danger from which the other is compelled to self-protection; thus, the former provides the stimulus to the latter's response. This makes the actor/offender responsible for the actions that the reactor/defender must undertake as self-protection.
If we better understood the reasoning behind the dynamics of offense and defense, then perhaps we would not continue to blur them together into one motivation -- "the will to hurt" – which seems to allow a whole host of sins against fair shares to be committed in the name of self-preservation. What Nietzsche calls the “will to power” may well be a “will to justice” in many cases. In this less than honest state of activity, we seem to be able to rationalize any want as if it were a need, take any pleasure as if we are justified by the mere belief that it is good for us, as if freedom has no restraints.
Thomas Hobbes is commonly taken to have argued the claim that all human beings exhibit "the will to hurt." (quote in Hobbes, "the will to hurt", p. 21, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo) But as we shall see, the line between actions that are self-defensive and those which are actually offensive, between what we will here call primary /active and secondary /reactive defection (p.38, in The Implications of the PD for Social Science Theory), is a line Hobbes himself drew when he qualified his assertion with the following claim: "All men in the state of nature have a desire and will to hurt, but not proceeding from the same cause, neither equally to be condemned. "(p.21, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo)
This qualifier indicates that, despite Hobbes seeming pessimism about human motivation and the conclusions he drew about the limits of our potentials, there is more going on in the depths of his analysis than is taken into consideration in the conclusion with which history credits him.
In fact, Hobbes analysis of the reasons behind "the will to hurt" shows clearly that it is more than the mere "impulsion of nature" which causes this will, and thus, that it is not as necessary and inevitable as we have taken him to mean. Rather, because it is part action and part reaction which brings the aggression out in human beings, the deeper dynamics he observes in human behavior do not lead us directly to the conclusion that aggressive motivation is the nature of human beings.
Rather, it is both an assumption (p.18, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo) and a conclusion (p. 25, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo) in Hobbes that the law of nature is for humans to seek peace. It "is the dictate of right reason, that is, the law of nature...to seek peace, where there is any hope of obtaining it..."(p.25, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo )
"[I]t cannot be denied but that the natural state of men, before they entered into society, was a mere war, and that not simply, but a war of all men against all men. For what is WAR, but that same time in which the will of contesting by force is fully declared... The time remaining is termed PEACE."( p.24, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo)
The essence of Hobbes reasoning is that human beings choose to form societies for the sake of peace, that is, relief and resolution from and of the conflict that comes with open competition for goods. But the lopsided message we have taken from his philosophy has been upon the conflict inherent in the state of nature, rather than the important part, that is, the tendency of humans to choose away from conflict where they can, and opt instead for peace.
*
But again, it "is the dictate of right reason, that is, the law of nature...to seek peace, where there is any hopes of obtaining it..."( p.25, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo)
It does not take a great leap to see the form of egoism that Hobbes rationalizes – i.e. primary defection, which is to say the harm of others out of motivation other than self-defense -- is contrary to this law of nature, and in this, irrational.
While we have understood Hobbes to have claimed that conflict is inherent in the state of nature,
One important point of all this is that what is empirically evident depends in large part upon what one is looking for. If one looks for the best in human nature, it is there to be seen in vast abundance – it just is easier to overlook and take for granted. But the truth is that both and all potentials are part of the whole truth about human nature.
However, a philosophy which equates the state of nature with human conflict and society with peace, besides being a misreading of Hobbes deeper analysis, also ignores that society, as actualized empirically, often causes more conflict than it resolves, at least for another certain portion of its population. One who might be willing to affirm society as a good thing when it does resolve the conflict inherent to interdependent survival, could still deny any rationalization, such as Hobbes' seems to claim, which assumes society good across the board, even when it creates conflict where there might otherwise be peace. While, ideally, it might be true that the primary reason to opt into the social contract is to resolve the conflict intrinsic to our mutual need to survive, and certainly this is part of what society accomplishes for a certain portion of its population, but it's not all that human society accomplishes, in real terms, as it has actually evolved. Therefore, while humans may sometimes choose into the social contract to resolve the conflict intrinsic to the mutual need to survive, it could be argued that, by the very same law of nature which causes them to opt into society, human beings might find reason to opt out of it. It depends entirely upon whether society is causing a given choosing individual peace or conflict to begin with.
The perceived need to defend oneself seems to be, as Hobbes suggests in his blurry identification of these motives, the chief source of the perceived right to offend others. Rightful defense turns to unjustified offense whenever particular experiences with individuals lead to generalized attitudes about everyone in the groups and categories to which those individuals belong -- as in the case at hand, from learned distrust of proved egoists to an assumed distrust of human nature, in general.
And yet, despite the conflict created by this generalized attitude, what follows from Hobbes deeper analysis is that, not conflict, but conflict resolution is the ultimate motivation inherent in human nature. We can conclude this from the line of his reasoning, regardless of the conclusions he himself draws, or of the empirical fact that many do, in fact, antagonize the existence of others. Those who do seem to deliberately create conflict for others make it necessary for all to cope with them, in self defense. But there is a critical distinction to be made between those actions which are toward the resolution of conflict, toward survival and peace, and those which resolve only one’s own conflict while actually creating it for others. It may seem irrational that some would act away from peace, but as Socrates says, “Everyone wants what’s good for them, but not everyone knows what that is.” People make mistakes about what is good for them, as about what is toward peace. But it is a mistake, not a sin they commit, for no one errs willingly.
It is this distinction that Hobbes himself draws in his claim that some motivations are simply more justified than others: "not proceeding from the same cause, neither equally to be condemned."( p.21, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo) When presented with conflict, consciousness either resolves it, where it can, or reacts defensively toward it where it cannot do otherwise. This confusion about what conflict is and is not resolvable is the very source of the increasingly narrowed self-interest that passes for ‘human nature’. But it is not the nature of human beings to cause conflict, after all, but to resolve it if it is or seems possible to do so.
Hobbes' deeper analysis is that the nature of humans (indeed, of all conscious beings) is to cope with conflict toward peace, and not to create it where it can be avoided. Those conflicts which arise naturally in survival are certainly that state of nature with which humans must contend, but it is the adaptation, the coping, the problem solving toward peace which is the true and better aspect of our nature.
Unfortunately, the belief that such conflict is our very nature quickly becomes a cause in itself of that conflict, a self fulfilling prophesy, in that the potential for peace gets lost in our perceived need to react defensively, even where we need not.
Such a view of human nature as that which cannot distinguish between different forms of aggression amounts to believing that children are born bad, so we have to protect ourselves against them, manage them, teach them and punish them when the don’t learn. This is not only ridiculous reasoning, but quite destructive to every human child who feels its effects in the course of adapting to institutions which are formed on this assumption, including family, education, religion, economy, polity, and law. Failing to distinguish between the cause and the effect of narrow rationality, we often provoke our dependents to their defense by our own narrowness. And in this way, we bring out the worst in our children.
We can talk about the relationship between responsibility and dependence in human survival reasoning. Hobbes admits that "a son cannot be understood to be at any time in the state of nature, as being under the power and command of them to whom he owes his protection as soon as ever he is born, namely, either his father's or his mother's, or him that nourished him;"( p.23, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo) Thus, the behavior of dependents is shown to be a reaction to the actions of operants. Since we are all born so dependent, it follows that the state of any given child's nature is such as that child's caretakers make it. As children, we are reactive to parents and other caretakers, who are active. Surely, an innocent child is no threat to its caretakers, and yet, by way of the belief that they are bad, children find themselves in our world provoked to their own self-defense, secondarily defecting to the primary defections of responsible others. It can't reasonably be argued that the secure have a right to threaten the dependent for whom they are responsible. And yet, a philosophy which does not consider the feedback dynamics in interactive psychology draws no distinction between defensive and offensive egoism, between the dependent young and the responsible elders, between the reactors and the actors.
Here then is the cause of that conflict which Hobbes I think wrongly calls the state of nature; it is a state of social organization in which individuals are compelled to grow aggressive in order to adapt and survive. Secondary defection sees to the individual organisms needs. On the other hand, an action motivated by what might be termed greed, as opposed to need, is not that of the "natural evil" which Hobbes assumes to arise from the struggle to survive in the state of nature, but is rather a moral evil, a primary defection, which arises out of just such rationalized injustice as Hobbes accomplishes in his failure to make this critical distinction between the right to survive and the assumed right to more than fair shares beyond one's interests in survival and well-being.
Primary defection is, in fact, defection without justified reason. It is offense, which presumes to be justified under the need for defense, is not a reaction, as such, but an action, and has no such external cause, reason, or justification as a stone moving downhill; rather, it is impelled by an internal motivation away from justice, and toward rather than away from evil. As he says, death is a natural evil, "For every man is desirous of what is good for him, and shuns what is evil, but chiefly the chiefest of natural evils, which is death; and this he doth by a certain impulsion of nature, no less than that whereby a stone moves downward."( p.22, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo) and therefore, if follows that causing death, as hindering other's survival does, is causing evil.
Self-defense (secondary defection) on the other hand, is a reaction to such evil, and thus, is as natural as a stone moving downhill. Hobbes rightly claims that, "It is therefore neither absurd nor reprehensible, neither against the dictates of true reason, for a man to use all his endeavors to preserve and defend his body and the members thereof from death and sorrows...justly, and with right."( p.22, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo) But a person with offensive motivation (primary defection) is not acting in self-defense, according to "natural right," for the reason he acts is not "to preserve and defend his body and the members thereof from death and sorrows...justly, and with right," but to "pursue farther than their security requires." (Thomas Hobbes, "The Leviathon", in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, Vol. III, ed. W. Molesworth. In ILS 206 Course Materials, ed. C. Anderson, p.42, [check this quote])
The choice to offend, as opposed to a need to defend, is not the necessary "impulsion of nature" he claims, but is the intentional impulse of unprovoked and unjustified narrow self-interest. Offensive action (primary defection) shows its irrationality in Hobbes own claim -- that it "is the dictate of right reason, that is, the law of nature...to seek peace, where there is any hopes of obtaining it..."( p.25, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo)
It is those who threaten the survival of others who actually destroy peace, for those others and for themselves by provoking violent reactions to their actions. A greedy actor causes others to need to hurt him by secondary reaction, which cannot be considered in any way "good" for the primary actor, who is now threatened by his or her own just deserts -- that is, has promoted his or her own death. It follows that the primary defector is irrational, in that he or she is the cause of survival threats to others, and thus, in promoting other's death, is the cause of evil itself -- which is here "moral," not "natural" [read: determined by will, not inevitable according to the physical forces of nature alone].
Those who undertake such rationalized greed are behaving unreasonably, for when they "pursue farther than their security requires,"( Thomas Hobbes, "The Leviathon", in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, Vol. III, ed. W. Molesworth. In ILS 206 Course Materials, ed. C. Anderson, p.42, [check this quote]) they effectively bring an end to the security, peace, and innocence into which the dependent have a right to be born and which more rational others crave.
Nowhere is this selfishness more apparent or potent than in the relationships of caretakers and dependents, which include far more than simply parents and children. That some who are offensive (primary defectors) cause dependent others of more temperate will to be defensive (secondary defectors), is given even in Hobbes. And that the offensive actor is to be condemned more than the defensive reactor, who is more justified, is also held there. But it does not follow that "all men in the state of nature have a desire to hurt others." Self-defense is not equal to a will to hurt, but to prevent a hurt. It may take the form of violence, but the intention is to end a violence, not create one. In this, secondary defection is toward peace, not war; toward justice, not injustice. Therefore, not in the state of nature, but reactive to particular conditions, as often created as resolved by society.
Since self-aggrandizement is not equal to self-preservation, an offensive action is not done by "right reason" -- even if it may seem so to the unreflective actor. It only seems his right because he does not use right reason, and does not reason justly when judging his actions. Judging oneself and one's interests superior to those one offends can make actions seem necessary to self-protection (p.23, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo) but they are not in fact justified by one's right to self-preservation.
This state of the actors belief and knowledge are critical variables in the justification of defective action. Hobbes says that "[I]f any man pretend somewhat to tend necessarily to his preservation, which yet he himself doth not confidently believe so, he may offend against the laws of nature..." ( p.23, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo) Even Hobbes admits, one offends the laws of nature by one's active ignorance of fairness and pretense of superiority when primary offense pretends to be secondary defense.
"[T]here is no reason why any man, trusting to his own strength, should conceive himself made by nature above others. They are equals... All men therefore among themselves are by nature equal; the inequality we now discern, hath its spring from the civil law."( p.21, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo)
As we will see, And yet, Hobbes allows for wide violation of this, "[B]ecause whatsoever a man would, it therefore seems good to him because he wills it, and either it really doth, or at least seems to him to contribute towards his preservation..."( p.23, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo)
Only one who believes others will play fair can actually choose to cooperate, i.e. play fair, or defect, i.e. play selfish. In the opposite case, where one believes, rightly or wrongly, that others will play selfish, one has little choice but to play selfishly oneself in self-defense, or in PD terms, sacrifice survival by taking the sucker's payoff.
*
Suffice it to say, for now, that while egoism may be a familiar characteristic of human beings, especially these days and in our ‘western’ part of the world, it is far from universal, or the so-called 'human nature' we like to call it. In fact, this tendency to capitalize on the vulnerable is merely a bad habit, and a relatively new and still fairly localized tendency at that. In fact, it is not much older than the idea of capitalism that has evolved (or been corrupted) into what it has become in our age. It's true that it can seem to be almost 'human nature' when you grow up surrounded by so many who seem to be capitalistic at heart, but – like the statue of Glaucus to which Plato compares the human soul, having sunk into the deep long ago, the human soul has become so steeped in the effects of the sea that the accumulated crust makes it hard to see its true state.
In fact, if this were our inevitable nature, then we would not see the myriad exceptions that we actually do around the world and throughout history. Closer to the whole truth of the matter, not as many live as we capitalists do as might seem to those of us who were born into this sea of corruption.
For our purposes though, let’s take what Axelrod says about this as a given, since the result of our misunderstanding of Hobbes has become our actual reality. Add to this that Hobbes was beyond subtle in his style of writing -- and for understandable reasons, since he wrote in a age when the divine right of kings was still a fundamental assumption underlying politico-religious relations in what was then the entirety of the western world, his theorizing had powerful implications for the powers that be in his time, who had no qualms about putting people to death for challenging them. So, given the reality of what was sure to happen to anyone who questioned their authority, it was no surprise that Hobbes would make the overt case that “authority should be absolute,” just as they would want to hear. What has gone unnoticed, even in our own time, was Hobbes covert argument, written between the lines, which emphatically laid out the limits of absolute power (“only for protection and defense…and never if protection and defense is needed against them*), but also examined the fundamental human motivations at work, which did not follow the reasoning that was implied by his claims about the state of nature.
Rather than suggesting that human are naturally and narrowly self-interested, Hobbes logic makes the case that humans are motivated primarily by a desire for peace. (*…) And by this reasoning, it would follow that humans are not fundamentally greedy and egoistic, but rather, defensively so. That is, they tend to behave this way when they feel it necessary to be, when they perceive their well being to be challenged, and especially when they are confused about just what their well-being entails. It is unfortunate that in the state of nature as we know it, individuals are too often compelled to their own defense, and so were better off with the protection and defense of a central authority. But the result has been a widespread belief that people will not ‘naturally’ be good unless induced to by extrinsic incentives (such as others praise, or the promise of an afterlife) or forced to (by threat of punishment).
So the problem remains, the pursuit of ‘self-interest’, such as we have come to understand it, tends to lead to a rather poor outcome for all. So many become convinced that the only solution can be in the form of hard-handed authority, whether that be in parental discipline, educational methods, legal sanctions, or the assertion of the need for communal adherence to religious orthodoxy over an ever present faith in the power of individual spiritual growth.
So the question arises, how to “foster cooperation among individuals, organizations, and nations.”(p.ix), to see if “cooperation can emerge among egoists without central authority.”(p.viii) That is, can people learn the intrinsic benefits of treating one another with mutual respect without being forced to, and without the impetus of extrinsic motivators to do so? Can cooperation be “based solely on reciprocity,”(p.viii) such that individuals will treat one another fairly simply out of self-interest sufficiently enlightened that it values the intrinsic benefits of doing so?
This is not unlike the question that Plato’s older brother, Glaucon, asks Socrates to prove to them in Plato’s Republic. What is the intrinsic value of justice?
*…
The answer to this question emerges in the dynamics of the prisoner’s dilemma game, which illuminates what is common in such situations.(p.7) A prisoner’s dilemma occurs when two persons find themselves in a situation where one’s benefit is (or is perceived to be) the others loss. (In fact, these need not actually be zero-sum games, but it is the perception that they are that causes each to reason toward a narrow form of rationality, that is, self-interest narrowly conceived, which does not include the interests of the other in the outcome.)
“The original story,” which had puzzled game theorists and political scientists for decades, involves a scenario in which “two accomplices to a crime are arrested and questioned separately. Either can defect against the other by confessing and hoping for a lighter sentence. But if both confess, their confessions are not as valuable. On the other hand, if both cooperate with each other by refusing to confess, the district attorney can only convict them on a minor charge. Assuming that neither player has moral qualms about, or fear of, squealing, the payoffs can form a Prisoner’s Dilemma (Luce and Faiffa 1957, pp. 94-95) From society’s point of view, it is a good thing that the two accomplices have little likelihood of being caught in the same situation again soon, because that is precisely the reason why it is to each of their individual advantages to double-cross the other. As long as the interaction is not iterated, cooperation is very difficult…” It is “continuing interaction,” which makes the future as important than the present, which turns out to be “what makes it possible for cooperation based on reciprocity to be stable.”(p.125) But I get ahead of myself…
The situation as we understand it at the outset is a single instance prisoner’s dilemma, that is, an apparently zero-sum game, involving two players who face a win/lose scenario. Whereas the iterated prisoner’s dilemma is a non-zero-sum game, that can also result in a win/win outcome. This is the ‘economic man’ model of human behavior, what some call human nature, which feeds our sense that it is necessary to compete with others. “A better standard of comparison” than the model that pits us against others, Axelrod says, “is how well you are doing relative to how well someone else could be doing in your shoes.”(p.111) But that is not the model of human nature we internalize at a young age in our day and age.
For instance, it may very well be that mutual cooperation makes for mutual benefit (say, each gets 3 points if they cooperate with, rather than turns on their buddy), but if each assumes that the other will cooperate, than it also seems to make sense that one would individually benefit more by non-cooperation (say, one might get 4 points to the other’s 0 by defecting against a cooperator). So the temptation can be to defect against both cooperators and defectors so as not to end up on the butt end of a defector, and thus end up with the sucker’s payoff (0). However, the worry is that, if both defect, then both lose, and thus both end up with much less (say, 1/1) than they would have if they’d both cooperated (3/3). Still, this is more than the sucker’s payoff, at least, so not knowing what the other will do, the temptation is always to defect, since it seems to yield a higher payoff in either case than cooperation would, and this is especially true if one cannot trust the other to cooperate.
“So it pays to defect,” it seems, “if you think the other player will defect.”(p.9) But “The dilemma is that if both defect, both do worse than if both had cooperated.”(p.8) So there is some incentive to cooperate with those we think we can trust to cooperate themselves, which is how trust builds. However, there is also some incentive to create the mere appearance of trustworthiness, so to build trust that goes only one way, which makes the trusting cooperator vulnerable to becoming a sucker when taken advantage of by the “wolf in sheep’s clothing.”
This is a situation familiar in many interpersonal ‘dating’ relationships, where it is often the case that both fear being burned by the other, so to speak, so will ‘play it cool,’ that is, defect in order to get the other to give them love, without having to give as much or any in return. Too often, both hold back in this way, building mutual distrust, and thus both lose what might have been gained if both had given. Or, the most common outcome is when one risks giving, while the other sees and acts on the opportunity to take, and the sucker’s outcome becomes a painful memory for the giver, making it increasingly difficult for them to trust others in the future. “And this is certainly true on the last move since there is no future to influence.”(p.10) Which is what can make breakups especially ugly, and makes it even more difficult for a person to give (which requires trusting the other to give back) in one’s future relationship. Indeed, such memories can actually have butterfly effects in people lives, especially when the cause comes from a particularly potent source, such as a parent or sibling.
It turns out, as Axelrod shows by way of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game, that the expectation of an ongoing relationship is itself reason to cooperate, because the opposite, defecting, actually sets one up to be remembered as a taker, and so plants the seeds of distrust that are likely to cause one to be defected against on the next turn. In fact, “This ability to recognize and remember allows the history of the particular interaction to be taken into account by a player’s strategy.”(p.11) “What makes it possible for cooperation to emerge is that the players might meet again. This possibility means that the choices made today not only determine the outcome of this move, but can also influence the later choices of the [other] players. The future can therefore cast a shadow back upon the present and thereby affect the current strategic situation.”(p.12)
This is what Axelrod means when he says that ‘self-interest’ is “strategic rather than genetic.”(p.x, 19) And to prove which conception of self-interest actually is the best strategy, Axelrod invited scholars from around the globe to submit those strategies they thought would survive best when put into competition with all other available strategies – and we might be quite surprised to find that, according to Axelrod’s research, in all likelihood, “the meek shall inherit the earth.” But, again, I get ahead of myself…
…
So it is, Axelrod concludes, that “If you expect others to reciprocate your defections as well as your cooperation, you will be wise to avoid starting any trouble. Moreover, you will be wise to defect after someone else defects, showing that you will not be exploited. Thus you will be wise to use a strategy based on reciprocity. So will everyone else. In this manner the appreciation of the value of reciprocity becomes self-reinforcing. That is, it’s a positive feedback loop. Once it gets going, it feeds on itself in such a way that trust grows, and this can happen rather quickly if this dynamic can be appreciated by intelligent players.*
In fact, the assumption that others cannot be trusted, that human nature is narrowly self-interested, is an attitude conditioned in us by so many stimuli in our culture, will set up a tendency to create such feedback loops of mutual defection in one’s life, conditions from which escape is likely to be impossible – until and unless one learns that “To provide discomfort for the other is but a roundabout way of providing it for themselves (Sorley 1919, p.283).”(p.84)
“This continuation of the conflict is due to the echo effect: each side responds to the other’s last defection with a new defection of its own.”(p.186) And as it turns out, “both cooperation and defection [are] self-reinforcing” in this way.(p.85) This echo dynamic arises by way of feedback loops, which could use more explanation, since we seldom attend to them sufficiently in our world to be aware how it is that we plant the seeds of our future well-being and/or destruction by our own previous actions. “The empirical and theoretical [implications] of this book might help people see more clearly the opportunities for reciprocity latent in their world.”(p.189)
So it’s important to note that, for all the reasons mentioned so far, the tendency to distrust others, to believe they are always narrowly self interested, and therefore likely to ultimately betray us, can create a self-fulfilling prophesy effect, which is to say, it is likely to ultimately bring about the effect it initially assumes. Which is to say, “using the assumption that the other player will always make the move you fear most will lead you to expect that the other will never cooperate, which in turn will lead you to defect,” provoking the like need to defect in the other, ultimately causing a cycle of “unending punishment. So unlike chess, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma it is not safe [i.e. self-defeating] to assume that the other player is out to get you.”(p.15)
[footnote?] Axelrod adds (somewhat inexplicably) that “The foundation of cooperation is not really trust, but the durability of the relationship.”(p.182) “Mutual cooperation can be stable if the future is sufficiently important relative to the present.”(p.126) So while it’s true that, “Whether the players trust each other or not is less important in the long run than whether the conditions are ripe for them to build a stable pattern of cooperation with each other.”(p.182) All the same, trust is the result of this commitment to the future that reduces the incentive to defect.
Axelrod puts this into language understood best in international politics, but it applies equally well to interpersonal relationships. What is known as the security dilemma, by which “nations…seek their own security through means which challenge the security of others,”(p.4) conflict is escalates when one’s defection triggers retaliation, setting off patterns of mutual hostility where everyone feels the need to take more than their share before anyone else gets it. (In zero-sum situations, this can sometimes takes the form of what Garret Hardin called the “tragedy of the commons,” a dynamic in which security for all is threatened by one or a few actors consuming what Locke would call the ‘fair shares’ of others, again, setting off a feedback dynamic that triggers defensive reactions in others.)
Thus, what we call ‘individual rationality’, fundamental to the ‘economic man’ model on which we base our economy, has a way of actually poisoning our interpersonal interactions when we apply it to human relationships. It is based on a shallow and erroneous understanding of Adam Smith’s theory of capitalism, which holds that each person following their own ‘self-interest’ will, as if by ‘invisible hand,’ lead to the best outcome for all. Our conventional reading of his theory is an unfortunate one, since Adam Smith, being a moral philosopher, meant for us to understand ‘self-interest’ in a much more enlightened sense than we do. But Axelrod’s analysis can help us understand this sense better, because, not only is it not always the best move to do what seems to be in one’s best immediate interest, but in fact, “no best rule exists independent of the strategy used by the other player.”(p.14)
This means we must stay on our toes, which is a very important point. It makes clear that it is not wise to simply cooperate with everyone all the time, as many well-meaning philosophies might seem to imply. Nor is it wise to always take advantage, as others suggest, for this has dire consequences too. In fact, if the other is using a “strategy that leaves room for the development of mutual cooperation,”(p.15) then one’s best move is to cooperate, for such a person is likely to reciprocate. However, if the other is using a strategy of ‘permanent retaliation’, in other words, cooperating until the other defects, and always defecting thereafter, “then your best strategy is never to defect,”(p.16) lest one invite perpetual war.
Corruption occurs when one cooperates unconditionally with corrupt others (such as the cooperation that the Nazis elicited from the German people). The same holds true when, in relationships, we cooperate with tyrants, those who will continue to defect against us if we continue to cooperate (read: enable) them in this. Indeed, there are some robust philosophies that have encouraged people (notably women) to bring this tyrannical dynamic on themselves by essentially being ‘too nice,’ which only spoils those who mistreat them by essentially training them that it will be tolerated. In this way, we can plant the seeds of their own domination in the process of ‘loving’ too much, for we give permission to tyrants to carry on without compunction.
So we cannot say that cooperation is always the best move, or that defection is always the worse. In fact, the best strategy turns out to be treating individuals as individuals, that is, to treat each person as they treat you, reciprocating both cooperation and defection (at least in the first reactive move). And thus, it is wisest “to cooperate with someone who will reciprocate that cooperation in the future, but not with someone whose future behavior will not be very much affected”(p.16) by how well we treat them. Which is to say, we should not cooperate with someone who will defect anyway – often because they believe that’s how everyone is ‘naturally’. Sadly, someone who believes this view of ‘human nature’ is likely to defect no matter what, at least any time it seems to be in their interest, which means this is not someone you can trust to treat you well, no matter how well you treat them.
So “the heart of the problem [with this economic man theory] was that these maximizing rules did not take into account that their own behavior would lead the other player to change.”(p.121) It leaves out “the reverberating process in which the other player is adapting to you,” while “you are adapting to the other, and then the other is adapting to your adaptation and so on.”(p.121) In this way, “your own behavior is likely to be echoed back to you.”(p.121) Here is where the positive feedback loop takes effect, and the self-fulfilling prophesy of low expectations kick in – as does likewise the power of love and respect for the good in others.
…
“The Prisoner’s Dilemma is simply an abstract formulation of some very common and very interesting situations in which what [seems to be] best for each person individually leads to mutual defection, whereas everyone would [actually] have been better off with mutual cooperation.”(p.9)
The strategy that actually ‘won’ the competition against all others was “the simplest of all strategies.” Called Tit for Tat, it “is the policy of cooperating on the first move and then doing whatever the other player did on the previous move.”(p.13) And the interesting thing about it is that “it won the tournament” -- “even though it never once scored better in a game than the other player!” That is, it won, “not by beating the other player, but by eliciting behavior from the other player which allowed both to do well.”(p.112) “It won, not by doing better than the other player, but by eliciting cooperation from the other player,”(p.137) which resulted in mutually rewarding outcomes.”(p.112)
Four properties follow from this strategy:
(1) It avoids unnecessary conflict by being ‘nice’ to begin with, that is, never being the first to defect, and cooperating as long as the other does.
(2) It reacts to unprovoked defection with retaliatory defection, not out of anger, but to teach the other not to do it again.
(3) It forgives when/if the other responds to retaliatory defection with cooperation (and this does not mean merely the promise of future cooperation, for “words not backed by actions are so cheap as to be meaningless,”(p.12) and settling for anything less diminishes the others incentive to cooperate. And
(4) it is clear and predictable so that the other can believe that it will be consistent, that is, trustworthy. The best way to encourage mutual cooperation and discourage defection is to make it clear that you will reciprocate either.(p.123)
Another way to look at this is summed up in “four simple suggestions” offered by the author:
1. “do not be envious of the other player’s success; (avoid temptation = temperance)
2. do not be the first to defect; (avoid injustice = just)
3. reciprocate both cooperation and defection; and (avoid cowardice = courageous)
4. do not be too clever.”(p.23) (avoid ignorance = wise)
We might see parallels with the key Greek virtues here, for what are these tendencies but those qualities of character that the Greeks called temperance, justice, courage, and wisdom? This may deserve a more thorough defense in another context, but it seems worth noting the synchronicity of these values, for there is much to be learned from what else the Greeks have to say on these matters.
This strategy of reciprocity can not only “thrive in a world where many different kinds of strategies are being tried,” (p.21), but also “can protect itself from invasion by less cooperative strategies.”(p.21) Interestingly, the author reports that, “Speaking personally, one of my biggest surprises in working on this project has been the value of provocability. I came to this project believing one should be slow to anger. The results of the Computer Tournament for the Prisoner’s Dilemma demonstrate that it is actually better to respond quickly to a provocation.” This does not mean one should be quick to anger, just quick to respond fairly, for “It turns out that if one waits so respond to uncalled for defections, there is a risk of sending the wrong signal. The longer defections are allowed to go unchallenged, the more likely it is that the other player will draw the conclusion that defection can pay… By responding right away, it gives the quickest possible feedback that a defection will not pay.”(p.185) And this teaches the best lesson, both quickly and clearly.
Thus, cooperation based on reciprocity can grow among self-interested people who understand their best interest in treating others as they would like to be treated, which is to say, by the golden rule. The golden rule may be a widely accepted standard, but it is not always widely understood, for selfishness can skew our empathy, making us think we would want to be treated in ways that aren’t actually good for us. Likewise, a shallow understanding of this rule might “seem to imply that you should always cooperate, since cooperation is what you [may think you] want from the other player.”(p.136) However, one who thinks it through will see that it is possible to cooperate too much, because always “turning the other cheek,” no matter what, only “provides an incentive for the other player to exploit you.” In this way, “Unconditional cooperation can not only hurt you, but it can hurt other innocent bystanders with whom the successful exploiters will interact later. Unconditional cooperation tends to spoil the other player;” making them think they can get away with anything, and in this way, “it leaves a burden on the rest of the community to reform the spoiled player, suggesting that reciprocity is a better foundation for morality than is unconditional cooperation.”(p.136)
And so, a deeper understanding of the golden rule would recognize that what we would really want from others is that they not cooperate with us when we are wrong, that is, when we try to defect against them, but rather react with reciprocity, which teaches us to do right, which is to say, that we cannot exploit others and get away with it. Reciprocity helps everyone “by making it hard for exploitive strategies to survive. And not only does it help others, but it asks no more for oneself than it is willing to concede to others.”(p.137) In this sense, the golden rule is not about getting what we want, but about giving what is fair, and expecting that in return.
And it doesn’t take too much intelligence to figure this out – just the will to survive which gives incentive to think through what is good for us, that is, what is truly in our own interest. This is a healthy egoism, an enlightened self-interest, and what’s more, Hobbes, Smith, and even Darwin gave us credit for being capable of it.
In other words, “…there is a lesson (for human relationships) in the fact that TIT FOR TAT succeeds without doing better than anyone with whom it interacts. It succeeds by eliciting cooperation from others, not by defeating them.”(p.190) And “…mutual cooperation can be better for both sides than mutual defection.”(p.190)
“No wonder that an educational psychologist, upon hearing of the virtues of Tit for Tat, recommended teaching reciprocity in the schools (Calfee 1981, p. 38).” (p.139) Why? Because “a community using strategies based upon reciprocity can actually police itself. By guaranteeing punishment [an undesirable outcome] for any individual who tries to be less than cooperative, the deviant strategy is made unprofitable. Therefore the deviant will not thrive, and will not provide an attractive model for others to imitate.” For reasons Socrates would have argued, “This self-policing feature gives you an extra private incentive to teach it to others – even those with whom you will never interact.”(p.18) For, as it turns out, ”cooperation can indeed emerge in a world of egoists without central authority” – IF the future matters! So it would follow that we would be wise to be more like Native Americans, who taught their young to think of the effects of their actions seven generations into the future.
On Egoism and Altruism: Are Human Beings ‘Naturally’ Selfish?
"If the misery of our poor be caused not by the laws of nature, but by our institutions, great is our sin.”
"The assumption of universal egoism is so fundamental and widespread in our culture that it is hard to recognize," Daniel Batson writes, "like water for fish. It only becomes apparent if we imagine the possible changes if it were not there."[1]
In his book, The Altruism Question: A Scientific Exploration of Why We Help One Another, Batson shows how such a belief, i.e. "that we are, at heart, purely egoistic, that we care for others only to the extent that their welfare affects ours,"[2] can become a self-fulfilling prophesy.[3] And so it is alarming to find, when one looks to one's varied associates and listens to one's peers, the ubiquity of this assumption about human motivation.
As a teacher, one is struck by the degree to which young minds are stumped by the confusion between self-interest and selfishness, a muddle which darkens their intentions and undermines their trust in even their closest friends. And one is hard pressed to find an argument that convinces even oneself that so-called human nature is not inevitably narrow and greedy. The logic that one must be so self-concerned--if only in self defense--is hard to deny; 'A person must be egoistic,' one hears one's own voice rationalizing, 'for if one doesn't take care of oneself, who will?'
And yet, important questions linger...such as, What does it mean to be selfish? What does it mean to take care of oneself? and--even more fundamentally--What does it mean to be a Self? These can lead one to conclusions about the potential left in human nature other than those to which one jumps to on the evidence of much common experience. That altruism does not seem common does not mean it is not 'true' or 'real': the frequency of egoism as an attitude says nothing of its necessity or its or its wisdom.
Thus, the answer to the question, Is psychological egoism true? depends upon what we mean, exactly, by these terms. It is important to distinguish selfishness from self-interest, for the fact that humans are self-preserving and goal-oriented should not lead us to conclude that they are unjustly so. If we mean, Is psychological egoism/hedonism, in its strong form, true?--which asks whether self-benefit/pleasure is always the ultimate motive for human behavior--then the answer (as evidenced herein) is clearly, no, our motives are not so determined; Batson, among others, has shown that, as a universal, egoism cannot be the case.[4] Selfishness is certainly a potential, but not a principle in human behavior. However, if we mean, Is psychological egoism/hedonism, in its weak form, true? --which asks whether self may ever benefit or achieve pleasure by unintended consequence of actions that have the ultimate goal of increasing another's welfare[5]--then the answer (as argued herein) is almost certainly, yes, psychological egoism is true in this sense; self-benefit can flow by serendipity from a good will toward others.
The difference between these forms of motivation is especially important because the weak form of egoism leaves room for altruism in our potentials, where the strong form denies this possibility altogether. In other words, the former allows us to answer the question, must we be selfish in self-defense? in the negative, while the latter excuses a host of sins which compel others to their own justified defense.[6]
In terms of self-knowledge, the weak form of egoism allows us to give ourselves credit for doing the right thing, even when it also turns out to be good for us, while the contrary would have us attribute all of our behavior to a kind of self-interest which cannot be distinguished from selfishness, and is therefore not bound by the rules of moral law.
This difference illuminates the ethics of our choice in the matter, and opens the door to a more optimistic view of our own nature than that to which we have become accustomed. The road less traveled not only appears more inviting from this view, it also looks to be the road most of us are already on.
Thus, the difference between these forms of egoism can lead to dramatically different implications for our understanding of our own and other's motivations, as well as our very sense of who we are--individually and collectively. And it is important to notice that neither potential tells us much about 'human nature' per se, except to suggest that the reasoning behind the extremes of motivation which show up in human character are complex, and perhaps deserve a deeper analysis than we have seen fit to give them in our oversimplified (if seemingly parsimonious) conception of egoism.[7]
For 'we' are, in fact, 'many,' and however others may behave and whatever universal tendencies are at work, we still make our own choices about our own actions...(although not necessarily about our own reactions[8]). Both narrow and broad self-interest exist as potentials in human nature, as options from which individuals make choices as they decide what is good for them and who to be.[9] And if broad enough, such interests--while they will properly include self as central to one's concern--will no longer seem properly to be called 'egoism' for other's well-being may very well be the ultimate end of one's interest. And, as Batson notes, "if...individuals act, at least in part, with an ultimate goal of increasing the welfare of another, then the assumption of universal egoism must be replaced by a more complex view of prosocial motivation that allows for altruism as well as egoism."[10]
The question then is, Does genuine altruism actually exist? And if it does, Why do and/or should we choose it?
It seems clear on the evidence presented thus far that egoism, however it is defined, accounts for a large part--but still only a part--of the motivation behind human behavior. As long as sometimes, under some circumstances, at least some people will act toward others as ends in themselves, it cannot account for all.
As Jane Mansbridge points out in her book, Beyond Self-Interest, "when people think about what they want, they think about more than just their narrow self-interest...they often give great weight both to their moral principles and to the interests of others."[11] "In fact," Mansbridge says, "evidence indicates that...people often take account of both other individuals interests and the common good when they decide what constitutes a 'benefit' that they want to maximize,"[12] including "long-run self interest, commitment to principle, and genuine we-feeling."[13]
These all may be, in fact, in the best interest of the actor, but this fact alone does not qualify the motivation behind them to be egoistic in the narrow sense, as we have come to think of our drives to be. Such evidence may simply indicate that some people sometimes will hold what Socrates long ago argued to be the case, that our truest interest lies in justice, which is nothing if not a proper balance between self and others.
Perhaps we understand our well-being better than 'economic-man' models suggest. Political scientists and cognitive psychologists, by use of such techniques as the prisoner's dilemma, game theory, and other thought and computer experiments, have turned up data which "indicates a stubborn refusal on the part of a significant faction (usually 25% to 35%) to take rational self-interested action."[14] Is it possible that we know intuitively what Axelrod (1984) has evidenced, i.e. the "evolutionary feasibility of reciprocal altruism," that is, the wisdom of tit-for-tat survival reasoning?[15]
Dowes, Van de Kragt, and Orbell have shown that cooperative group-identity is increased by means of discussion,[16] also in keeping with the method of Socratic ethics. And, with Aristotle, political scientists Barber and Pithin have indicated that communal deliberation can lead to transformation of self.[17] Additionally, Frank, Holmes, and Mansbridge have postulated what they call the "inclusive self."[18] But as Mansbridge points out, the cumulative impact of this research is yet to be felt in the social sciences--which does not widely recognize what some thoughtful individuals have apparently long recognized--that it is not only 'right' to be good to others, but that it is 'smart,' which is to say, it is in our own best-interest.
In his especially clear-headed appraisal of what has been for many centuries an extremely nebulous topic, entitled Evidence for Altruism: Toward a Pluralism of Prosocial Motives, Batson provides convincing evidence that altruism, born of empathy, does exist--altruism which need not involve self-sacrifice, and may even involve self-benefit as a secondary effect.[19] As Batson notes, some self-benefits for helping actually increase as the costs increase, specifically because the costs are so great.[20] There is also room here for prosocial motives that are not either altruistic or egoistic, such as Kant's categorical imperative or Kohlberg's principle of justice.[21]
Batson's goal is to determine the existence or nonexistence of altruism by discerning between the strong and the weak forms of psychological egoism/hedonism (i.e. whether benefit to another is always an instrumental means to one’s own ends, or whether it is sometimes the ultimate goal from which any self-benefits flow by unintended consequence.)[22] One cannot help but admire and appreciate the subtlety with which Batson explores these "conceptual briar patches and tangled thickets of data and alternative explanations."[23] Recasting these as goal-directed forces, altruism and egoism in Batson's conception are motivational states with the ultimate goal of increasing either another's or one's own welfare, which is to say, as an end in itself and not as a means to some other goal. The crucial difference in these motivations then is, whose interests are the ultimate goal?[24]
In answer to his question "whether anyone ever, in any degree, transcends the bounds of self-benefit and helps out of genuine concern for the welfare of another...whether altruism is part of human nature,"[25] Batson concludes that, "the evidence to date provides surprisingly strong support for the hypothesis that empathic emotion evokes altruistic motivation."[26] "Improbable as it may seem, the empathy-altruism hypothesis appears to be true. It seems that we are capable of caring for the welfare of persons for whom we feel empathy for their sakes and not simply for our own."[27]
With this, Batson affirms his hypothesis, and leaves open the question of whether there is not also a justice-altruism hypothesis to be evidenced, or even whether empathy might not be the connection between these as well.[28] While these – justice, empathy, and altruism -- are certainly conceptually distinct for most purposes, there is an argument to be made that, as sources of altruism, empathy and justice can function much the same. Consider such cases as those where some are dependent upon us to have their best-interest at heart, such as any of many institutionalized and personal relations in which we are nested (e.g. child-parent, student-teacher, employee-employer, patient-doctor, constituent-politician, etc.), relationships in which some make the rules by which others must abide -- in such relations, dependents can sometimes be far enough out of the reach of the perception of those who are responsible for them, and thus, beyond personal and direct empathy (perhaps unfortunately, even parent/child relationships can have this distance, and thus call upon the responsible parent to deliberately put themselves into the shoes of the dependent child). In such cases, justice might suffice as an active principle which gives rise to empathy, albeit indirectly, as would be exercised through, say, a "veil of ignorance" such as Rawls prescribes, or by some empathic exercise such as Negel recommends, wherever one asks oneself, How would I feel? and, What would I do?[29] And one would think that this leaves open the door for the inclusion of all these concepts under the heading of the concept of love. Such an undertaking would seem compatible with, if conceptually distinct from, that of Batson, whose research and scholarship contribute considerably toward proving the conclusion which my own work shares, that there is a high cost involved in weaving the assumption that human beings are universally selfish into the fabric of our institutions, and that love/empathy/justice as a universal principle, as the ancients asserted, is not without practical value.[30]
Thus, Batson concludes that:
"If altruism as defined here exists, then the widespread assumption that the ultimate goal of all human action is some more or less subtle form of self-benefit must be rejected."[31]
"If we must accept that our motivation for helping others may be egoistic, altruistic, or both, then ambiguous data concerning our true motives and the desire for honest self-knowledge need not combine to produce a self-deprecatory bias."
"…if altruistic motivation exists, then we must broaden our moral horizon once again. We can no longer excuse our callousness and insensitivity to the needs of others by explaining that it is unrealistic to expect more."[32]
"If altruistic motivation exists, then we need to know it, even though this knowledge may play havoc with our assumptions about human motivation and, indeed, about human nature."[33]
Meaning, you can "honestly admit that your reason for visiting the nursing home
e, at least in part, because you care about the patients' welfare."[34] And what's more, your grandmother can admit that at least part of your reason for visiting her is from the goodness of your heart, because you actually care about her, and not just because you care about her will and your inheritance. Our cynicism about human motivation in general only brings out the worst in individuals, including ourselves and others. And it is time we recognize that we have responsibility to give individuals and human nature more credit –not just for their sake, but for our own – because the natural goodness of our hearts needs exercise…if we would be happy.
Such a shift in our understanding of so-called human nature might go a long way toward restoring trust in human relationships.[35] We can see then why Batson calls altruism a "valuable untapped natural resource."[36]
It is important that we recognize this dynamic, as Mansbridge says, because all of our social problems show that institutions that utilize the energy generated by our narrow conceptions of self-interest fail to generate enough public spirit to maintain healthy social bonds. The task of bringing out the good in our young, and even in ourselves, is made increasingly difficult when and because social scientists, psychologists, academics and even religions deny that natural common interest even exists in human potential.[37] And because "institutions...are likely to encourage certain motives and discourage others,"[38] Mansbridge argues, “changing an institution actually affects motivation."[39] It would be beyond surprising if high expectations could not be manifest through institutions as easily as low ones can.[40]
As Batson concludes, "If we are capable of altruism, then virtually all of our current ideas about individual psychology, social relations, economics, and politics are, in an important respect, wrong."[41]
This is important to remember because, while we are not responsible for what we cannot change (what Aristotle calls nature),[42] we are responsible for what we can change (what he calls artiface), and responsible not only to others, but most especially to our own potential better (read: happier) self.[43] Batson may call this a "flight of fancy,"[44]as if it is only the speculation of an idle dreamer, but it is the substance of all ancient philosophy, and clearly Batson’s own research shows such imaginings to be not the idle dreams of muddle-headed idealists, but the realistic prescription for happiness that empirical evidence bears out. For if altruism exists, and what's more, if it has any of the self-fulfilling potential that egoism has, which the prisoner’s dilemma show it does, then all such things are possible as we can imagine in our classical conceptions of human potential at its height. Human happiness is available to any and all who will share it.
This is why we might choose altruism, not as a moral imperative ("you should"), but as an opportunity ("you could"); because our own best interest depends upon it. We must remember this and act on it, not from duty, but from inclination; not just because it’s good for others and for the collective whole, but because it’s actually good for us, as individuals.
As Batson rightly emphasizes, rather than a source of obligation, this seems a cause for celebration.[45] It is the true and ultimate solution to practically all of our problems – at least all we have brought on ourselves, and seeing this, could halt at there source.
"Prescriptively, therefore, it makes sense to try to redress this imbalance by revitalizing or creating institutions that foster a commitment to the common good."[46] Why? Because Darwin once said, "If the misery of our poor be caused not by the laws of nature, but by our institutions, great is our sin."[47]
And this is where we come to the questions of our schools, and whether our educational methods are bringing out the best or the worst in your young.
But first, more evidence...
On Egoism and Altruism in Biology and Psychology
“WHAT WE HAVE DONE FOR OURSELVES ALONE DIES WITH US;
WHAT WE HAVE DONE FOR OTHERS AND THE WORLD REMAINS AND IS IMMORTAL" (Dan Brown (The Lost Symbol, p.454)
On Batson and Shaw's Evidence for Altruism: (Toward a Pluralism of Prosocial Motives)
Why do we help others? Is it because we have no choice, because it's expected, or because it's in our own best interest?[48] Daniel Batson says these are the easy answers and, given the empirical nature of the question, we needn't settle for them.
In his study, entitled Evidence for Altruism: Toward a Pluralism of Prosocial Motives, Batson attempts to evidence the altruist’s claim, that "at least some of us, to some degree, under some circumstances, are capable of a qualitatively different form of motivation, motivation with an ultimate goal of benefiting someone else."[49] This, against the egoists claim, "that we are, at heart, purely egoistic, that we care for others only to the extent that their welfare affects ours."[50]
This view, which has come to be known as universal egoism, has a long history. "From Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, through Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham, to Friedrich Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud, the dominant view in Western thought has long been that we are, at heart, exclusively self-interested,” he says (though we might qualify at least Aristotle’s view). “And today, when we ask why we care for and help others, the answer provided by all major theories of motivation – Freudian, behavioral, and even humanistic theories – is quite clear: Everything we do, including everything we do to benefit others, is ultimately done for our own benefit.” [51]
It is a view held by too many social scientists and psychologists, he says. And what's more, it is a view that can too easily be evidenced, since practically any act, no matter how seemingly selfless, can be argued to provide at least some self-benefit, and this can then be argued to have been the ultimate motivation. But, as Batson says, the easy answers are not always the right ones.
“The assumption of universal egoism is so fundamental and widespread in our culture that it is hard to recognize, like water for fish. It only becomes apparent if we imagine the possible changes if is were not there."[52]
And that is exactly what we must do.
In this especially clear-headed study of what has been for some millennia an extremely nebulous topic, Batson asks "whether anyone ever, in any degree, transcends the bounds of self-benefit and helps out of genuine concern for the welfare of another. We want to know whether altruism is part of human nature."[53]
Batson qualifies universal egoism by distinguishing between the strong form of psychological hedonism/egoism, which claims that people always act for their own pleasure/benefit, and the weak form, which claims only that pleasure/benefit can sometimes follow human action without necessarily being the motivation for it.[54] And yet, as Batson points out, "The weak form is not inconsistent with the possibility that the ultimate goal of some action is to benefit another rather than to benefit oneself; the pleasure obtained can be a consequence of reaching the goal without being the goal itself."[55] "[I]f we are to answer the question of the existence of altruism, then we must determine whether benefit to the other is (a) an ultimate goal and any self-benefits unintended consequences or (b) an instrumental means to reach the ultimate goal of benefiting oneself."[56] If we can show that it is not, then a conclusion that human nature is always selfish, which ignores the possibility of altruism, is too strong to accurately describe the evidence.
This strong form of psychological hedonism/egoism is considered the parsimonious explanation, even by Batson, who concedes that his research indicates a plurality of motives at work in human behavior. After examining Batson's methods, the results of his empirical studies, and some implication of his results, we will return to this question and draw our own conclusions.
Methodology:
Batson's method is straight forward:
"Altruism is a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing another's welfare.
Egoism is a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing one's own welfare."[57]
Examining each key phrase in both of these definitions, Batson recasts these as goal-directed psychological forces within an organism (Lewin, 1935) for which that goal is "an end in itself and not just an intermediate means for reaching some other goal."[58] Accordingly, the subject "(a) perceives some desired change in his or her own world and (b) experiences a force to bring about that change as (c) an end in itself."[59]
Batson gives eight implications of these definitions:
1. The distinction between altruism and egoism is qualitative, not quantitative.
2. A single motive cannot be both, altruistic and egoistic, as this "implies two ultimate goals (as long as self and other are perceived to be distinct),"[60][emphasis added]
3. "Both egoistic and altruistic motives can exist simultaneously within a single organism," which can lead to "motivational conflict."[61]
4. Reflexive, automatic, and otherwise non-goal-directed behavior is neither altruistic nor egoistic.[62]
5. Peomay be mistaken about their own motivation.[63]
6. A motive is a force which may or may not lead to action.
7. Altruism may or may not involve self-sacrifice, and may even involve self-benefit, when that is an unintended consequence and not the ultimate goal of behavior.
8. "[T]here may be prosocial motives that are neither altruistic nor egoistic" [such as] "upholding a principle of justice (Kohlberg, 1976)."[64] And again, this may benefit both the other and the self by unintended consequence without being motivated by self as the ultimate end.
Here is a potential that could use more exploration, for it might be that a conception of selfhood as a dynamic system of interaction would require just such a principle to help balance the complex interaction between self and other.[65] Batson points out in his response to the commentaries, "our definition of altruism requires a self-other distinction. Without such a distinction, it makes no sense to ask whether a helper's ultimate goal is to increase another's welfare, to increase his or her own welfare, or to pursue some other goal."[66][emphasis added] However, one might wonder whether this distinction is as universal as is assumed. It could be argued that Batson's own definitions leave open the possibility of self and other both being included in self as a dynamic system. As some commentators and others to whom Batson refers in his manuscript have pointed out (Archer, Hornstein, Lerner, and Krebs), a close relationship might eliminate the self-other distinction, making self and other psychologically one. For Lerner, the 'identity relationship' is such that "we are psychologically indistinguishable from the other and we experience that which we perceive they are experiencing."[67] In which case, "the question of whether the ultimate goal is to increase one's own or the other's welfare cannot meaningfully be asked; the two welfares have become one."[68] Batson rightly points out that, "If this occurs, then as these commentators note, the terms altruism and egoism as we have defined them do not apply. The goals of increasing the other's welfare and increasing one's own welfare are no longer distinguishable."[69]
Indeed, from a view of self and other in a system of interaction, "it makes no sense to ask" which is the ultimate goal, for both are combined in the system of one's whole best-interest. A self's values might be such that one includes the other into the weighing of ends--which allows the possibility of both self and other being ultimate. We sacrifice our own interest every time we set self aside long enough to put another first.
Batson admits to a suspicion that, "except perhaps in some mystical states" the breakdown of this distinction between self and others is rare in adults.[70] "Even mothers, we suspect, have a clear sense of the person of their child as distinct from self. Is this not part of the mystery of motherhood: From one's own body comes another, distinct human being?"[71] I think Batson is confusing the perception of the distinction between self and other with the importance of the distinction between self and other, for one can perfectly well know that self and other are distinct, and yet, not let that distinction matter in certain regards. In other words, one can see the difference between self and other without seeing that difference as important to whether we care for the other more or less. We see our children as individuals, but not necessarily as individuals who are in competition with our own interests. To say that the distinction between self and others disappears is not to say that it is not recognized at all, but only that it is not seen as important, not recognized as a reason to treat others with any less regard as you would have them treat us.
This sense of self as a unit, with others attached, whether linked or blended[72] in such a way that our interests are intertwined, is not so far fetched after all, especially in adults. It is, ideally, what happens to our self-concept every time we take responsibility for another human being, whether as parents, teachers, doctors, politicians, etc.. Some might call this egoistic, since our behaving altruistically in such cases seems to be good for us too, but this is, in an important way, quite irrelevant, since one chooses to begin with to include others within the scope of one's own well-being, such that self cannot thereafter be well without living up to one's responsibilities. It is the reason that we need to evaluate the difference in the strong and the weak form of psychological hedonism/egoism, because the weak form, from which good for self might flow from being good to others, is perfectly consistent with this conception of self as a system, a choice which would seem to require viewing other's interests as ends with which one's own interests are inextricably intertwined, not as means, but as part of the process of mental and moral health.
It is true, as Batson says, that we don't need to bring up morality, but we can, because, as he notes, "If altruistic motivation exists, then we must broaden our moral horizon once again. We can no longer excuse our callousness and insensitivity to the needs of others by explaining that it is unrealistic to expect more."[73] And the same would be true if such identification of self-interest with the interests of others exists. In his response to commentaries, Batson says that, "To keep motivational concepts distinct from moral concepts, we think it wise to avoid using the moral terms unselfish and selfish as synonyms for altruism and egoism."[74] But, "From a moral perspective (not, we believe, from a scientific one), it is possible to assert that altruistic motivation, if is exists, is morally good. This assertion cannot, however, be reversed: Moral goodness need not be altruistic."[75]
Batson also does not "deny that a person can have a goal of meeting the needs of a unit that includes self and others,"[76] but he conceives of this unit as being an entity separate from the individuals, like a marriage, which can operate independent of the good of the individuals involved. Also, he leaves open the question of whether the ultimate goal in such a case is "(a) the greatest good for the unit as a whole, [or] (b) upholding the principle to avoid feeling guilty about failing to live up to one's principle," which is egoistic, compared to (a) which is neither egoistic nor altruistic.[77]
At any rate, one cannot help but admire and appreciate the subtlety with which Batson explores these "conceptual briar patches and tangled thickets of data and alternative explanations."[78] Having recast altruism and egoism as motivational states with the ultimate goal of increasing either another's or one's own welfare as an end in itself and not as a means to some other goal, Batson is able to determine the existence of altruism by discerning between the strong and the weak forms of psychological egoism/hedonism, i.e. whether benefit to another is always an instrumental means to one’s own ends, or whether it is sometimes the ultimate goal from which any self-benefits flow by unintended consequence.[79] The crucial difference in these motivations then is, whose interests are the ultimate goal?[80]
Discerning which is in fact the ultimate goal is puzzling, Batson admits, but this is no reason to surrender prematurely, for not only can we ascertain people's ultimate goals, but that we do it all the time.[81] We draw reasonable inferences about other's motives and intentions from their behavior over varying conditions. The specific purpose of such a study as Batson and Shaw's is to vary the conditions in such a way as to "disentangle the relationship between potential ultimate goals."[82] Since "the behavior should always be directed toward the ultimate goal...these two steps provide an empirical basis for inferring the nature of a person's motivation."[83]
There are two steps necessary to infer the nature of a person's motivation from his or her behavior, according to Batson; they are, firstly, by a conceptual analysis of the various potential alternative goals. Batson accomplishes this by a three-path model which includes two egoistic routes (reinforcement and arousal reduction) and one altruistic one--"the most commonly suggested source" being empathic emotion, which begins with perception of need, and leads to adopting the other's perspective, which evokes altruistic motivation, not helping behavior[84] and which can be induced by instruction, including self-instruction, and may also be the result of prior similar experience and/or attachment.[85] And secondly, by systematic observation of the person's behavior, which is accomplished here by sketching the logic and results of some 20 experiments that have been conducted during the past decade to test one or more possible egoistic goals, including aversive-arousal reduction and empathy-specific punishment, both socially and self-administered, as well as empathy-specific reward, another major egoistic alternative to the empathy-altruism hypothesis, and it variations, empathic-joy and negative-state relief.[86]
The strong form of the empathy-altruism hypothesis, asserted here, "postulates not only that empathic emotion evokes altruistic motivation, but also that all motivation to help evoked by empathy is altruistic, and the weaker form, not asserted here, is that "empathic emotion evokes both egoistic and altruistic motivation."[87] Remembering that to determine the existence of altruism we must determine whether benefit to the other is ever the ultimate goal from which any self-benefits flow serendipidously, or whether it is always merely an instrumental means to the ultimate end of self-benefit,[88] we can see why this is an objective which the weak form of the empathy-altruism hypothesis will not help us reach.
It may seem that Batson jumps to a conclusion regarding the relationship between altruism and empathy in his article with Shaw. However, he explains in his response to commentaries, that "empathy has been the most frequently mentioned source of altruistic motivation since antiquity."[89] "It was named as a source--if not the source--of altruism by Thomas Aquinas, David Hume, Adam Smith, Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, and William McDougall."[90] Confucius held that “becoming a chun tsu, a fully realized human being,” comes of “expanding one’s empathy indefinitely.”[91] This transcendence of selfishness, he taught, is both a broadening and a deepening process, as the “inner world deepens and grows more refined as empathy expands.”[92]
The term empathy was "coined by Titchener in 1909 to translate the German Einfuhlung, which was used to Lipps in a perceptual context to refer to the process of intuiting one's way into an object or event to 'see' it from the inside (see Wispe, 1968, 1986, 1987."[93]
Adam Smith gave a good account of empathy when he said that:
"I consider what I should suffer if I was really you, and I not only change circumstances with you, but I change persons and characters. My grief, therefore, is entirely upon your account, and not in the least upon my own."[94]
This account shows how empathy: "involves more than simply focusing attention on the other. One may focus attention on another's need but maintain a relatively objective perspective, dispassionately observing the other's plight. In contrast, adopting the other's perspective involves imagining how that person is affected by his or her situation (Stotland, 1969)."[95]
Batson notes in his response to commentaries that "we view perspective taking as imagining how the other person is affected by his or her situation, not how I would be affected by that situation."[96] Batson thus uses empathy in a way that "is distinct from personal distress evoked by perceiving someone in need, but it is indistinguishable from what many philosophers and early psychologists called sympathy (Smith, Darwin, Spencer, James), compassion (Hume, Smith) pity (Aquinas, Hume, Smith), or tenderness (McDougall)."[97]
Results of empirical tests are summarized which provide strong support for the empathy-altruism hypothesis. In answer to his question "whether anyone ever, in any degree, transcends the bounds of self-benefit and helps out of genuine concern for the welfare of another...whether altruism is part of human nature,"[98] Batson concludes that, "the evidence to date provides surprisingly strong support for the hypothesis that empathic emotion evokes altruistic motivation."[99] "Improbable as it may seem, the empathy-altruism hypothesis appears to be true. It seems that we are capable of caring for the welfare of persons for whom we feel empathy for their sakes and not simply for our own."[100] In his manuscript, Batson provides quite convincing evidence that altruism, born of empathy, does exist--altruism which need not involve self-sacrifice, and may even involve self-benefit as a secondary effect.[101] As he notes, some self-benefits for helping actually increase as the costs increase, specifically because the costs are so great.[102]
Thus, as long as sometimes, under some circumstances, at least some people will act toward others as ends in themselves, egoism cannot account for all of human behavior. He concludes that "If altruism as defined here exists, then the widespread assumption that the ultimate goal of all human action is some more or less subtle form of self-benefit must be rejected."[103] "[I]f...individuals act, at least in part, with an ultimate goal of increasing the welfare of another, then the assumption of universal egoism must be replaced by a more complex view of prosocial motivation that allows for altruism as well as egoism."[104] Then there is also room here for prosocial motives that are not either altruistic or egoistic, such as Kant's categorical imperative or Kohlberg's principle of justice.[105] As Jane Mansbridge points out in her book, Beyond Self-Interest, "when people think about what they want, they think about more than just their narrow self-interest...they often give great weight both to their moral principles and to the interests of others."[106] "In fact," Mansbridge says, "evidence indicates that...people often take account of both other individuals interests and the common good when they decide what constitutes a 'benefit' that they want to maximize,"[107] including "long-run self interest, commitment to principle, and genuine we-feeling."[108] These all may be, in fact, in the best interest of the actor, but this fact alone does not qualify the motivation behind them to be egoistic in the narrow sense, as we have come to think of our drives to be. Such benefits may simply indicate what Socrates long ago argued to be the case,that our truest personal interest lies in interpersonal justice, which is nothing if not a proper balance between self and others.
Regarding parsimony, Batson holds that: "Advocates of universal egoism have elegance and parsimony on their side in this debate [because] it is far simpler to explain all human behavior in terms of self-benefit than it is to postulate a motivational pluralism that allows both self-benefit and another's benefit to serve as ultimate goals."[109] And "Prior to the evidence for the empathy-altruism hypothesis...parsimony clearly favors an exclusively egoistic explanation."[110]
However, "If...the empirical tests of the empathy-altruism hypothesis lead us to conclude the empathic emotion evokes altruistic motivation...then the situation is changed. Parsimony becomes irrelevant. There is no longer any logical reason to favor an egoistic interpretation of those cases in which the motivation might be egoistic, altruistic, both, or neither. Prudence no longer gives egoism exclusive credit for the large area of overlap of the two explanations."[111] "This more complex view of prosocial motives lacks the tidy parsimony of a view that assumes all motivation is egoistic."
He takes this attribution of pluralism from August Compte, who considered egoism and altruism to be "two distinct motives within the individual."[112] However, to pick up on earlier speculation regarding the nature of self, it seems fair to question whether parsimony would not actually be retained by a conception of self as a system, a conception which follows from Batson's evidence, if not from his definitions. Seen this way, from a self-as-system perspective, in which an equilibration between one's real and one's ideal self, between one's actual and one's potential, it doesn't look like dualism at all, but monism--in that a system is one whole, single, if complex thing.
Egoism is not more parsimonious than this dynamic conception. I think Batson actually gives evidence for a more parsimonious explanation for human behavior than egoism has ever been, for parsimony cannot mean oversimplification of the phenomenon by reduction to only certain aspects of it. It must rather mean a single simple explanation for a range of complex behaviors. Viewing self as a dynamic but united system of logical interactions between organisms and their environments provides as simple an explanation as could possibly be hoped for to account for the complexity of human motivation and behavior.
Batson points out that "Sober expresses concern about our willingness to speak of 'the' ultimate goal of helping evoked by empathy," suggesting that it is "inconsistent with our proposal of pluralism of prosocial motives."[113] Batson response is that "The empathy-altruism hypothesis does not assume that the motivation evoked by empathy is the only motive an empathically aroused person is experiencing. As the three-path model...suggests, the conditions that evoke empathy-induced altruistic motivation are likely also to evoke a range of egoistic motives."[114]
However, we needn't talk about plurality of motives at all in order to understand altruism; we need only change the way we talk about the self itself. The person whose motivation falls within the weak form of psychological hedonism/egoism behaves in ways that are good for both self and others, and so does not necessarily have two opposing ends, but has a single broad goal of well-being. If 'self-concept' is reconsidered in deeper and broader terms, in which self is seen as a system, it is shown to be a single cognitive framework into which both self and other, egoism and altruism, fit--which seems to rival egoism in its parsimony. It is as simple in hypothesis, to be sure, and yet it is far more complex in its manifestations. Not dualistic in nature, but an interactive whole.
Thus, we need not "turn our back on the Eden of simplicity provided by the monism of universal egoism"[115] in order to accommodate Batson's findings.
We can do what we will with this proof that altruism is potential, and one wise thing we might do is to recognize that it is as rich in prescription, as in description. Altruism is not only among our choices but, by this evidence, it is a wise choice, meaning, in the best interest, not just of self, but of the all of whom self is a part.
As Batson notes, "If altruistic motivation exists, then we need to know it, even though this knowledge may play havoc with our assumptions about human motivation and, indeed, about human nature."[116] Perhaps we would see that it is a mistake to attempt to reduce us all to the same agent, as if we all have the same motivations, simply because we all have the same potentials to choose from. "We" are, in fact, many individual agents; and, what's more, we even change from time to time. It is futile to ask what people always do when in fact people don't always do anything. The complexity of human motivation and the multitude of our motivational choices makes most questions about so-called 'human nature' relatively meaningless to ask and impossible to answer, at least if we are talking about all as if they are the same. We choose from among many complex potential behaviors on the basis of our understanding of 'the good' as an end which our actions are the means towards. And, importantly, different people make different choices. We are similarly goal-directed and share the universal goals of survival and well-being as our purposes, and we do function more or less properly toward defining our being well and achieving those ends. The problem with human motivation is not that we have this 'nature' which provokes us to be greedy and selfish, it is that too often we simply don't understand what is actually good for us, and – forgetting we have a future and that our actions here and now will affect it (karma) -- we choose to act toward our best immediate, rather than our best ultimate good. Immediate good may be compatible with other's expense, but ultimate good, iterated experiences proves, is not.[117] Which is to say, our interests are proved to depend upon both the good of self and of others, seen clearly, it can be shown that, in wholistic terms, i.e. in terms of self-knowledge, there is no such thing as profit at someone else's expense. What comes of this intention is anything but 'good,' and it is only confused with good by a misunderstanding of the true meaning of the term.
This shift "requires considerable rethinking of our underlying assumptions about human nature and human potential,"[118] Batson says, for, in the words of Adam Smith, "there are evidently some principles in [our] nature, which interest [us] in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to [us]."[119] The possibility that a "genuine concern for another's welfare is within the human repertoire" has been ignored, he says, and this "valuable untapped natural resource" could cause us "to rethink what it means to be human."[120] Batson concludes that, "If we are capable of altruism, then virtually all of our current ideas about individual psychology, social relations, economics, and politics are, in an important respect, wrong."[121] And what's more, they are wrong in a way that has a self-fulfilling prophesy effect.[122]
This is important to remember because, while we are not responsible for what we cannot change (which is to say that, "If we are capable of seeking only our own benefit, then we can hardly be blamed for doing so"[123]), but we are responsible for what we can change (which is to say that, "If, on the other hand, it turns out that we are capable of altruism, then our moral horizon--and our potential for moral responsibility--broadens considerably"[124]) most especially to our own potential self. This is why we might choose altruism--not as a moral imperative, but as an opportunity; not from duty, but from inclination. As Batson points out, rather than a source of obligation, this seems a cause for celebration.[125]
"If our belief in universal egoism is wrong and we are actually capable of altruism, then possibilities arise for the development of more caring individuals and a more compassionate, humane society. And in a world so full of fear, insensitivity, suffering, and loneliness, such developments are sorely needed."[126]
What's more, Batson quotes another study which concluded that, "There is considerable evidence of various kinds to suggest that doing good may indeed by good for you."[127] One study suggests that the antidote to such life-threatening ailments as heart disease "is the development of a trusting heart."[128] The fact is, it is very easy to be good to others when we understand how bad it is for us to be anything but. And once we learn the lesson, it no longer matters why, whether because it’s good for us to be good to others, or simply that it is bad for us to be anything but, these are the same idea from different points of view. Once we break free of our zero-sum assumptions about what is good, (which are not necessarily materialistic, but simply assumes some quantity of good which one looses if the other gains) then the traditional dichotomy between self vs. other breaks down. Material goods do seem to require some either/or division, meaning, either I get this or you get it, and these zero sum conditions are very restricting. But, learning that these win/lose assumptions are conditions that obtain where they are assumed, that is, self-fulfilling prophesy, we can think again. They are also conditions that can be transcended by wholistic, meaning deeper and broader, considerations of what else, besides the tangible extrinsic rewards and punishments for which we have learned to strive, is lost and gained in the exchange.
The understanding that guides the steering mechanism that brings human beings to choose certain motivations from among the logical potentials that are all part of so-called human nature might be considerably advanced were the human sciences as dedicated to comprehending the self as a choosing system, with egoism as one potential among many moral options, as it has been dedicated to proving and disproving the truth of universal motivation. Therefore, for my part, at any rate, the question is, What does an individual self have to learn from the lessons of egoistic and altruistic dynamics about what actually is and is not in his or her best interest? and, How do we ameliorate our social conditions by the lessons of this research?
The answer to the question asked by Batson, Is altruism potential in human behavior? is that all options are still and always our potential, and the fact of moral autonomy is that, whether we actually behave one way or the other, altruistically or egoistically, is a matter of choice--choice within the constraints of context, it's true--but a choice, nonetheless. In that different choices have different effects, different karmic consequences, if you will, or call it, different fitness values, we still have much to learn about why we might choose one over the other. Which is to say, What is actually good for us?
[1] Daniel Batson, The Altruism Question: A Scientific Exploration of Why We Help One Another.{Manuscript:1991, p. 20.
[2] C. Daniel Batson and Laura L. Shaw, Evidence for Altruism: Toward a Pluralism of Prosocial Motives (Psychological Inquiry, 1991, Vol. 2, No. 2) p. 107.
[3] Batson, along with Mainsbridge, draws on historical and interdisciplinary research to show how this assumption becomes a self-depreciating bias which has a self-fulfilling effect, explaining at least in part why 'human nature' appears so narrow in our day. Which is to say that, institutions actually encourage narrow self-interest when they assume it to be the nature of humans to begin with. (Batson, Manuscript, p. 441.) Batson shows the dynamic of this self-fulfilling process: the assumption of universal egoism "permits us to unashamedly say no when given the opportunity to help someone else in the absense of clear self-benefits. There need be no remorse or guilt for failing to care for others if we know [read: believe*] that our caring is not really sincere, if it is only an attempt on our part to feel good about ourselves or to avoid feeling bad. Indeed, there is a sense of relief in knowing ourselves, selfish desires and all, and in not being suckered into trying to act good. This knowledge considerably narrows our moral scope. If we cannot really care for others, then surely there is no reason to try."(Batson, Manuscript, p. 442.)[emphasis added] "This self-depreciating bias may lead you to make a selfish attribution for your helping, even if this attribution is wrong."(Batson, Manuscript, p. 440.) As a consequent, you may come to see your visits to your grandmother as "little more than a self-serving charade," and "If you pursue this logic, much of the satisfaction from your visits is likely to disappear."(Batson, Manuscript, p. 440.) Realize it or not, one is likely to find oneself doing the right thing for the wrong reason from here on in, e.g because one has no choice, one is expected, or one has some interest in the visits. Moral degeneration cannot help but result. Perhaps worse, we may find ourselves not doing the right thing at all. Thus, assuming our own selfishness is likely to become a prophesy fulfilled. In this way, the assumption of universal egoism translates into a conception of human nature which serves to excuse a host of sins.
[4] (P1) Universal egoism predicts that people will never behave altruistically (e.g. go to aid lepers in their colonies)
(P2) People sometimes do behave altruistically (as evidenced in Batson, 1992)
(C1) Therefore, universal egoism is not true, and
(C2) Altruism is not ruled out as a source of human motivation.
[5] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry) p. 108.
[6] As noted elsewhere in this text, the line between those actions which are toward one's own self-preservation and those which seek more than one's fair share, and thus provoke others to act in their own self-preservative interests, is the distinction between defensive secondary defection and offensive primary defection, and the prisoner's dilemma can help us draw this distinction more clearly.
[7] The complex processes and comprehensive feedback dynamics by which systems interact with other systems, including human systems, is made clear and pragmatic in the work of T.F.H. Allen. Integration and generalism may not seem practical from the point of view of many scholars, but what could be more so than such a method of flexible perspectives as Allen introduces in his book, entitled (with slightly false humility) Toward a Unified Ecology. In fact, rather than merely moving toward the object of his inquiry, Allen gives us the full and deeply developed picture of a method that allows us to look at and into the world from the infinity of perspectives that are intrinsic to it, making order out of chaos, if we so choose. It is precisely the sort of tool we need to help us sort out the complexity of our knowledge. (For instance, some ideas have had extremely robust lives as forces of human activity, such as the golden rule, the conservation of energy, free-enterprise, and democracy. There is much to be considered regarding the dynamics at work in this interaction. (T.F.H. Allen, Toward a Unified Ecology (New York: Columbia Univeristy Press, 1992)) By using his method to first integrate his own discipline, Allen shows how all of these apparently competing schools of thought--organismic, community, exosystem, landscape, biome, and biosphere--are actually complementary, interactive, and flexible perspectives on the same complex but comprehensive object(s) of knowledge. In the process showing how every object of knowledge is similarly complex and comprehensive, and yet, knowable by the human mind. The possibilities are enough to make a philosopher salivate. It is clear that without considering as many of these perspectives as possible, we cannot meaningfully claim to ‘know’ the object of our study at all, not at least if we hold the whole truth as an ideal. Allen's unified ecology, supported by chaos theory, gives us the capacity to take all these and other views together in order to see, in effect, the whole picture--not merely of ecology, but of any object we might choose to know, no matter how concrete or abstract, how simple or complex. Taking this approach to the subject at hard challenges the egoist's claim to parsimony, for it leaves us with a perspective on self which is not pluralistic, as Batson claims, but monistic, in that self as a whole system is one thing, not two motivations in conflict.
[8] See "Toward a Theory of Self-Knowledge," J. Hunt, 1992, for a detailed analysis of the action/reaction dynamics involved in human motivation.
[9] Both ultimate aims remain potential in every act. It seems to me that the conclusion to this argument should be enough to show the question, Is egoism true? to be relatively meaningless, at least as long as we're talking about all individuals as if they are the same agent, the same chooser. While we recognize the object of our search to be understanding of those tendencies that are universal in the dynamics of human interaction, it is my claim that we might do this best by keeping close in mind that "we" are actually "many," and thus what is true of us, as a whole, that is, what is 'human nautre, one or the other, really can't be judged as long as individuals can make choices from among these natural potentials--good or evil, just or unjust, broad or narrow. Such a conception of human interaction asks what conditions provoke what survival strategies, egoism or altruism, or combinations of these elements. The assumption is that we are naturally selfish is a "guilty until proven innocent" position with respect to our underlying motivations: if we are assumed to be selfish, then we are treated by others as if we are...and since we pay the price whether we are or not, then we might as well get the benefits....and so we might as well behave selfishly, it seems. Thus, if we are simply assumed to be "sinners," we are robbed of much but not all of our choice in the matter.
This assumption thus seems to necessitate our unconditional defection in defensive response to other's defensive responses against us. The dynamic that follows violates the natural innocence of reason, and narrowness is the natural and just response to such a low expectation of human beings.
This wholesale reduction of all human behavior to narrow self-interest, which we far too often take for granted, can prove to be a causal force in the further narrowing of that behavior. But it cannot prevent our understanding of the subtle dynamics involved in our own moral reasonings. All it can really do is tell us how humans have seen fit to adapt to conditions thus far -- not how humans will inevitably choose to behave. Indeed, frequency of a given behavior does not imply necessity. If we change the conditions of human development, it stands to reason that we will have changed the frequency of certain human behaviors -- but it is unlikely that by this we would have changed human nature itself.
Human nature includes all that is potential; any particular adaptation is part reflex, and part choice. Note that to say that human nature is all potential is not to say that all selves are potential for all people, for the interactive effect between the individual and the social environment will reinforce, one way or another, the individual's intrinsic tendencies, encouraging or discouraging development in some directions more than others, and making some avenues of development practically impossible.
Where self-knowledge is concerned, futures are a matter of probability, with certain odds which change with the action of the agent as well as the actions of social forces. Seeing consciousness as the tool of survival that it is, with focus of attention at center, and with peripheral vision, as well as future and hindsight, shows a conception of Self that exercises and reaches to be as broad or narrow as a choosing agent sees necessary to fitness. It is the universal nature of all conscious beings to survive as well as possible, making survival choices universal, and yet a matter of the particular conditions of adaptive opportunity and limitations within the environment in which an organism is nested. In such a self-concept, one perceives oneself as somewhere in between here and there, now and then, actual and potential, real and ideal. Self-concept, in this conception of flexible perspectives, grows in terms of knowledge and power, that is, with the sense of one's reach of awareness and influence, from narrow to broad and sometimes back again.
Perception of self changes as perception of security or threat changes. It does not require a leap of faith or a betrayal of one's realism to agree that understanding these dynamics from the inside-out is a form of self-knowledge we need more of. What it does require is the ability to see the difference between the approaches taken in these two passages regarding the study of human interaction, the first of which is descriptive and predictive, and the second, prescriptive:
1."A young child who is exceptionally good-natured or responsive may draw more or better attention from his nursery school teacher than one who is unresponsive."(Kopp and Krakow, p.9.)
2. A young child who gets more and better attention from his nursery school teacher is more likely to be good-natured and responsive.
The difference in these approaches is that the second employs the moral which is taught by the first.
[10] Batson, Psychological Inqyiry, p.119.
[11] Jane Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) p. ix.
[12] Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.x.
[13] Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.xi.
[14] Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.20.
[15] Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.19. [See also Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, (New York: Basic Books, Inc.), and my thesis.] The prisoner's dilemma is a thought experiment that, along with a little empathy, can assist us in clearing up some of the confusion about the diverse survival challenges that humans routinely face. As argued earlier in this work, when the object of our study is also a subject, we cannot hope to "know" it if we do not take its own perspective into view, hence the reason that our desire for the whole truth must go beyond our scientific method, into those methods that employ empathy to compel us to ask ourselves, what would I do? The so-called Prisoner’s Dilemma is just such an introspective exercise. It can help show us the objective truth in the form of principles underlying the subjective diversity of our particular views of the world, allowing us to better see ourselves in context, as well as to put ourselves in the place of others. With the help of the prisoner's dilemma we might meaningfully consider the conditions of different environments so to understand why different people can come to believe and behave in different ways based on different reasoning, some better and some worse. It can also help us understand how the effects of good or bad reason are iterated over time and throughout populations. The PD shows the dynamics involved in such common circumstances, such as those wherein individuals reason through their survival strategies and lay out the circumstances of their choice, and then asking, in much the same sense that Nagel advises we do, "How would you feel?" or "What would you do?", (Thomas Nagel, "The Possibility of Altruism", (in Egoism and Altruism, ed. by Ronald D. Milo) p. 123.) The PD provides evidence, both empirically and a priori, of the logical and often misunderstood feedback dynamics of both egoism and altruism. And rather than supporting the traditional view of human self-interest as necessarily being narrow and of human beings as purely egoistic, this dynamic view of interacting selves shows altruism (or giving) as well as egoism (or taking) to be options, both available choice from among many more or less enlightened potentials. Recognizing this, we can see that egoism is more our habit than our 'nature,' and not such a wise move, considering Despite traditional reasoning about "rationality", the prisoner's dilemma can help us to see the consequences of such choices as we routinely and unreflectively make have ways of backfiring, and that when we think we are acting in our own interest, we are sometimes actually shooting ourselves in the foot. Thus, coming to see how the PD works can make clear how altruism has hidden benefits, and egoism has hidden costs. And herein lies its prescriptive potential. For the PD shows, among other things, that if action toward survival and well-being is what we mean by 'rational,' then a policy of unconditional defection, or generalized egoism, such as we have long considered rational, is not actually in our best interest. It also shows that a policy of unconditional cooperation is likewise not wise. As one can see by examination of this analysis, neither unconditional cooperation, (that is, extreme altruism), or unconditional defection (e.g. extreme egoism) is actually good for us in all cases, and what makes more sense involves healthy reasoning in particular cases according to what will improve the relationship and teach the other to treat us well. As we will see, the most rational interactive strategies of how we should treat others are, in the long run, conditional; which is to say, "there is no best strategy independent of the strategy used by the other player.” ("Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, (New York: Basis Books, Inc.) p.15.) Survival being contingent, individuals are sensitively dependent upon group and group upon individuals, and thus, neither 'always defect' or 'always cooperate' is rational, in and of itself. While the strategy to 'always defect' is the only rational policy in a population of all defectors, it is self-defeating among those who would reciprocate fairly if we would. Likewise, while "always cooperate" works fine in a population of cooperators or reciprocators, it collapses in a population of primary defectors, against whom only reciprocal defection is rational. Therefore, the extreme egoist, who always defects and thinks he is taking advantage of the extreme altruist, who always cooperates, is actually losing in the long run, even if he wins in the short run (and this tendency does seem to exist more in masculine than in feminine motivations). For while hawks can invade a group of doves, who are too nice for their own good, causing subversion from within to occur and making it so that a strategy of always cooperate can't evolve in a population (which is to say, it is not an evolutionarily stable strategy (ess) because the group is vulnerable to defectors against whom players can't or at any rate won't protect themselves, the cooperator who reciprocates (i.e. by way of a tit-for-tat strategy), and thus may lose the immediate game, has nonetheless won the advantage in the long run dynamic game, that is, they have increased the likelihood of drawing future cooperation from fair players, the advantage that the defecting egoist has lost. Thus, a group of players who always defects is collectively stable only if it is not invaded by clusters of such reciprocating others, who protect themselves from defectors while earning rewards from one another. Because tit-for-tat reciprocate both cooperation and defection, thus collects allies and repels enemies, and is therefore collectively stable (if and only if w, i.e. the importance of the future, is large enough, and if frequency of interaction is sufficient)[see Sober]. In this, it is the means by which altruism can evolve, even within populations which are composed of predominantly egoistic players.
Thus, among tit-for-tatters, who would reciprocate giving, the defector defeats his or her own self-interest, for he will elicit taking. So, even though a tit-for-tat strategy of reciprocity never wins in any given single interaction, it wins in the long run (called Simpson's Paradox). Egoists would therefore be wise to take a lesson from reciprocators here. The iterated PD illustrates how taking advantage of an opponent for short-term gain can earn one a long-term loss, because the egoist makes a choice that invites defection back from others toward themselves, for he or she is thereafter subject to retributive reaction from players in future games, even those who would be willing to reciprocate giving and could be trusted to behave altruistically toward giving other's. Thus, the altruist invites the trust of others, drawing out their altruistic response, even from those who would defect against less trusted others.
A strategy of reciprocity amounts to treating individuals as individuals, and this is both fair and, as the iterated PD illustrates, toward survival and well being, which makes reciprocity more rational than unconditional strategies of either egoism or altruism. Besides being nice [never the primary defector], a wise response to either or any strategy played by others, such as tit-for-tat seems to be, is also retaliatory [always responds with secondary defection to a primary defection by the other], then forgiving [does not hold a grudge], and is always clear [consistent].
[*see thesis for discussion of action/reaction dynamics involved here; pp.13=>] Again, this approach to human interaction introduces a new area of discussion -- such as the distinction between, the function of, and consequences which follow from, both primary and secondary defection in our strategic choices. The line between those actions which are toward one's own self-preservation and those which seek more than one's fair share, and thus provoke others to act in their own self-preservative interests, is the distinction between defensive secondary defection and offensive primary defection, and the prisoner's dilemma can help us draw this distinction more clearly. Perhaps even Thomas Hobbes might have been convinced by its logic, both empirical and a priori, that the fine but critical distinction between the "will to hurt" and the "will to keep from being hurt, ("Thomas Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", (in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo) p. 12.) which he himself took account of but did not take seriously, is the line between "selfishness" and "self-preservation" -- morally, a very big difference. We will also ask whether this also accounts for the difference between psychological and evolutionary egoism as well. If we are going to keep asking about the tendency toward 'egoism' in 'human nature,' we ought to be clear on these different types of self-interest, on their different ends, different levels of justification, and different consequences.
The economic-man concept of human rationality is based on the logic of the static prisoner's dilemma game – that is, those instances when only one interaction is considered. But the thing is, life is not a one shot game, which limits the usefulness of this static analysis in broader applications. The paradox presented by the iterated PD (as well as Arrow's Theorem, and other contemporary issues which are outside the scope of this work) teaches that our conception of what is rational actually proves itself to be quite irrational when the variable of time and future consequences is taken into consideration. For when we are likely play the game again with the same opponent, we are less likely to reason that it makes sense to trade another’s trust (which Batson distinguishes from what he calls the value of the future) for quick gain. Rather we are more likely to feel that trust, a variable not considered valuable in the static analysis, is in fact the only way to win in the long run. Which is to say that, when we play this partner again in the future, we will have earned defection against ourselves if we have defected against this opponent in the past, and likewise, cooperation if we have cooperated.
Thus, by reasoning out the interaction between survival strategies over time, we see that self-interest councils us to consider the effect of our present actions on the future, or be willing to lose what we seek to win there. While a static analysis excludes future consequences and psychological significances from the payoff we receive, that is, from the conception of "good" upon which reason acts, the iterated PD clarifies the dynamics of reasoning involved in an interactive and dynamic analysis of choice situations. For when choice involves value in future consequences, "maximizing one's interests" indicates different preferences than those we typically assume to be rational.
[16] Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.17.
[17] Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.19.
[18] Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.19.
[19] Batson qualifies his definition of altruism with these eight implications: 1. that it is qualitative; 2. that a single motive cannot be both altruistic and egoistic; 3. that both can exist in a single organism at the same time, but the organism will experience motivational conflict; 4. that it does not apply to reflexive or automatic behavior, only to goal-directed behavior; 5. that a person is not necessarily the best judge of his or her own motivation*; 6. that it need not necessarily lead to action; 7. that it need not involve self-sacrifice, and may even involve self-benefit as an unintended consequence; and 8. that there may be other prosocial motives that are not either altruistic or egoistic. [p.109]
[20] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 109.
[21] This makes room for an interactive conception of self as a dynamic system of complex interactions in which self's and other's interests are balanced by just such a principle of justice. See my Senior Thesis* (1992) for a detailed discussion of such a Self conception.
[22] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 109. In the biological sciences, sociobiologists who once asked the question, why don't self-interested genes perpetuate themselves and altruistic genes die out, have been answered by reference to Simpson's Paradox, which explains how groups can select for altruism, even while individuals select for egoism...which is still not to say that individuals necessarily do... The question that Batson asks "is about precisely those motives that Dawkins and other sociobiologists exclude from their analysis."(Batson, Manuscript, p.25)
[23] Batson, Manuscript, p. 27.
[24] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 108. Also, in Batson, Manuscript, [*put earlier] "Altruism is a motivational state with the ulitmate goal of increasing another's welfare."[p. 11] "Egoism is a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing one's own welfare."[p.14]
[25] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.107.
[26] Batson, Manuscript, p. 29.
[27] Batson, Manuscript, p. 29.
[28] This is a connection I have explored in detail in a paper entitled, Toward a Theory of Self-Knowledge, 1992.
[29] Thomas Nagel, "The Possibility of Altruism", (in Egoism and Altruism, ed. by Ronald D. Milo) p. 123. As Mansbridge notes, developmental psychologists have found empathy in newborns (MacClean 1973, Krebs 1971, 1982), and biologists have found empathic menstruation, or "menstral synchrony," among women of many species (McClintok 1981, 1987).(Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.18.)
[30] *Refer back here, in the final version, to those chapters where the substance of my senior thesis has landed.
[31] Batson, Manuscript, p. 18.
[32] Batson, Manuscript, p. 442.
[33] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 107.
[34] Batson, Manuscript, p. 441.
[35] But if we are truly to take Batson's work as seriously as we might, it would seem to require an inclusive shift in the angle of our approach to studying this most familiar of subject matters, a shift from outside-looking-in to inside-looking-out, as well as a shift from descriptive to prescriptive theory. For this evidence says more than that we have cause to believe that altruism exists--it indicates that such a belief is a cause in itself--a self-fulfilling prophesy. This being the case gives us reason to consider the vast magnitude of the potential damage done when an entire economic system assumes a war of all against all, when a legal system puts children into such wars through the failure of family law to seek resolution of conflict due to the assumption that such contracts are necessarily adversary nature, and throughout an entire educational system no one seeks to end the myriad ongoing wars as long as everyone is trying to win them. As Virginia Held points out in her essay, Mothering versus Contract, "a society resting on no more than bargains between self-interested or mutually disinterested individuals will not be able to withstand the forces of egoism and dissolution pulling such societies apart,"(Virginia Held, Mothering versus Contract, in Beyond Self Interest, ed. Jane Mansbridge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1990)) such as our "adversary democracy" does.(Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.3. (Indeed, "...the battle of interest against interests decided by, say, the procedure of majority rule--may fail to meet the criteria for democracy implicit in the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court."(Mansbridge on Sustein, p.9)) We must come to understand that subversion from within is always potential in human populations, and this danger exists wherever egoism, even to the point of evil, is assumed. Of course it is always an option, that is, one from among many human potentials, but too often it is assumed and even encouraged to be the preferred option, but only where its self-destructive effect is ignored. But this option, being only potential, can either be reinforced or discouraged, and so those the responsibility falls to those with power (parents, teachers, etc) in the contexts in which individual children learn to survive. This is a choice made at by individuals at the personal level, and while it may reflect the morality of the group as a whole, the responsibility lies in individual choice. The assumptions upon which institutions are built – such as that children are ‘naturally’ bad and thus must be punished and controlled to be ‘good’, play out in the actions of individuals, who are free to act on their better reasoning, rather than to react to assumptions based on flawed reasoning.
[36] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 120.
[37] Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.x.
[38] Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.21.
[39] Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.xiii,
[40] As Virginia Held points out, "The child in relation to the mothering person is permanently in the best possible position from which to recognize that might is not equivalent to right, that power, including the power to teach and enforce a given morality, is not equivalent to morality itself. Becoming a person is not so much learning a morality that is being taught as it is developing the ability to decide for oneself what morality requires of one."(Held, Mothering, pp.302-303.) "[W]e should probably none of us ever forget what it is like to lack power...[we must] remember the point of view of those who cannot rely on the power of arms to uphold their moral claims."(Held, Mothering, p.303.) "Morality...must guide us in our relations with actual particular children, enabling them to develop their own lives and commitments. For mothering-persons," Held notes, "morality can never seem adequate if it offers no more than ideal rules for hypothetical situations; morality must connect with the actual context of real, particular others in need."(Held, Mothering, p.302.) "It would be a morality based on caring and concern for actual human others, and it would have to recognize the limitations of both egoism and perfect justice." (Held, Mothering, p.302.) We have imagined relations between parent and child "as somehow outside human society altogether in a region labled 'nature'," but parenting "is at the heart of human society."(Held, Mothering, p.304.) Of such feminist theories some ask the hostile question about culture at large, who are the mothers and who are the children? It is a good question, Held and I both think, and not as difficult to answer as some inquirers might suppose. While we adults are sometimes one and sometimes the other,(Held, Mothering, pp.303-304) regarding responsibility and dependence, there is no doubt that we are, at least, the adults--and in this regard, responsible at least to the children. (An attempt to answer this question is made in my senior thesis (chapter *), where the subject of responsibility/dependence, action/reaction, offense/defense behavior is discussed at length. Altruism and egoism exist as options, and in my analysis, I have focused on the logical dynamics of cause and effect which help answer the next question, why should one choose altruism over egoism, or vice versa. The prisoner's dilemma can help us see the iterated consequences of our assumptions. The question of whose interests are the ultimate goal, and what consequences follow from such motivations, are especially instructive...on the level of self-knowledge and of institutional assumptions. We can use empathy on principle here, as a method of knowing, along with the prisoner's dilemma, to reason through the logical consequences of our motivations and the actions they lead to, which shows clearly the wisdom or foolishness of given choices.)
[41] Batson, Manuscript, p.20.
[42] Batson, Manuscript, p.21. "If we are capable of seeking only our own benefit, then we can hardly be blamed for doing so..."
[43] Batson, Manuscript, p.22. "If, on the other hand, it turns out that we are capable of altruism, then our moral horizon--and our potential for moral responsibility--broadens considerably."
[44] Batson, Manuscript, p.22.
[45] Batson, Manuscript, p.442.
[46] (Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.xii.) The "underlying prescriptive thrust" (Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.xii.) of this research reinforces the words of Nobel Prize winner, James Buchanan (1986), who rightly noted that "There has not been enough attention paid to the interdependence between the predicted patterns of political outcomes and the rules or institutions that constrain the political actors."(Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.21.) As Mansbridge notes, James Madison emphasized that the constitution "would have large and terrible consequences if it embodied inadequate assumptions regarding human motivations." (Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, pp.6-7.) Plato worried himself to great lengths about the dangers of a mythology which reflected the gods as capable of great evils, knowing humans would have no incentive to be otherwise without ideals of good to aim at. In The Repbulic, when Thrasymachus argues that “might makes right”, and Glaucon urge Socrates to agree that “appearing just is enough,” Socrates replies at length (the entire rest of the text, in fact) that on the contrary, it is “right that makes might,” and no mere facade of justice can suffice to put the soul in order and thus to bring happiness to human beings. In his account of the philsopher king inside us all, Socrates shows that when we are driven by reason adhering to justice, human beings can transcend self-interest, caring for others for the other's sake alone. Paradoxically, it is this that beings true good and happiness to the giver. As many of the ancient sages tried to teach us, pursuit of one’s own good at others expense actually chases true happiness away, whereas pursuit of the good of others for their sake alone actually draws it near. Go figure. Adam Smith tried to teach us this as well, for contrary to the popular conception of his thoughts on human motivation; he was well aware that "there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interests him in the fortune of others, and renders their happiness necessary to him."(Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.120.)
[47] Charles Darwin, Voyage of the Beagle, reprinted in Stephen J. Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (New York: Norton & Company, 1981.)
[48] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, (Vol. 2., No. 2. 1991) p.107
[49] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.107.
[50] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.107.
[51] Batson, Manuscript, ( ) p.20.
[52] Batson, Manuscript, ( ) p.20.
[53] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.107.
[54] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.108.
[55] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.108. In fact, evidence indicates that there "Self-actualization cannot be attained if it is made an end in itself, but only as a side effect of self-transcendence."(Frankl, 1959, p.175; in Batson, Manuscript, p. 432] "The more one aims at pleasure, the more this aim is missed...The very 'pursuit of happiness' is what thwarts it"[1969, p. 33, in Batson, Manuscript, p. 432]
[56] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.109.
[57] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.108.
[58] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.108.
[59] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.108.
[60] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 109.
[61] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 109.
[62] As he notes in his manuscript, if we care for others from instinct or habit or other reflexive impulses, "then terms like selfish and selfless, egoistic and altruistic, do not apply."[p.66]
[63] My intuition here is different, for while I agree that people do not always attend to it, and they do not always admit to it, I cannot help but feel that somewhere, on some level, we do 'know' our own motivation, but it does require an honest appraisal to be sure. So we’re not always honest, but we can't say we do not actually know our true motivation--if we don't, who does?
[64] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 109.
[65] See my Senior Thesis for a detailed examination of the dynamics of such a system of interaction.
[66] Batson, Response to Commentaries, p.160.
[67] Batson, Manuscript, p.102.
[68] Batson, Manuscript, p.104.
[69] Batson, Response to Commentaries, p.160.
[70] Batson, Response to Commentaries, p.161.
[71] Batson, Response to Commentaries, p.161.
[72] Batson, Response to Commentaries, p.161.
[73] Batson, Manuscript, p.442.
[74] Batson, Response to Commentaries, p.160.
[75] Batson, Response to Commentaries, p.160. One especially interesting aspect of Batson study is the evidence turned up regarding Kohlberg's vs. Gilligan's models of moral development. The results suggested that "high scores for women may not be associated with altruistic motivation so much as with an egoistic desire to conform to the sex-role ideal."[p.375-76] "This was not the pattern of results we expected to find, but it was a pattern we found intriguing. It suggests that high scores on sex-role congruent measures of 'altruism' may reflect an egoistic desire to present oneself as appropriately moral, as a good girl or good boy. On the other hand, high scores on the sex-role incongruent measures, less subject to contamination by self-presentation...may tap a truly altruistic personality."[p.376] "Personality assessment instruments designed to measure altruistic motives stereotypic for one gender may actually measure egoistic motives for that gender but altruistic motives for the other gender. Like swapping towels, 'her' altruistic personality may be more clearly revealed by what shows through on 'his' morality, and vice versa."[p.377] "To have an 'altruistic' self-image or public persona is dramatically different from actually possessing altruistic attributes."[p.379]
[76] Batson, Response to Commentaries, p.161.
[77] Batson, Response to Commentaries, p.161.
[78] Batson, Manuscript, p. 27.
[79] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 109. In the biological sciences, sociobiologists who once asked the question, why don't self-interested genes perpetuate themselves and altruistic genes die out, have been answered by reference to Simpson's Paradox, which explains how groups can select for altruism, even while individuals select for egoism...which is still not to say that individuals necessarily do... The question that Batson asks "is about precisely those motives that Dawkins and other sociobiologists exclude from their analysis."(Batson, Manuscript, p.25)
[80] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 108. Also, in Batson, Manuscript, "Altruism is a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing another's welfare."[p. 11] "Egoism is a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing one's own welfare."[p.14]
[81] Batson and Shaw, Response to the Commentaries, p.163.
[82] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.110.
[83] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.110.
[84] See Sober, Psychological Inquiry, p.145, and author's response to Sober, p.163.
[85] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 113.
[86] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.114-118.
[87] Batson and Shaw, Response to the Commentaries, p.163.
[88] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 109.
[89] Batson and Shaw, Response to the Commentaries, p.162.
[90] Batson and Shaw, Response to the Commentaries, p.162.
[91] Huston Smith, Illustrated World’s Religions, p.114.
[92] Smith, p 114.
[93] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 113.
[94] Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, VII.iii.1.4
[95] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.112.
[96] Batson and Shaw, Response to the Commentaries, p.162.
[97] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.114.
[98] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.107.
[99] Batson, Manuscript, p. 29.
[100] Batson, Manuscript, p. 29.
[101] Batson qualifies his definition of altruism with these eight implications: 1. that it is qualitative; 2. that a single motive cannot be both altruistic and egoistic; 3. that both can exist in a single organism at the same time, but the organism will experience motivational conflict; 4. that it does not apply to reflexive or automatic behavior, only to goal-directed behavior; 5. that a person is not necessarily the best judge of his or her own motivation*; 6. that it need not necessarily lead to action; 7. that it need not involve self-sacrifice, and may even involve self-benefit as an unintended consequence; and 8. that there may be other prosocial motives that are not either altruistic or egoistic. [p.109]
[102] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 109.
[103] Batson, Manuscript, p.18.
[104] Batson, Psychological Inquiry, p.119.
[105] This makes room for an interactive conception of self as a dynamic system of complex interactions in which self's and other's interests are balanced by just such a principle of justice. See my Senior Thesis (1992) for a detailed discussion of such a Self conception.
[106] Jane Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) p. ix.
[107] Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.x.
[108] Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.xi.
[109] Batson, Psychological Inquiry, p.107.
[110] Batson, Psychological Inquiry, p.119.
[111] Batson, Psychological Inquiry, p.120.
[112] Batson, Psychological Inquiry, p.108.
[113] Batson, Psychological Inquiry, p.163.
[114] Batson, Psychological Inquiry, p.163.
[115] Batson, Psychological Inquiry, p.119.
[116] Batson, Psychological Inquiry, p.107.
[117] See my Senior Thesis for an account of how the prisoner's dilemma helps us analyze such data.
[118] Batson, Psychological Inquiry, p.120.
[119] Batson, Psychological Inquiry, p.120.
[120] Batson, Psychological Inquiry, p.120.
[121] Batson, Manuscript, p.20.
[122] Batson, Manuscript, p.441.
[123] Batson, Manuscript, p.21.
[124] Batson, Manuscript, p.22.
[125] Batson, Manuscript, p.442.
[126] Batson, Manuscript, p.22.
[127] Batson, Manuscript, p.428.
[128] Batson, Manuscript, p.430.
Without a dialectic tendency to look from both sides, we scarcely notice that this defense is perceived as offense from the receiving end, just as was the action that provoked our defensive reaction. Self-protection easily becomes other-defection in this way, and actually provokes more of just what we’re trying to overcome.
Such is the slippery slope between self-interest and selfishness – which are not, contrary to some popular beliefs, the same thing – though there is only a fine line between them, and one that is easy to miss. For there is no wrong in doing what is good for us, since what is truly good for us will also be good for others, as the ancients unanimously agreed. But being willing to actually harm others for what we perceive to be our good, not only is wrong (since it isn’t what we would, given the choice, have other do to us), but it is actually not even good for us, since it backfires against us by provoking the other’s defense, which from our view will be received as offense. For this reason alone, true self-interest will not serve us at other’s expense.
And so selfishness begets selfishness – even long before we learn the Christian conception of ‘original sin’ and the ‘economic man’ theory of Capitalism that rationalizes it. The former is (arguably) a misreading of Jesus’ teaching that seemed to serve the Roman Empire better than what he actually taught, and the latter is (arguably) a misreading of Adam Smith’s teachings that has seemed to served the American empire better than what he actually taught. For teaching that no true goodness is possible in this world, and that sin and deception is our nature, ward off much criticism of corrupted leaders, and deferred those who would have leadership be just to the next life or the ‘second coming,’ their only hope. Likewise, the ‘economic man’ theory suggests we might put this natural selfishness to good use to generate a material economy as if by ‘invisible hand’ (or as one astute student put it, by ‘invisible elbow”).
We might want to blame Philosophers themselves for these misunderstandings and the game of telephone that passes these misconceptions through time without justification (that is, a reasoned case for their justice), for so many have written so much more than most people have time or inclination to read. But we can hardly blame well-meaning philosophers who tried their best to teach what we choose not to read and think for ourselves. For if we did, we would hear Jesus teaching us precisely the opposite of selfishness, rather, to “Love thy neighbor as thyself.” Likewise, we would hear Adam Smith, a moral philosopher, teaching an enlightened form of self-interest, one that would not rationalize greed as good and selfishness as an excuse to treat our interest as opposed to others.
We might also object that not all misunderstand or misconstrue these teachings deliberately, for most of us are simply miseducated, often by well-meaning teachers who themselves took the word of their own well-meaning teachers for these interpretations of Christian and Capitalist theory. To which Buddha, Socrates, Jesus and many others would ask – why do we take other’s word for what is real, true, good, and right? Rather than reading, thinking and reasoning for yourself? Believing and trusting in the word of others without thinking these things through is frankly, just lazy, and fails to use the divine gifts we have been given. There was a time, admittedly, when people were put to death for so much as questioning the authority of those who had usurped Jesus’ message, but this is no longer the case, at least in our part of the world. And admittedly, during that time, history was rewritten by the winners, who had every incentive to present truth good as evil, and true evil as good. But while no one but monks in high towers could access these ancient texts then, what excuse have we got in an age when the original voices of so many of the ancient sages are available at our fingertips? Wolves in sheep’s clothing have long won trust by deceit so to have the power to pounce on those who speak truth to power. And for centuries, any and all who dared think for themselves and teach others to do the same were simply put to death, not unlike Jesus, Socrates, and so many others who questioned the official gods of their respective states. All written evidence of ancient wisdom they could get their hands on was destroyed, along with those who dared to seek the truth of the message of Jesus and many other ancient sages. And even the most courageous free thinkers could not access the original wisdom texts. But, fortunately for us, they couldn’t get their hands on all of it, and much is within our reach now that generations past would have given their lives for. Indeed, not only is it available to those who seek, but at our very fingertips with a click, and searchable, no less. So what is our excuse for simply believing what might be understood?
Philo (friends of or searchers for) Sophia (wisdom or truth) had this and many other things in common, but little would we know it, or anything else the ancients taught, given the game of telephone by which there teachings have been passed through time. But passive ignorance of history (which might have been justified when death was the penalty for learning) can no longer be the excuse, at least in an age when so much is so readily available to us. And so many more ancient texts having been found in recent years only makes our willingness to follow others interpretations more deplorable. Given that the verb root of the noun ‘ignorance’ is ‘to ignore’ – there can be no excuse in a good heart for settling for secondary sources, when the original sources are literally at our fingertips. To think…what so many would have given?
Contemplate this, and you may come to see why the ancients considered active ignorance to be the only true source of sin. Not our nature, and not our selfish soul – but our blind belief that let us simply follow fools with ulterior motives wherever they lead. It is lazy learning that lets us be miseducated, b/c we’ve settled for taking others word for what Jesus and other philosopher’s taught, lived, and often died, that we might learn. Miseducation by way of well-meaning but themselves misguided teachers may breed passibe ignorance in our youth, but only active ignorance lets us stay that way in our maturity, especially in a world that makes learning so easy!
So, as Buddha said, “Be lamps onto yourselves.” And you will discover why he added, “There is a path to the end of suffering. Tread it!” For it is our selfishness that is the cause of our suffering. Good reason to unlearn the (both passive and active) lies by which we have been content to live.
Adam Smith, another misquoted seeker of truth, was a moral philosopher who tried to teach us how to actualize our true good (not merely what we want) in interdependent communities where our self-interest could be manifest as good for all. Translated for us by profit mongers (who themselves didn’t bother to read well enough to understand, but only to find what they wanted to hear) have given us a false sense of his message, and letting them think for us has robbed us, not only of a form of capitalism that might have been better for us – one in which our own good as inextricably intertwined with the good of others – but also robbed us of the joy of finding that work we might enjoy so much that we would actually do for free (though needn’t, in a world where trade is fair.) Who wouldn’t prefer a world in which giving of ourselves – our work – what is actually good for others would bring what is good for us back around in turn.
We might wonder how many other great thoughts have been misconstrued in this way. For instance, how might the world be different if we’d understood that Karl Marx was arguing only for the quality of our work-time, that we might find work that we love, rather than merely selling our time for others profit? And what if the Newtonian-Cartesian world view had not been twisted into the materialization of our good, and the mechanization of power and change? How much less selfish would we be if we’d learned from ancient eastern and western philosophy how the concepts of karma and justice really work?
What kind of people would we be if these misunderstandings had not been so prevalent in our education? What kind of people might we yet be if we would rethink the errors of our own learning, and help our young to not learn them to begin with?
Education that makes the most of the original sources of humanities greatest thoughts would (arguably) prevent the kind of selfishness which these days plagues the world. The voices of the great souls who learned and taught of their own good, that we might better learn and teach our young of theirs. For learned selfishness is both self and other destructive, and a belief that it is our nature is as much self-fulfilling prophesy, as would be a better understanding of our potential goodness, from which our true happiness grows. This choice we make is the source of good and/or evil, passively or actively, in our lives and in our world. And it is one purpose of this book, and true philosophy throughout time, to help us see and understand the divine potentials we too often neglect.
Aristotle said of Plato, who said of Socrates, who said of many others from whom he learned, “To be good is to be happy.” But you needn’t and shouldn’t take anyone’s word for this, when the processes by which this happens might be so easily understood first hand (hence, the challenges I presented in my introductory thoughts). It’s the purpose of this chapter to show how all this works, and the value of learning it for any human life.
For there are well reasoned teachings (for which many of the great souls paid with their lives) that can help us ‘see’ how we create both good and evil in the world around us by way of our true power and true self-interest, or the lack thereof. The power that love gives us to bring out the good in others is (arguably) the source of our very divinity…just as the power of our selfishness to bring out the worst in others is the source of so much evil. Either way, we reap what we sew. So it’s in our true interest to learn to actualize the former, and overcome the habits of the latter, and to help others overcome theirs as well.
On The Evolution of Cooperation and Competition
Robert Axelrod adds to this discussion then in his study of the prisoner’s dilemma, illuminating the power of these ancient ideas to help us heal our relationships with one another, as well as our relationship with nature. His book is entitled The Evolution of Cooperation, and as a political scientist and game theorist, Axelrod’s study provides an excellent examination of the logic and philosophical implications of what game theorists call the prisoner’s dilemma. I provide an exegesis of it here to emphasize a theme that is crucial to an understanding of the practical value of philosophy, and the importance of fairness for the growth of healthy relationships and human happiness in general. In the process, it shows the feedback dynamics by which a bad idea can plant the seed of destruction, not only in a life, but in an entire culture.
Axelrod’s study begins as “an investigation of individuals who pursue their own self-interest without the aid of a central authority to force them to cooperate with each other.”(p.6) In other words, those who are free to do otherwise, so will only cooperate if they choose to.
Because self-interest, as we commonly understand it, is assumed to put one in competition with others, the typical tendency is to take when perhaps we should rather give, or sometimes to give when that too is unwise. The fact is, with little experience in the matter, most of us aren’t very astute when it comes to telling the difference in what is wise and when. And what too often happens, after a few good-hearted attempts to give to takers, our tendency is too often to retreat into a strictly defensive policy of always taking, which seems to guarantee we will never be burned again. But is this really in our true interest?
Given so many such confusing incentives in our development, including a widespread belief in ‘original sin’ or ‘fallen man,’ as well as much incentive to adopt the ‘economic man’ concept of self-interest, from which the good for all will supposedly emerge, as if by ‘invisible hand,’ many of us have had little encouragement to rethink how it is that we ourselves may be planting the seeds of our own unhealthy relationships by way of these attitudes. We see a growing tendency toward competition in our world, without the necessary balance that a better understanding of cooperation would provide. And in the process, we face the challenge to both understand, and teach, the practical reason for treating others fairly – which may mean sometimes cooperating, and sometimes competing.
“The most famous answer was given over three hundred years ago by Thomas Hobbes. It was pessimistic.”(p.4) Indeed, Hobbes “argued that before governments existed, the state of nature was dominated by the problem of selfish individuals who competed on such ruthless terms that life was ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’ (Hobbes 1651/1962, p. 100). So Hobbes assumption was that people would not cooperate out of self-interest in the state of nature. In his view, cooperation could not develop without a central authority, and consequently a strong government was necessary. Ever since, arguments about the proper scope of government have often focused on whether one could, or could not, expect cooperation to emerge in a particular domain if there were not an authority to police the situation.”(p.4)
Arguably, it’s possible Hobbes didn’t actually say this (an issue to which we will return), but what he did do was what all too many philosophers do, he wrote too much! His book, Levaithan, was * pages long! With the result is that people tend not to bother reading it, but either took someone else’s word for what was written therein (making room for the game of telephone effect), or read only enough to allow them to jump to conclusions. And the thing is, what Hobbes did say would be of much more help to those who truly want to understand so-called ‘human nature.’
What Hobbes argued…*
Peter Kropotkin…*
George Herbert Mead recognized, as did Piaget, that individuals are restrained and constrained by both the natural and the social environment, forces which overpower us in many respects in the hierarchical scheme of relative powers. But he also noted that we ourselves exercise a power over those to whom we are environment. This relationship makes self-control over one's growth and development the right and responsibility of the human organism itself -- as is the growth and development of that over which we have power, and thus, responsibility.
B. F. Skinner was quite clear about the determining relationship between the environment and the individual, but he failed to note that we are each other's environments. Thus, as Mead argued, we are not socially determined, as he wanted to conclude, but interactive within the forces that surround us. Skinner conveniently ignored that the world around us consists of other people making choices with regard to one another and us, and therefore that we are conditioned by each other, making our relationships subject to feedback dynamics. In as much as others react to our choices and actions, we are conditioned by the reciprocal effects of our own behavior – which is a process highly conducive to reform, for it is not unidirectional, as if influence flows only one way, but interactive, which allows us to change our environment rather than merely to be changed by it.
This dynamics of interactive power were better understood in ancient times than they tend to be today, and would certainly need to be understood better, if we would hope to improve our relationships, let alone the human condition. For we can be – and in fact, are, whether we want to be or not – an influence over others, just as they are over us. And just as we are subject to conditioning forces that others set into motion, we are therefore subject to the consequences of our own actions toward those others. Which is to say that, by yesterday’s actions we chose our environments of today, and likewise, by our actions today, we choose the environment we will live in tomorrow. The same ancient idea the Vedic Hindus called karma.
Thanks in part to Skinner's behavioristic legacy, we are in the habit of thinking in terms of big environment and little people, conveniently forgetting that we are environment to those who are dependent upon us, just as they are environment to us. The natural responsibility that comes with this power can be both frightening and challenging. While we may be influenced and even controlled by our environment, we are not altogether determined by it, because we have influence over those in our environment who in turn have influence over us, and we often get back what we give. Our choices of actions and reactions, little as they seem to change our own environment, have powerful consequences as they come to affect the environments of others, which often comes back to us. In effect, we are parent to more than just our own immediate offspring. And in this, we are responsible for the difference we make.
Skinner claimed that the fact that we "feel free" is what disguises control of our operant conditioning. By control of our sense of value, institutions effectively control our behavior, allowing us to feel free when we are choosing between options, that are nonetheless chosen for us --which is certainly true to a point, but not the last word. If certain values and thus the behaviors which follow from them are positively reinforced by various persuasive methods of social conditioning, then so much talk of our freedom is just that, mere talk, rhetoric, designed to deter us from looking too close at the ways that our 'freedom' is co-opted and our behavior coerced. Such that ours is not a free system, but a system of psychological coercion, one that distorts our knowledge, values, and power -- such that in our insecurity we come to "believe" and to trust the false values of those who perpetuate their own power at our expense while claiming to have our best interest at heart. Institutions that purport to guide, direct, and council, but actually "manage" while seeing to their own survival as organisms in their own right. And yet, there is a sense in which our choice remains free, but not true freedom, as long as the artificial value system that guides it, if we can see through the blinding constraints of the materialism we are sold. By simply recognizing this dynamic of coerced behavior through persuasion of value, we begin to undermine its effectiveness.
As we shall see, by the mechanisms revealed in consideration of the Prisoners Dilemma, this force that exploits and prevents our effective "counter-control", actually originates within us. By intelligent exercise of the free-will, which is still and always our potential, we retain the power to choose alternate values. We certainly do have free-will, we simply don't always remember how to use it to our advantage once we have bought into narrowly self-interested values that can ultimately defeat us. It boils down to the fact that, these days, we just don't know our own best-interest. This ignorance, or more accurately, this act of ignoring true value is what cripples our choice.
As Socrates said, “Everybody wants what's good for them, but not every body knows what that is.”
It seems to me that we can reason both empirically and a priori about what is universally good for us, in the broadest possible sense, such as that "objective good" to which Plato and Nagel refer.(p. 127, The Possibility of Altruism, by Thomas Nagel, in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo) Toward this, the PD model is prescriptive. By assuming an initial natural equality among humans (if only an equality of right to fair consideration in decisions by which they are affected, as in the method of deep ecology), and asking What does well-being mean? Or what is good for us? (in much the way that John Rawls does), we quite reasonably come up with something very much like his and other's conclusion of satisfied need compatible with the like need in others. If we still want to talk about desires, we might want to ask about why we have the particular desires that we do, why we sometimes desire what is not good for us, and why we often don't desire what is good for us? These are interesting questions, and they get at the important subject of social conditioning and assumed rationality.
Taking seriously the levels of moral reasoning postulated by theorists from Plato to Kohlberg could contribute significantly to our understanding of the conditioned will in its adaptations, which is more or less reflective as it sees fit, and egoistic when it deems necessary. The dynamics of these motivating reasons have the potential to clear up many a debate over semantics, including that which revolves around the meaning of "rationality," I think, as what we mean when we say this or that about self and ego is going to depend critically on the level of reasoning about which we are talking and how well we understand the assumptions underlying those reasons, which are the actual causes behind actions, and can be talked about in quite universal terms. Understanding the honest motivations that follow from certain needs and assumed values, e.g. pleasure/pain, social approval, or principle of justice and equality, would seem more fruitful and comprehensive than a complex system of preferences between desires and pleasures.
My thesis involves reasoning out which from among our choices are more or less enlightened in certain common survival challenges. We have assumed a form of "rationality" which turns out to be practically irrational, modern paradoxes call into question, and toward resolution of these conflicts of interest we face, replication of the lessons of these paradoxes is toward intelligent evolution.
Pleasure/pain psychology is certainly at work in our motivations, and as theorists from Plato, to Piaget, Kohlberg, and Rawls have elaborated, they are among the strongest of our motivations, if only because they answer to the most fundamental level of need, and are therefore governed more directly by physical laws; which is to say that they are reflexive, and in this, not easily overridden by reflection at the psychological level. We almost can't help but respond to the positive reinforcement of pleasure and the negative reinforcement of pain in our environment; it is simply the self-preservative response. [psychological egoism]
However, we do not exist and behave merely on this level. Because of the continuum of our needs, which stretches from the physical to the psychological, we are not always reflexively reactive to external stimuli, but interactive with it. Which is to say, we are able to exercise our will by intelligent reflection on our choices, a force in the psychological realm of things beyond the physical laws of nature. If human beings come to understand and achieve moral self-control, it is by coming to terms with the limits of our justified rights of taking pleasure and of causing pain.
Hence Kohlberg's next level of moral reasoning, beyond pleasure/pain, which is rule-oriented "good boy/good girl" psychology. This form of reasoning involves a conception of self as nested within and causal toward society. Here, one exercises more reflection in choosing one's actions, reasoning more toward the good of the whole as good for self. Note though that while cooperative, in PD terms, this is not altruistic, since it is still self-interested, just shared interest.
As in Hobbes account that humans choose society for peace, his claim is really one about why people might come to play tit for tat, that is, to scratch the back of those who will reciprocate. While this shift toward the collective is certainly up the ladder of moral reason from pleasure/pain psychology, it is important to see that this reasoning is not, in fact, less self-interested, for in this case the good of society is for the sake of the good of self, only here in a slightly broader sense. One may be less reactive and more active in this self-directed choice (that is, more determined by one's own reflective choices rather than by reflex), but these choices still hold self's own good as the end toward which behavior aims. Following the rules and behaving properly because it is often beneficial to one self do so, or because it is uncomfortable to do otherwise, is still a fairly narrow form of reasoning about one's self-interest.
At yet another higher and broader level of moral reflection in Kohlberg's system, self sees beyond one's own pleasure and pain, beyond reputation among others which drives behavior at the lower and narrower level, even beyond one's own interest in peace and well-being, and comes to act on principle, according to an ideal conception of just response, toward good of the whole on which the individual depends, and so will come to identify with those groups on which he or she depends, which is as broadly as self can possibly identify, perhaps as the stoics held self to be a "citizen of the universe". Which is to say, even when the principle works against self's narrower interests. This reasoning is on the basis of a conception of self as occupying any and all positions in that society (as behind Rawls' "veil of ignorance") free of one's own narrow interests. Right for right's sake yields then a broader conception of self, and with it, a broader conception of one's interests. The choice of actions which follows from this highly reflective moral reasoning are those which conform to Kant's Categorical Imperative, the Christian golden rule, Gandhi's passive resistance, Taoist wu wei, the Stoic natural law, the Socratic dictum, and even the postulates of Zen Buddhism -- call it what you will.
On the surface these imperatives may seem anything but compatible, but (arguably) they differ in perspective and words only. On the level of such broad reasoning, they are all consistent with the same fundamental principle of justice, which is itself compatible with the law of nature that preserves the conservation of energy -- for the principle by which every action yields an equal and opposite reaction is as true on a psychological level as it is true on the level of the physical. Which perhaps accounts for one of the lessons Aristotle is said to have learned from Plato -- that the truest happiness comes from the most genuine goodness -- happiness being the reaction to the action of goodness, for goodness sake. [reference: Aristotle, from Leatch]
Here, Kant's distinction between the genuine and the egoistic altruist has meaning, because right-for-right's-sake has a fundamentally different reason than right-for-the-sake-of-social-approval, or right-for-the-sake-of-pleasure.[p.16, Milo] It is a difference which shows up clearly in the mature individual whenever these different motivations come into conflict, e.g. when social approval or pleasure and pain reinforce behavior which goes against what is objectively right; it is the choice made in this pinch -- familiar to many of us -- which is the critical choice as far as character is concerned. Whether a given individual is genuinely altruistic -- adhering to the principle even when doing so means self-sacrifice (as in the extreme cases of those martyrs who have given their lives for what it teaches to others, that is, "for our sins"), or only concerned about others when it is easy, useful or pleasurable, and thus are prone to turn against that broad interest whenever it is not socially reinforced or self-beneficial in some way -- seems an important distinction [though not a distinction that should be taken too far in its general application]. It at least makes a critical difference when push comes to shove, as they say; the difference in whether a person can really be trusted to treat others fairly or not, is the line between the egoist and the altruist. That a person gets some personal benefit from doing the right thing by others does not deem their altruism inauthentic; the question is whether they would or would not do it without this personal benefit. Therefore the real test is whether a person will do best by others even at expense to him or herself.
This approach comes at the concept of self in such a way as to render moot the question of the degree to which we are or ought to be egoistic. These questions don't come up in an interactive system of self, because they are explained by a conception of self as potentiality, adapted to given conditions of survival. If self is considered to be consciousness acting toward fit survival of the organism, and flexible in this adaptation as it comes to define survival on the continuum between the concrete self and the abstract other, then the degree to which people actually are or ought to be egoistic or altruistic is largely an effect of the environment in which individuals are required to survive, or at least of the beliefs about that environment and its threats that the individual holds and upon which strategies of survival are formed. Beliefs about what is 'natural', or at any rate, what is necessary to survive well, however accurate or erroneous, are the assumptions upon which reason is formed. And the relationship between them and the behavior that follows from them will take a conditional form --"if... then..."
Such a conception gives us reason to ask what conditions provoke what survival strategies, egoism or altruism, or combinations of these elements. The dynamics of these choices are deep and complex, and certainly worthy of our attention, but the question of which is more the inclination of human nature seems practically meaningless, as all it can really tell us is how humans have seen fit to adapt to conditions so far -- not how humans are inevitably. If we change the conditions of human development, it stands to reason that we will have changed human behavior -- but it is unlikely that by this we would have changed human nature, per se. Human nature is all potential; any particular adaptation is part reflex, and part choice. Seeing consciousness as the tool of survival that it is, with attention at center, with peripheral, future, and hindsight as well, shows self and its reaches to be as broad or narrow as an individual sees fit. (Footnote: Note that to say that human nature is all potential is not to say that all selves are potential for all people, for the interactive effect between the individual and the opportunities presented by the environment will reinforce, one way or another, the individuals intrinsic tendencies, encouraging or discouraging development in some directions more than others.) It is the universal nature of all conscious beings to survive as well as possible, making egoistic/altruistic choices a matter of the particular conditions of opportunity and limitations within the environment in which an organism is nested.
The dynamics of cause and effect in interactive human reasoning are very important, for what an individual consciousness believes about what is valuable and worth acting for will form the very foundations of that persons reasoning; the assumptions about what's important which underly one's motivations. Thus, it seems a potentially dangerous exercise to generalize about whether people are narrowly or broadly self-interested, as the conclusions of such generalized speculation tends to be causally efficacious – that is, beliefs become self-fulfilling prophesies.
On the other hand, with the help of the PD, we might meaningfully consider the conditions of different environments so to understand why different people come to believe and behave in different ways, as well as how these effects are iterated over time. By such self-analysis as this thought experiment involves, we might also recognize the true extent of the individuals part in the whole social dynamic, and thus the answer to the ubiquitous question, which too often these days receives a self-defeating answer, "What can one person do?" In every individual life, the answer to this question is "Everything!" for one lives, not within a purely and objectively selfish world, as the old psychology assumed, but within the part of the world that one literally creates around oneself, reactive to one's actions that it is. If we care what's good for us -- as every theory of human motivation holds that we do -- then what follows from this interactive reasoning should interest us very much.
Perhaps even Thomas Hobbes might have been convinced by it logic, both empirical and a priori, that the fine but critical distinction between the "will to hurt" and the "will to keep from being hurt," which he himself took account of but did not take seriously enough, is the line between "selfishness" and "self-preservation" -- morally, a very big difference. [Perhaps this also accounts for the difference between psychological and evolutionary egoism as well]. If we are going to keep asking ourselves and our students about the tendency toward "egoism" in "human nature," we ought to be clear on these different types of self-interest, on their different ends, different levels of justification, and different consequences. The wholesale reduction of all human behavior to narrow self-interest is a causal force in the further narrowing of that behavior, and prevents our understanding of the subtle dynamics involved in our own moral reasonings. The assumption that we are "guilty until proven innocent" with respect to our underlying motivations, simply assumed to be "sinners," robs us of our choice in the matter, necessitating our unconditional defection, thus violating the natural innocence of reason. Since narrowness is the natural, defensive, and just reaction to such an assumption that others themselves are narrowly self-interested, shouldn’t we assume the best about human nature, since that too can become a self-fulfilling prophesy?
Why does it matter in everyday situations whether behavior is, in fact, action or reaction? It matters because a reaction is justifiable in a way that action is sometimes not. In as much as self-preservation is the right and responsibility of every living organism, so reaction to environmental stimuli is the natural, necessary, and in an important sense fair response to the survival challenges of the world in which one lives. Reaction has its origin, that is, its locus of control, outside of the organism, and is thus, as Hobbes says, determined "by a certain impulsion of nature, no less than that whereby a stone moves downward." (p.22, Hobbes)
"[T]o have a care of one's self is so far from being a matter scornfully to be looked upon, that one has neither the power nor wish to have done otherwise. For every man is desirous of what is good for him, and shuns what is evil, but chiefly the chiefest of natural evils, which is death; and this he doth by a certain impulsion of nature, no less than that whereby a stone moves downward." (p.22, Hobbes) (For an elaboration of primary and secondary defection, see "Justice, Choice, and Interactive Responsibility," Juliana Hunt,1990.)
"It is therefore neither absurd nor reprehensible, neither against the dictates of true reason, for a man to use all his endeavors to preserve and defend his body and the members thereof from death and sorrows...justly, and with right."(p.22, Hobbes)
Action, on the other hand, involves more of choice and discrimination between alternative options of behavior, and is, in this sense, self-determined by one's internal locus of control.( Further distinction is drawn between thinking and unthinking responses, i.e. reflective and reflexive, [in Chapter 11] because, to the extent that human beings have reflective moral control, many reactions are in part action.)
The line between those actions which are toward one's own self-preservation and those which seek more than one's fair share, and thus provoke others to act in their own self-preservative interests, is the line beyond which (defensive) secondary defection becomes (offensive) primary defection. Seeing this distinction helps us talk about the difference between defense and offense, so important, but often ignored, in most discussions of human rationality. It is critical to see this because behaving toward one's own preservation is a right that is justified in a way that behaving toward more than one's fair share of goods or power is not. Between secondary and primary defection is a threshold beyond which one's safety is secured and thus one's rightful freedoms are limited. As Mill argues, my freedom ends where that of another begins – a threshold we scarcely seem to notice.
Clearly, there is a sharp moral difference between the reasoning of the actor and the reactor, for when one's actions threaten another, they create the very danger from which the other is compelled to self-protection; thus, the former provides the stimulus to the latter's response. This makes the actor/offender responsible for the actions that the reactor/defender must undertake as self-protection.
If we better understood the reasoning behind the dynamics of offense and defense, then perhaps we would not continue to blur them together into one motivation -- "the will to hurt" – which seems to allow a whole host of sins against fair shares to be committed in the name of self-preservation. What Nietzsche calls the “will to power” may well be a “will to justice” in many cases. In this less than honest state of activity, we seem to be able to rationalize any want as if it were a need, take any pleasure as if we are justified by the mere belief that it is good for us, as if freedom has no restraints.
Thomas Hobbes is commonly taken to have argued the claim that all human beings exhibit "the will to hurt." (quote in Hobbes, "the will to hurt", p. 21, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo) But as we shall see, the line between actions that are self-defensive and those which are actually offensive, between what we will here call primary /active and secondary /reactive defection (p.38, in The Implications of the PD for Social Science Theory), is a line Hobbes himself drew when he qualified his assertion with the following claim: "All men in the state of nature have a desire and will to hurt, but not proceeding from the same cause, neither equally to be condemned. "(p.21, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo)
This qualifier indicates that, despite Hobbes seeming pessimism about human motivation and the conclusions he drew about the limits of our potentials, there is more going on in the depths of his analysis than is taken into consideration in the conclusion with which history credits him.
In fact, Hobbes analysis of the reasons behind "the will to hurt" shows clearly that it is more than the mere "impulsion of nature" which causes this will, and thus, that it is not as necessary and inevitable as we have taken him to mean. Rather, because it is part action and part reaction which brings the aggression out in human beings, the deeper dynamics he observes in human behavior do not lead us directly to the conclusion that aggressive motivation is the nature of human beings.
Rather, it is both an assumption (p.18, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo) and a conclusion (p. 25, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo) in Hobbes that the law of nature is for humans to seek peace. It "is the dictate of right reason, that is, the law of nature...to seek peace, where there is any hope of obtaining it..."(p.25, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo )
"[I]t cannot be denied but that the natural state of men, before they entered into society, was a mere war, and that not simply, but a war of all men against all men. For what is WAR, but that same time in which the will of contesting by force is fully declared... The time remaining is termed PEACE."( p.24, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo)
The essence of Hobbes reasoning is that human beings choose to form societies for the sake of peace, that is, relief and resolution from and of the conflict that comes with open competition for goods. But the lopsided message we have taken from his philosophy has been upon the conflict inherent in the state of nature, rather than the important part, that is, the tendency of humans to choose away from conflict where they can, and opt instead for peace.
*
But again, it "is the dictate of right reason, that is, the law of nature...to seek peace, where there is any hopes of obtaining it..."( p.25, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo)
It does not take a great leap to see the form of egoism that Hobbes rationalizes – i.e. primary defection, which is to say the harm of others out of motivation other than self-defense -- is contrary to this law of nature, and in this, irrational.
While we have understood Hobbes to have claimed that conflict is inherent in the state of nature,
One important point of all this is that what is empirically evident depends in large part upon what one is looking for. If one looks for the best in human nature, it is there to be seen in vast abundance – it just is easier to overlook and take for granted. But the truth is that both and all potentials are part of the whole truth about human nature.
However, a philosophy which equates the state of nature with human conflict and society with peace, besides being a misreading of Hobbes deeper analysis, also ignores that society, as actualized empirically, often causes more conflict than it resolves, at least for another certain portion of its population. One who might be willing to affirm society as a good thing when it does resolve the conflict inherent to interdependent survival, could still deny any rationalization, such as Hobbes' seems to claim, which assumes society good across the board, even when it creates conflict where there might otherwise be peace. While, ideally, it might be true that the primary reason to opt into the social contract is to resolve the conflict intrinsic to our mutual need to survive, and certainly this is part of what society accomplishes for a certain portion of its population, but it's not all that human society accomplishes, in real terms, as it has actually evolved. Therefore, while humans may sometimes choose into the social contract to resolve the conflict intrinsic to the mutual need to survive, it could be argued that, by the very same law of nature which causes them to opt into society, human beings might find reason to opt out of it. It depends entirely upon whether society is causing a given choosing individual peace or conflict to begin with.
The perceived need to defend oneself seems to be, as Hobbes suggests in his blurry identification of these motives, the chief source of the perceived right to offend others. Rightful defense turns to unjustified offense whenever particular experiences with individuals lead to generalized attitudes about everyone in the groups and categories to which those individuals belong -- as in the case at hand, from learned distrust of proved egoists to an assumed distrust of human nature, in general.
And yet, despite the conflict created by this generalized attitude, what follows from Hobbes deeper analysis is that, not conflict, but conflict resolution is the ultimate motivation inherent in human nature. We can conclude this from the line of his reasoning, regardless of the conclusions he himself draws, or of the empirical fact that many do, in fact, antagonize the existence of others. Those who do seem to deliberately create conflict for others make it necessary for all to cope with them, in self defense. But there is a critical distinction to be made between those actions which are toward the resolution of conflict, toward survival and peace, and those which resolve only one’s own conflict while actually creating it for others. It may seem irrational that some would act away from peace, but as Socrates says, “Everyone wants what’s good for them, but not everyone knows what that is.” People make mistakes about what is good for them, as about what is toward peace. But it is a mistake, not a sin they commit, for no one errs willingly.
It is this distinction that Hobbes himself draws in his claim that some motivations are simply more justified than others: "not proceeding from the same cause, neither equally to be condemned."( p.21, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo) When presented with conflict, consciousness either resolves it, where it can, or reacts defensively toward it where it cannot do otherwise. This confusion about what conflict is and is not resolvable is the very source of the increasingly narrowed self-interest that passes for ‘human nature’. But it is not the nature of human beings to cause conflict, after all, but to resolve it if it is or seems possible to do so.
Hobbes' deeper analysis is that the nature of humans (indeed, of all conscious beings) is to cope with conflict toward peace, and not to create it where it can be avoided. Those conflicts which arise naturally in survival are certainly that state of nature with which humans must contend, but it is the adaptation, the coping, the problem solving toward peace which is the true and better aspect of our nature.
Unfortunately, the belief that such conflict is our very nature quickly becomes a cause in itself of that conflict, a self fulfilling prophesy, in that the potential for peace gets lost in our perceived need to react defensively, even where we need not.
Such a view of human nature as that which cannot distinguish between different forms of aggression amounts to believing that children are born bad, so we have to protect ourselves against them, manage them, teach them and punish them when the don’t learn. This is not only ridiculous reasoning, but quite destructive to every human child who feels its effects in the course of adapting to institutions which are formed on this assumption, including family, education, religion, economy, polity, and law. Failing to distinguish between the cause and the effect of narrow rationality, we often provoke our dependents to their defense by our own narrowness. And in this way, we bring out the worst in our children.
We can talk about the relationship between responsibility and dependence in human survival reasoning. Hobbes admits that "a son cannot be understood to be at any time in the state of nature, as being under the power and command of them to whom he owes his protection as soon as ever he is born, namely, either his father's or his mother's, or him that nourished him;"( p.23, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo) Thus, the behavior of dependents is shown to be a reaction to the actions of operants. Since we are all born so dependent, it follows that the state of any given child's nature is such as that child's caretakers make it. As children, we are reactive to parents and other caretakers, who are active. Surely, an innocent child is no threat to its caretakers, and yet, by way of the belief that they are bad, children find themselves in our world provoked to their own self-defense, secondarily defecting to the primary defections of responsible others. It can't reasonably be argued that the secure have a right to threaten the dependent for whom they are responsible. And yet, a philosophy which does not consider the feedback dynamics in interactive psychology draws no distinction between defensive and offensive egoism, between the dependent young and the responsible elders, between the reactors and the actors.
Here then is the cause of that conflict which Hobbes I think wrongly calls the state of nature; it is a state of social organization in which individuals are compelled to grow aggressive in order to adapt and survive. Secondary defection sees to the individual organisms needs. On the other hand, an action motivated by what might be termed greed, as opposed to need, is not that of the "natural evil" which Hobbes assumes to arise from the struggle to survive in the state of nature, but is rather a moral evil, a primary defection, which arises out of just such rationalized injustice as Hobbes accomplishes in his failure to make this critical distinction between the right to survive and the assumed right to more than fair shares beyond one's interests in survival and well-being.
Primary defection is, in fact, defection without justified reason. It is offense, which presumes to be justified under the need for defense, is not a reaction, as such, but an action, and has no such external cause, reason, or justification as a stone moving downhill; rather, it is impelled by an internal motivation away from justice, and toward rather than away from evil. As he says, death is a natural evil, "For every man is desirous of what is good for him, and shuns what is evil, but chiefly the chiefest of natural evils, which is death; and this he doth by a certain impulsion of nature, no less than that whereby a stone moves downward."( p.22, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo) and therefore, if follows that causing death, as hindering other's survival does, is causing evil.
Self-defense (secondary defection) on the other hand, is a reaction to such evil, and thus, is as natural as a stone moving downhill. Hobbes rightly claims that, "It is therefore neither absurd nor reprehensible, neither against the dictates of true reason, for a man to use all his endeavors to preserve and defend his body and the members thereof from death and sorrows...justly, and with right."( p.22, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo) But a person with offensive motivation (primary defection) is not acting in self-defense, according to "natural right," for the reason he acts is not "to preserve and defend his body and the members thereof from death and sorrows...justly, and with right," but to "pursue farther than their security requires." (Thomas Hobbes, "The Leviathon", in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, Vol. III, ed. W. Molesworth. In ILS 206 Course Materials, ed. C. Anderson, p.42, [check this quote])
The choice to offend, as opposed to a need to defend, is not the necessary "impulsion of nature" he claims, but is the intentional impulse of unprovoked and unjustified narrow self-interest. Offensive action (primary defection) shows its irrationality in Hobbes own claim -- that it "is the dictate of right reason, that is, the law of nature...to seek peace, where there is any hopes of obtaining it..."( p.25, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo)
It is those who threaten the survival of others who actually destroy peace, for those others and for themselves by provoking violent reactions to their actions. A greedy actor causes others to need to hurt him by secondary reaction, which cannot be considered in any way "good" for the primary actor, who is now threatened by his or her own just deserts -- that is, has promoted his or her own death. It follows that the primary defector is irrational, in that he or she is the cause of survival threats to others, and thus, in promoting other's death, is the cause of evil itself -- which is here "moral," not "natural" [read: determined by will, not inevitable according to the physical forces of nature alone].
Those who undertake such rationalized greed are behaving unreasonably, for when they "pursue farther than their security requires,"( Thomas Hobbes, "The Leviathon", in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, Vol. III, ed. W. Molesworth. In ILS 206 Course Materials, ed. C. Anderson, p.42, [check this quote]) they effectively bring an end to the security, peace, and innocence into which the dependent have a right to be born and which more rational others crave.
Nowhere is this selfishness more apparent or potent than in the relationships of caretakers and dependents, which include far more than simply parents and children. That some who are offensive (primary defectors) cause dependent others of more temperate will to be defensive (secondary defectors), is given even in Hobbes. And that the offensive actor is to be condemned more than the defensive reactor, who is more justified, is also held there. But it does not follow that "all men in the state of nature have a desire to hurt others." Self-defense is not equal to a will to hurt, but to prevent a hurt. It may take the form of violence, but the intention is to end a violence, not create one. In this, secondary defection is toward peace, not war; toward justice, not injustice. Therefore, not in the state of nature, but reactive to particular conditions, as often created as resolved by society.
Since self-aggrandizement is not equal to self-preservation, an offensive action is not done by "right reason" -- even if it may seem so to the unreflective actor. It only seems his right because he does not use right reason, and does not reason justly when judging his actions. Judging oneself and one's interests superior to those one offends can make actions seem necessary to self-protection (p.23, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo) but they are not in fact justified by one's right to self-preservation.
This state of the actors belief and knowledge are critical variables in the justification of defective action. Hobbes says that "[I]f any man pretend somewhat to tend necessarily to his preservation, which yet he himself doth not confidently believe so, he may offend against the laws of nature..." ( p.23, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo) Even Hobbes admits, one offends the laws of nature by one's active ignorance of fairness and pretense of superiority when primary offense pretends to be secondary defense.
"[T]here is no reason why any man, trusting to his own strength, should conceive himself made by nature above others. They are equals... All men therefore among themselves are by nature equal; the inequality we now discern, hath its spring from the civil law."( p.21, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo)
As we will see, And yet, Hobbes allows for wide violation of this, "[B]ecause whatsoever a man would, it therefore seems good to him because he wills it, and either it really doth, or at least seems to him to contribute towards his preservation..."( p.23, Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo)
Only one who believes others will play fair can actually choose to cooperate, i.e. play fair, or defect, i.e. play selfish. In the opposite case, where one believes, rightly or wrongly, that others will play selfish, one has little choice but to play selfishly oneself in self-defense, or in PD terms, sacrifice survival by taking the sucker's payoff.
*
Suffice it to say, for now, that while egoism may be a familiar characteristic of human beings, especially these days and in our ‘western’ part of the world, it is far from universal, or the so-called 'human nature' we like to call it. In fact, this tendency to capitalize on the vulnerable is merely a bad habit, and a relatively new and still fairly localized tendency at that. In fact, it is not much older than the idea of capitalism that has evolved (or been corrupted) into what it has become in our age. It's true that it can seem to be almost 'human nature' when you grow up surrounded by so many who seem to be capitalistic at heart, but – like the statue of Glaucus to which Plato compares the human soul, having sunk into the deep long ago, the human soul has become so steeped in the effects of the sea that the accumulated crust makes it hard to see its true state.
In fact, if this were our inevitable nature, then we would not see the myriad exceptions that we actually do around the world and throughout history. Closer to the whole truth of the matter, not as many live as we capitalists do as might seem to those of us who were born into this sea of corruption.
For our purposes though, let’s take what Axelrod says about this as a given, since the result of our misunderstanding of Hobbes has become our actual reality. Add to this that Hobbes was beyond subtle in his style of writing -- and for understandable reasons, since he wrote in a age when the divine right of kings was still a fundamental assumption underlying politico-religious relations in what was then the entirety of the western world, his theorizing had powerful implications for the powers that be in his time, who had no qualms about putting people to death for challenging them. So, given the reality of what was sure to happen to anyone who questioned their authority, it was no surprise that Hobbes would make the overt case that “authority should be absolute,” just as they would want to hear. What has gone unnoticed, even in our own time, was Hobbes covert argument, written between the lines, which emphatically laid out the limits of absolute power (“only for protection and defense…and never if protection and defense is needed against them*), but also examined the fundamental human motivations at work, which did not follow the reasoning that was implied by his claims about the state of nature.
Rather than suggesting that human are naturally and narrowly self-interested, Hobbes logic makes the case that humans are motivated primarily by a desire for peace. (*…) And by this reasoning, it would follow that humans are not fundamentally greedy and egoistic, but rather, defensively so. That is, they tend to behave this way when they feel it necessary to be, when they perceive their well being to be challenged, and especially when they are confused about just what their well-being entails. It is unfortunate that in the state of nature as we know it, individuals are too often compelled to their own defense, and so were better off with the protection and defense of a central authority. But the result has been a widespread belief that people will not ‘naturally’ be good unless induced to by extrinsic incentives (such as others praise, or the promise of an afterlife) or forced to (by threat of punishment).
So the problem remains, the pursuit of ‘self-interest’, such as we have come to understand it, tends to lead to a rather poor outcome for all. So many become convinced that the only solution can be in the form of hard-handed authority, whether that be in parental discipline, educational methods, legal sanctions, or the assertion of the need for communal adherence to religious orthodoxy over an ever present faith in the power of individual spiritual growth.
So the question arises, how to “foster cooperation among individuals, organizations, and nations.”(p.ix), to see if “cooperation can emerge among egoists without central authority.”(p.viii) That is, can people learn the intrinsic benefits of treating one another with mutual respect without being forced to, and without the impetus of extrinsic motivators to do so? Can cooperation be “based solely on reciprocity,”(p.viii) such that individuals will treat one another fairly simply out of self-interest sufficiently enlightened that it values the intrinsic benefits of doing so?
This is not unlike the question that Plato’s older brother, Glaucon, asks Socrates to prove to them in Plato’s Republic. What is the intrinsic value of justice?
*…
The answer to this question emerges in the dynamics of the prisoner’s dilemma game, which illuminates what is common in such situations.(p.7) A prisoner’s dilemma occurs when two persons find themselves in a situation where one’s benefit is (or is perceived to be) the others loss. (In fact, these need not actually be zero-sum games, but it is the perception that they are that causes each to reason toward a narrow form of rationality, that is, self-interest narrowly conceived, which does not include the interests of the other in the outcome.)
“The original story,” which had puzzled game theorists and political scientists for decades, involves a scenario in which “two accomplices to a crime are arrested and questioned separately. Either can defect against the other by confessing and hoping for a lighter sentence. But if both confess, their confessions are not as valuable. On the other hand, if both cooperate with each other by refusing to confess, the district attorney can only convict them on a minor charge. Assuming that neither player has moral qualms about, or fear of, squealing, the payoffs can form a Prisoner’s Dilemma (Luce and Faiffa 1957, pp. 94-95) From society’s point of view, it is a good thing that the two accomplices have little likelihood of being caught in the same situation again soon, because that is precisely the reason why it is to each of their individual advantages to double-cross the other. As long as the interaction is not iterated, cooperation is very difficult…” It is “continuing interaction,” which makes the future as important than the present, which turns out to be “what makes it possible for cooperation based on reciprocity to be stable.”(p.125) But I get ahead of myself…
The situation as we understand it at the outset is a single instance prisoner’s dilemma, that is, an apparently zero-sum game, involving two players who face a win/lose scenario. Whereas the iterated prisoner’s dilemma is a non-zero-sum game, that can also result in a win/win outcome. This is the ‘economic man’ model of human behavior, what some call human nature, which feeds our sense that it is necessary to compete with others. “A better standard of comparison” than the model that pits us against others, Axelrod says, “is how well you are doing relative to how well someone else could be doing in your shoes.”(p.111) But that is not the model of human nature we internalize at a young age in our day and age.
For instance, it may very well be that mutual cooperation makes for mutual benefit (say, each gets 3 points if they cooperate with, rather than turns on their buddy), but if each assumes that the other will cooperate, than it also seems to make sense that one would individually benefit more by non-cooperation (say, one might get 4 points to the other’s 0 by defecting against a cooperator). So the temptation can be to defect against both cooperators and defectors so as not to end up on the butt end of a defector, and thus end up with the sucker’s payoff (0). However, the worry is that, if both defect, then both lose, and thus both end up with much less (say, 1/1) than they would have if they’d both cooperated (3/3). Still, this is more than the sucker’s payoff, at least, so not knowing what the other will do, the temptation is always to defect, since it seems to yield a higher payoff in either case than cooperation would, and this is especially true if one cannot trust the other to cooperate.
“So it pays to defect,” it seems, “if you think the other player will defect.”(p.9) But “The dilemma is that if both defect, both do worse than if both had cooperated.”(p.8) So there is some incentive to cooperate with those we think we can trust to cooperate themselves, which is how trust builds. However, there is also some incentive to create the mere appearance of trustworthiness, so to build trust that goes only one way, which makes the trusting cooperator vulnerable to becoming a sucker when taken advantage of by the “wolf in sheep’s clothing.”
This is a situation familiar in many interpersonal ‘dating’ relationships, where it is often the case that both fear being burned by the other, so to speak, so will ‘play it cool,’ that is, defect in order to get the other to give them love, without having to give as much or any in return. Too often, both hold back in this way, building mutual distrust, and thus both lose what might have been gained if both had given. Or, the most common outcome is when one risks giving, while the other sees and acts on the opportunity to take, and the sucker’s outcome becomes a painful memory for the giver, making it increasingly difficult for them to trust others in the future. “And this is certainly true on the last move since there is no future to influence.”(p.10) Which is what can make breakups especially ugly, and makes it even more difficult for a person to give (which requires trusting the other to give back) in one’s future relationship. Indeed, such memories can actually have butterfly effects in people lives, especially when the cause comes from a particularly potent source, such as a parent or sibling.
It turns out, as Axelrod shows by way of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game, that the expectation of an ongoing relationship is itself reason to cooperate, because the opposite, defecting, actually sets one up to be remembered as a taker, and so plants the seeds of distrust that are likely to cause one to be defected against on the next turn. In fact, “This ability to recognize and remember allows the history of the particular interaction to be taken into account by a player’s strategy.”(p.11) “What makes it possible for cooperation to emerge is that the players might meet again. This possibility means that the choices made today not only determine the outcome of this move, but can also influence the later choices of the [other] players. The future can therefore cast a shadow back upon the present and thereby affect the current strategic situation.”(p.12)
This is what Axelrod means when he says that ‘self-interest’ is “strategic rather than genetic.”(p.x, 19) And to prove which conception of self-interest actually is the best strategy, Axelrod invited scholars from around the globe to submit those strategies they thought would survive best when put into competition with all other available strategies – and we might be quite surprised to find that, according to Axelrod’s research, in all likelihood, “the meek shall inherit the earth.” But, again, I get ahead of myself…
…
So it is, Axelrod concludes, that “If you expect others to reciprocate your defections as well as your cooperation, you will be wise to avoid starting any trouble. Moreover, you will be wise to defect after someone else defects, showing that you will not be exploited. Thus you will be wise to use a strategy based on reciprocity. So will everyone else. In this manner the appreciation of the value of reciprocity becomes self-reinforcing. That is, it’s a positive feedback loop. Once it gets going, it feeds on itself in such a way that trust grows, and this can happen rather quickly if this dynamic can be appreciated by intelligent players.*
In fact, the assumption that others cannot be trusted, that human nature is narrowly self-interested, is an attitude conditioned in us by so many stimuli in our culture, will set up a tendency to create such feedback loops of mutual defection in one’s life, conditions from which escape is likely to be impossible – until and unless one learns that “To provide discomfort for the other is but a roundabout way of providing it for themselves (Sorley 1919, p.283).”(p.84)
“This continuation of the conflict is due to the echo effect: each side responds to the other’s last defection with a new defection of its own.”(p.186) And as it turns out, “both cooperation and defection [are] self-reinforcing” in this way.(p.85) This echo dynamic arises by way of feedback loops, which could use more explanation, since we seldom attend to them sufficiently in our world to be aware how it is that we plant the seeds of our future well-being and/or destruction by our own previous actions. “The empirical and theoretical [implications] of this book might help people see more clearly the opportunities for reciprocity latent in their world.”(p.189)
So it’s important to note that, for all the reasons mentioned so far, the tendency to distrust others, to believe they are always narrowly self interested, and therefore likely to ultimately betray us, can create a self-fulfilling prophesy effect, which is to say, it is likely to ultimately bring about the effect it initially assumes. Which is to say, “using the assumption that the other player will always make the move you fear most will lead you to expect that the other will never cooperate, which in turn will lead you to defect,” provoking the like need to defect in the other, ultimately causing a cycle of “unending punishment. So unlike chess, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma it is not safe [i.e. self-defeating] to assume that the other player is out to get you.”(p.15)
[footnote?] Axelrod adds (somewhat inexplicably) that “The foundation of cooperation is not really trust, but the durability of the relationship.”(p.182) “Mutual cooperation can be stable if the future is sufficiently important relative to the present.”(p.126) So while it’s true that, “Whether the players trust each other or not is less important in the long run than whether the conditions are ripe for them to build a stable pattern of cooperation with each other.”(p.182) All the same, trust is the result of this commitment to the future that reduces the incentive to defect.
Axelrod puts this into language understood best in international politics, but it applies equally well to interpersonal relationships. What is known as the security dilemma, by which “nations…seek their own security through means which challenge the security of others,”(p.4) conflict is escalates when one’s defection triggers retaliation, setting off patterns of mutual hostility where everyone feels the need to take more than their share before anyone else gets it. (In zero-sum situations, this can sometimes takes the form of what Garret Hardin called the “tragedy of the commons,” a dynamic in which security for all is threatened by one or a few actors consuming what Locke would call the ‘fair shares’ of others, again, setting off a feedback dynamic that triggers defensive reactions in others.)
Thus, what we call ‘individual rationality’, fundamental to the ‘economic man’ model on which we base our economy, has a way of actually poisoning our interpersonal interactions when we apply it to human relationships. It is based on a shallow and erroneous understanding of Adam Smith’s theory of capitalism, which holds that each person following their own ‘self-interest’ will, as if by ‘invisible hand,’ lead to the best outcome for all. Our conventional reading of his theory is an unfortunate one, since Adam Smith, being a moral philosopher, meant for us to understand ‘self-interest’ in a much more enlightened sense than we do. But Axelrod’s analysis can help us understand this sense better, because, not only is it not always the best move to do what seems to be in one’s best immediate interest, but in fact, “no best rule exists independent of the strategy used by the other player.”(p.14)
This means we must stay on our toes, which is a very important point. It makes clear that it is not wise to simply cooperate with everyone all the time, as many well-meaning philosophies might seem to imply. Nor is it wise to always take advantage, as others suggest, for this has dire consequences too. In fact, if the other is using a “strategy that leaves room for the development of mutual cooperation,”(p.15) then one’s best move is to cooperate, for such a person is likely to reciprocate. However, if the other is using a strategy of ‘permanent retaliation’, in other words, cooperating until the other defects, and always defecting thereafter, “then your best strategy is never to defect,”(p.16) lest one invite perpetual war.
Corruption occurs when one cooperates unconditionally with corrupt others (such as the cooperation that the Nazis elicited from the German people). The same holds true when, in relationships, we cooperate with tyrants, those who will continue to defect against us if we continue to cooperate (read: enable) them in this. Indeed, there are some robust philosophies that have encouraged people (notably women) to bring this tyrannical dynamic on themselves by essentially being ‘too nice,’ which only spoils those who mistreat them by essentially training them that it will be tolerated. In this way, we can plant the seeds of their own domination in the process of ‘loving’ too much, for we give permission to tyrants to carry on without compunction.
So we cannot say that cooperation is always the best move, or that defection is always the worse. In fact, the best strategy turns out to be treating individuals as individuals, that is, to treat each person as they treat you, reciprocating both cooperation and defection (at least in the first reactive move). And thus, it is wisest “to cooperate with someone who will reciprocate that cooperation in the future, but not with someone whose future behavior will not be very much affected”(p.16) by how well we treat them. Which is to say, we should not cooperate with someone who will defect anyway – often because they believe that’s how everyone is ‘naturally’. Sadly, someone who believes this view of ‘human nature’ is likely to defect no matter what, at least any time it seems to be in their interest, which means this is not someone you can trust to treat you well, no matter how well you treat them.
So “the heart of the problem [with this economic man theory] was that these maximizing rules did not take into account that their own behavior would lead the other player to change.”(p.121) It leaves out “the reverberating process in which the other player is adapting to you,” while “you are adapting to the other, and then the other is adapting to your adaptation and so on.”(p.121) In this way, “your own behavior is likely to be echoed back to you.”(p.121) Here is where the positive feedback loop takes effect, and the self-fulfilling prophesy of low expectations kick in – as does likewise the power of love and respect for the good in others.
…
“The Prisoner’s Dilemma is simply an abstract formulation of some very common and very interesting situations in which what [seems to be] best for each person individually leads to mutual defection, whereas everyone would [actually] have been better off with mutual cooperation.”(p.9)
The strategy that actually ‘won’ the competition against all others was “the simplest of all strategies.” Called Tit for Tat, it “is the policy of cooperating on the first move and then doing whatever the other player did on the previous move.”(p.13) And the interesting thing about it is that “it won the tournament” -- “even though it never once scored better in a game than the other player!” That is, it won, “not by beating the other player, but by eliciting behavior from the other player which allowed both to do well.”(p.112) “It won, not by doing better than the other player, but by eliciting cooperation from the other player,”(p.137) which resulted in mutually rewarding outcomes.”(p.112)
Four properties follow from this strategy:
(1) It avoids unnecessary conflict by being ‘nice’ to begin with, that is, never being the first to defect, and cooperating as long as the other does.
(2) It reacts to unprovoked defection with retaliatory defection, not out of anger, but to teach the other not to do it again.
(3) It forgives when/if the other responds to retaliatory defection with cooperation (and this does not mean merely the promise of future cooperation, for “words not backed by actions are so cheap as to be meaningless,”(p.12) and settling for anything less diminishes the others incentive to cooperate. And
(4) it is clear and predictable so that the other can believe that it will be consistent, that is, trustworthy. The best way to encourage mutual cooperation and discourage defection is to make it clear that you will reciprocate either.(p.123)
Another way to look at this is summed up in “four simple suggestions” offered by the author:
1. “do not be envious of the other player’s success; (avoid temptation = temperance)
2. do not be the first to defect; (avoid injustice = just)
3. reciprocate both cooperation and defection; and (avoid cowardice = courageous)
4. do not be too clever.”(p.23) (avoid ignorance = wise)
We might see parallels with the key Greek virtues here, for what are these tendencies but those qualities of character that the Greeks called temperance, justice, courage, and wisdom? This may deserve a more thorough defense in another context, but it seems worth noting the synchronicity of these values, for there is much to be learned from what else the Greeks have to say on these matters.
This strategy of reciprocity can not only “thrive in a world where many different kinds of strategies are being tried,” (p.21), but also “can protect itself from invasion by less cooperative strategies.”(p.21) Interestingly, the author reports that, “Speaking personally, one of my biggest surprises in working on this project has been the value of provocability. I came to this project believing one should be slow to anger. The results of the Computer Tournament for the Prisoner’s Dilemma demonstrate that it is actually better to respond quickly to a provocation.” This does not mean one should be quick to anger, just quick to respond fairly, for “It turns out that if one waits so respond to uncalled for defections, there is a risk of sending the wrong signal. The longer defections are allowed to go unchallenged, the more likely it is that the other player will draw the conclusion that defection can pay… By responding right away, it gives the quickest possible feedback that a defection will not pay.”(p.185) And this teaches the best lesson, both quickly and clearly.
Thus, cooperation based on reciprocity can grow among self-interested people who understand their best interest in treating others as they would like to be treated, which is to say, by the golden rule. The golden rule may be a widely accepted standard, but it is not always widely understood, for selfishness can skew our empathy, making us think we would want to be treated in ways that aren’t actually good for us. Likewise, a shallow understanding of this rule might “seem to imply that you should always cooperate, since cooperation is what you [may think you] want from the other player.”(p.136) However, one who thinks it through will see that it is possible to cooperate too much, because always “turning the other cheek,” no matter what, only “provides an incentive for the other player to exploit you.” In this way, “Unconditional cooperation can not only hurt you, but it can hurt other innocent bystanders with whom the successful exploiters will interact later. Unconditional cooperation tends to spoil the other player;” making them think they can get away with anything, and in this way, “it leaves a burden on the rest of the community to reform the spoiled player, suggesting that reciprocity is a better foundation for morality than is unconditional cooperation.”(p.136)
And so, a deeper understanding of the golden rule would recognize that what we would really want from others is that they not cooperate with us when we are wrong, that is, when we try to defect against them, but rather react with reciprocity, which teaches us to do right, which is to say, that we cannot exploit others and get away with it. Reciprocity helps everyone “by making it hard for exploitive strategies to survive. And not only does it help others, but it asks no more for oneself than it is willing to concede to others.”(p.137) In this sense, the golden rule is not about getting what we want, but about giving what is fair, and expecting that in return.
And it doesn’t take too much intelligence to figure this out – just the will to survive which gives incentive to think through what is good for us, that is, what is truly in our own interest. This is a healthy egoism, an enlightened self-interest, and what’s more, Hobbes, Smith, and even Darwin gave us credit for being capable of it.
In other words, “…there is a lesson (for human relationships) in the fact that TIT FOR TAT succeeds without doing better than anyone with whom it interacts. It succeeds by eliciting cooperation from others, not by defeating them.”(p.190) And “…mutual cooperation can be better for both sides than mutual defection.”(p.190)
“No wonder that an educational psychologist, upon hearing of the virtues of Tit for Tat, recommended teaching reciprocity in the schools (Calfee 1981, p. 38).” (p.139) Why? Because “a community using strategies based upon reciprocity can actually police itself. By guaranteeing punishment [an undesirable outcome] for any individual who tries to be less than cooperative, the deviant strategy is made unprofitable. Therefore the deviant will not thrive, and will not provide an attractive model for others to imitate.” For reasons Socrates would have argued, “This self-policing feature gives you an extra private incentive to teach it to others – even those with whom you will never interact.”(p.18) For, as it turns out, ”cooperation can indeed emerge in a world of egoists without central authority” – IF the future matters! So it would follow that we would be wise to be more like Native Americans, who taught their young to think of the effects of their actions seven generations into the future.
On Egoism and Altruism: Are Human Beings ‘Naturally’ Selfish?
"If the misery of our poor be caused not by the laws of nature, but by our institutions, great is our sin.”
"The assumption of universal egoism is so fundamental and widespread in our culture that it is hard to recognize," Daniel Batson writes, "like water for fish. It only becomes apparent if we imagine the possible changes if it were not there."[1]
In his book, The Altruism Question: A Scientific Exploration of Why We Help One Another, Batson shows how such a belief, i.e. "that we are, at heart, purely egoistic, that we care for others only to the extent that their welfare affects ours,"[2] can become a self-fulfilling prophesy.[3] And so it is alarming to find, when one looks to one's varied associates and listens to one's peers, the ubiquity of this assumption about human motivation.
As a teacher, one is struck by the degree to which young minds are stumped by the confusion between self-interest and selfishness, a muddle which darkens their intentions and undermines their trust in even their closest friends. And one is hard pressed to find an argument that convinces even oneself that so-called human nature is not inevitably narrow and greedy. The logic that one must be so self-concerned--if only in self defense--is hard to deny; 'A person must be egoistic,' one hears one's own voice rationalizing, 'for if one doesn't take care of oneself, who will?'
And yet, important questions linger...such as, What does it mean to be selfish? What does it mean to take care of oneself? and--even more fundamentally--What does it mean to be a Self? These can lead one to conclusions about the potential left in human nature other than those to which one jumps to on the evidence of much common experience. That altruism does not seem common does not mean it is not 'true' or 'real': the frequency of egoism as an attitude says nothing of its necessity or its or its wisdom.
Thus, the answer to the question, Is psychological egoism true? depends upon what we mean, exactly, by these terms. It is important to distinguish selfishness from self-interest, for the fact that humans are self-preserving and goal-oriented should not lead us to conclude that they are unjustly so. If we mean, Is psychological egoism/hedonism, in its strong form, true?--which asks whether self-benefit/pleasure is always the ultimate motive for human behavior--then the answer (as evidenced herein) is clearly, no, our motives are not so determined; Batson, among others, has shown that, as a universal, egoism cannot be the case.[4] Selfishness is certainly a potential, but not a principle in human behavior. However, if we mean, Is psychological egoism/hedonism, in its weak form, true? --which asks whether self may ever benefit or achieve pleasure by unintended consequence of actions that have the ultimate goal of increasing another's welfare[5]--then the answer (as argued herein) is almost certainly, yes, psychological egoism is true in this sense; self-benefit can flow by serendipity from a good will toward others.
The difference between these forms of motivation is especially important because the weak form of egoism leaves room for altruism in our potentials, where the strong form denies this possibility altogether. In other words, the former allows us to answer the question, must we be selfish in self-defense? in the negative, while the latter excuses a host of sins which compel others to their own justified defense.[6]
In terms of self-knowledge, the weak form of egoism allows us to give ourselves credit for doing the right thing, even when it also turns out to be good for us, while the contrary would have us attribute all of our behavior to a kind of self-interest which cannot be distinguished from selfishness, and is therefore not bound by the rules of moral law.
This difference illuminates the ethics of our choice in the matter, and opens the door to a more optimistic view of our own nature than that to which we have become accustomed. The road less traveled not only appears more inviting from this view, it also looks to be the road most of us are already on.
Thus, the difference between these forms of egoism can lead to dramatically different implications for our understanding of our own and other's motivations, as well as our very sense of who we are--individually and collectively. And it is important to notice that neither potential tells us much about 'human nature' per se, except to suggest that the reasoning behind the extremes of motivation which show up in human character are complex, and perhaps deserve a deeper analysis than we have seen fit to give them in our oversimplified (if seemingly parsimonious) conception of egoism.[7]
For 'we' are, in fact, 'many,' and however others may behave and whatever universal tendencies are at work, we still make our own choices about our own actions...(although not necessarily about our own reactions[8]). Both narrow and broad self-interest exist as potentials in human nature, as options from which individuals make choices as they decide what is good for them and who to be.[9] And if broad enough, such interests--while they will properly include self as central to one's concern--will no longer seem properly to be called 'egoism' for other's well-being may very well be the ultimate end of one's interest. And, as Batson notes, "if...individuals act, at least in part, with an ultimate goal of increasing the welfare of another, then the assumption of universal egoism must be replaced by a more complex view of prosocial motivation that allows for altruism as well as egoism."[10]
The question then is, Does genuine altruism actually exist? And if it does, Why do and/or should we choose it?
It seems clear on the evidence presented thus far that egoism, however it is defined, accounts for a large part--but still only a part--of the motivation behind human behavior. As long as sometimes, under some circumstances, at least some people will act toward others as ends in themselves, it cannot account for all.
As Jane Mansbridge points out in her book, Beyond Self-Interest, "when people think about what they want, they think about more than just their narrow self-interest...they often give great weight both to their moral principles and to the interests of others."[11] "In fact," Mansbridge says, "evidence indicates that...people often take account of both other individuals interests and the common good when they decide what constitutes a 'benefit' that they want to maximize,"[12] including "long-run self interest, commitment to principle, and genuine we-feeling."[13]
These all may be, in fact, in the best interest of the actor, but this fact alone does not qualify the motivation behind them to be egoistic in the narrow sense, as we have come to think of our drives to be. Such evidence may simply indicate that some people sometimes will hold what Socrates long ago argued to be the case, that our truest interest lies in justice, which is nothing if not a proper balance between self and others.
Perhaps we understand our well-being better than 'economic-man' models suggest. Political scientists and cognitive psychologists, by use of such techniques as the prisoner's dilemma, game theory, and other thought and computer experiments, have turned up data which "indicates a stubborn refusal on the part of a significant faction (usually 25% to 35%) to take rational self-interested action."[14] Is it possible that we know intuitively what Axelrod (1984) has evidenced, i.e. the "evolutionary feasibility of reciprocal altruism," that is, the wisdom of tit-for-tat survival reasoning?[15]
Dowes, Van de Kragt, and Orbell have shown that cooperative group-identity is increased by means of discussion,[16] also in keeping with the method of Socratic ethics. And, with Aristotle, political scientists Barber and Pithin have indicated that communal deliberation can lead to transformation of self.[17] Additionally, Frank, Holmes, and Mansbridge have postulated what they call the "inclusive self."[18] But as Mansbridge points out, the cumulative impact of this research is yet to be felt in the social sciences--which does not widely recognize what some thoughtful individuals have apparently long recognized--that it is not only 'right' to be good to others, but that it is 'smart,' which is to say, it is in our own best-interest.
In his especially clear-headed appraisal of what has been for many centuries an extremely nebulous topic, entitled Evidence for Altruism: Toward a Pluralism of Prosocial Motives, Batson provides convincing evidence that altruism, born of empathy, does exist--altruism which need not involve self-sacrifice, and may even involve self-benefit as a secondary effect.[19] As Batson notes, some self-benefits for helping actually increase as the costs increase, specifically because the costs are so great.[20] There is also room here for prosocial motives that are not either altruistic or egoistic, such as Kant's categorical imperative or Kohlberg's principle of justice.[21]
Batson's goal is to determine the existence or nonexistence of altruism by discerning between the strong and the weak forms of psychological egoism/hedonism (i.e. whether benefit to another is always an instrumental means to one’s own ends, or whether it is sometimes the ultimate goal from which any self-benefits flow by unintended consequence.)[22] One cannot help but admire and appreciate the subtlety with which Batson explores these "conceptual briar patches and tangled thickets of data and alternative explanations."[23] Recasting these as goal-directed forces, altruism and egoism in Batson's conception are motivational states with the ultimate goal of increasing either another's or one's own welfare, which is to say, as an end in itself and not as a means to some other goal. The crucial difference in these motivations then is, whose interests are the ultimate goal?[24]
In answer to his question "whether anyone ever, in any degree, transcends the bounds of self-benefit and helps out of genuine concern for the welfare of another...whether altruism is part of human nature,"[25] Batson concludes that, "the evidence to date provides surprisingly strong support for the hypothesis that empathic emotion evokes altruistic motivation."[26] "Improbable as it may seem, the empathy-altruism hypothesis appears to be true. It seems that we are capable of caring for the welfare of persons for whom we feel empathy for their sakes and not simply for our own."[27]
With this, Batson affirms his hypothesis, and leaves open the question of whether there is not also a justice-altruism hypothesis to be evidenced, or even whether empathy might not be the connection between these as well.[28] While these – justice, empathy, and altruism -- are certainly conceptually distinct for most purposes, there is an argument to be made that, as sources of altruism, empathy and justice can function much the same. Consider such cases as those where some are dependent upon us to have their best-interest at heart, such as any of many institutionalized and personal relations in which we are nested (e.g. child-parent, student-teacher, employee-employer, patient-doctor, constituent-politician, etc.), relationships in which some make the rules by which others must abide -- in such relations, dependents can sometimes be far enough out of the reach of the perception of those who are responsible for them, and thus, beyond personal and direct empathy (perhaps unfortunately, even parent/child relationships can have this distance, and thus call upon the responsible parent to deliberately put themselves into the shoes of the dependent child). In such cases, justice might suffice as an active principle which gives rise to empathy, albeit indirectly, as would be exercised through, say, a "veil of ignorance" such as Rawls prescribes, or by some empathic exercise such as Negel recommends, wherever one asks oneself, How would I feel? and, What would I do?[29] And one would think that this leaves open the door for the inclusion of all these concepts under the heading of the concept of love. Such an undertaking would seem compatible with, if conceptually distinct from, that of Batson, whose research and scholarship contribute considerably toward proving the conclusion which my own work shares, that there is a high cost involved in weaving the assumption that human beings are universally selfish into the fabric of our institutions, and that love/empathy/justice as a universal principle, as the ancients asserted, is not without practical value.[30]
Thus, Batson concludes that:
"If altruism as defined here exists, then the widespread assumption that the ultimate goal of all human action is some more or less subtle form of self-benefit must be rejected."[31]
"If we must accept that our motivation for helping others may be egoistic, altruistic, or both, then ambiguous data concerning our true motives and the desire for honest self-knowledge need not combine to produce a self-deprecatory bias."
"…if altruistic motivation exists, then we must broaden our moral horizon once again. We can no longer excuse our callousness and insensitivity to the needs of others by explaining that it is unrealistic to expect more."[32]
"If altruistic motivation exists, then we need to know it, even though this knowledge may play havoc with our assumptions about human motivation and, indeed, about human nature."[33]
Meaning, you can "honestly admit that your reason for visiting the nursing home
e, at least in part, because you care about the patients' welfare."[34] And what's more, your grandmother can admit that at least part of your reason for visiting her is from the goodness of your heart, because you actually care about her, and not just because you care about her will and your inheritance. Our cynicism about human motivation in general only brings out the worst in individuals, including ourselves and others. And it is time we recognize that we have responsibility to give individuals and human nature more credit –not just for their sake, but for our own – because the natural goodness of our hearts needs exercise…if we would be happy.
Such a shift in our understanding of so-called human nature might go a long way toward restoring trust in human relationships.[35] We can see then why Batson calls altruism a "valuable untapped natural resource."[36]
It is important that we recognize this dynamic, as Mansbridge says, because all of our social problems show that institutions that utilize the energy generated by our narrow conceptions of self-interest fail to generate enough public spirit to maintain healthy social bonds. The task of bringing out the good in our young, and even in ourselves, is made increasingly difficult when and because social scientists, psychologists, academics and even religions deny that natural common interest even exists in human potential.[37] And because "institutions...are likely to encourage certain motives and discourage others,"[38] Mansbridge argues, “changing an institution actually affects motivation."[39] It would be beyond surprising if high expectations could not be manifest through institutions as easily as low ones can.[40]
As Batson concludes, "If we are capable of altruism, then virtually all of our current ideas about individual psychology, social relations, economics, and politics are, in an important respect, wrong."[41]
This is important to remember because, while we are not responsible for what we cannot change (what Aristotle calls nature),[42] we are responsible for what we can change (what he calls artiface), and responsible not only to others, but most especially to our own potential better (read: happier) self.[43] Batson may call this a "flight of fancy,"[44]as if it is only the speculation of an idle dreamer, but it is the substance of all ancient philosophy, and clearly Batson’s own research shows such imaginings to be not the idle dreams of muddle-headed idealists, but the realistic prescription for happiness that empirical evidence bears out. For if altruism exists, and what's more, if it has any of the self-fulfilling potential that egoism has, which the prisoner’s dilemma show it does, then all such things are possible as we can imagine in our classical conceptions of human potential at its height. Human happiness is available to any and all who will share it.
This is why we might choose altruism, not as a moral imperative ("you should"), but as an opportunity ("you could"); because our own best interest depends upon it. We must remember this and act on it, not from duty, but from inclination; not just because it’s good for others and for the collective whole, but because it’s actually good for us, as individuals.
As Batson rightly emphasizes, rather than a source of obligation, this seems a cause for celebration.[45] It is the true and ultimate solution to practically all of our problems – at least all we have brought on ourselves, and seeing this, could halt at there source.
"Prescriptively, therefore, it makes sense to try to redress this imbalance by revitalizing or creating institutions that foster a commitment to the common good."[46] Why? Because Darwin once said, "If the misery of our poor be caused not by the laws of nature, but by our institutions, great is our sin."[47]
And this is where we come to the questions of our schools, and whether our educational methods are bringing out the best or the worst in your young.
But first, more evidence...
On Egoism and Altruism in Biology and Psychology
“WHAT WE HAVE DONE FOR OURSELVES ALONE DIES WITH US;
WHAT WE HAVE DONE FOR OTHERS AND THE WORLD REMAINS AND IS IMMORTAL" (Dan Brown (The Lost Symbol, p.454)
On Batson and Shaw's Evidence for Altruism: (Toward a Pluralism of Prosocial Motives)
Why do we help others? Is it because we have no choice, because it's expected, or because it's in our own best interest?[48] Daniel Batson says these are the easy answers and, given the empirical nature of the question, we needn't settle for them.
In his study, entitled Evidence for Altruism: Toward a Pluralism of Prosocial Motives, Batson attempts to evidence the altruist’s claim, that "at least some of us, to some degree, under some circumstances, are capable of a qualitatively different form of motivation, motivation with an ultimate goal of benefiting someone else."[49] This, against the egoists claim, "that we are, at heart, purely egoistic, that we care for others only to the extent that their welfare affects ours."[50]
This view, which has come to be known as universal egoism, has a long history. "From Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, through Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham, to Friedrich Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud, the dominant view in Western thought has long been that we are, at heart, exclusively self-interested,” he says (though we might qualify at least Aristotle’s view). “And today, when we ask why we care for and help others, the answer provided by all major theories of motivation – Freudian, behavioral, and even humanistic theories – is quite clear: Everything we do, including everything we do to benefit others, is ultimately done for our own benefit.” [51]
It is a view held by too many social scientists and psychologists, he says. And what's more, it is a view that can too easily be evidenced, since practically any act, no matter how seemingly selfless, can be argued to provide at least some self-benefit, and this can then be argued to have been the ultimate motivation. But, as Batson says, the easy answers are not always the right ones.
“The assumption of universal egoism is so fundamental and widespread in our culture that it is hard to recognize, like water for fish. It only becomes apparent if we imagine the possible changes if is were not there."[52]
And that is exactly what we must do.
In this especially clear-headed study of what has been for some millennia an extremely nebulous topic, Batson asks "whether anyone ever, in any degree, transcends the bounds of self-benefit and helps out of genuine concern for the welfare of another. We want to know whether altruism is part of human nature."[53]
Batson qualifies universal egoism by distinguishing between the strong form of psychological hedonism/egoism, which claims that people always act for their own pleasure/benefit, and the weak form, which claims only that pleasure/benefit can sometimes follow human action without necessarily being the motivation for it.[54] And yet, as Batson points out, "The weak form is not inconsistent with the possibility that the ultimate goal of some action is to benefit another rather than to benefit oneself; the pleasure obtained can be a consequence of reaching the goal without being the goal itself."[55] "[I]f we are to answer the question of the existence of altruism, then we must determine whether benefit to the other is (a) an ultimate goal and any self-benefits unintended consequences or (b) an instrumental means to reach the ultimate goal of benefiting oneself."[56] If we can show that it is not, then a conclusion that human nature is always selfish, which ignores the possibility of altruism, is too strong to accurately describe the evidence.
This strong form of psychological hedonism/egoism is considered the parsimonious explanation, even by Batson, who concedes that his research indicates a plurality of motives at work in human behavior. After examining Batson's methods, the results of his empirical studies, and some implication of his results, we will return to this question and draw our own conclusions.
Methodology:
Batson's method is straight forward:
"Altruism is a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing another's welfare.
Egoism is a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing one's own welfare."[57]
Examining each key phrase in both of these definitions, Batson recasts these as goal-directed psychological forces within an organism (Lewin, 1935) for which that goal is "an end in itself and not just an intermediate means for reaching some other goal."[58] Accordingly, the subject "(a) perceives some desired change in his or her own world and (b) experiences a force to bring about that change as (c) an end in itself."[59]
Batson gives eight implications of these definitions:
1. The distinction between altruism and egoism is qualitative, not quantitative.
2. A single motive cannot be both, altruistic and egoistic, as this "implies two ultimate goals (as long as self and other are perceived to be distinct),"[60][emphasis added]
3. "Both egoistic and altruistic motives can exist simultaneously within a single organism," which can lead to "motivational conflict."[61]
4. Reflexive, automatic, and otherwise non-goal-directed behavior is neither altruistic nor egoistic.[62]
5. Peomay be mistaken about their own motivation.[63]
6. A motive is a force which may or may not lead to action.
7. Altruism may or may not involve self-sacrifice, and may even involve self-benefit, when that is an unintended consequence and not the ultimate goal of behavior.
8. "[T]here may be prosocial motives that are neither altruistic nor egoistic" [such as] "upholding a principle of justice (Kohlberg, 1976)."[64] And again, this may benefit both the other and the self by unintended consequence without being motivated by self as the ultimate end.
Here is a potential that could use more exploration, for it might be that a conception of selfhood as a dynamic system of interaction would require just such a principle to help balance the complex interaction between self and other.[65] Batson points out in his response to the commentaries, "our definition of altruism requires a self-other distinction. Without such a distinction, it makes no sense to ask whether a helper's ultimate goal is to increase another's welfare, to increase his or her own welfare, or to pursue some other goal."[66][emphasis added] However, one might wonder whether this distinction is as universal as is assumed. It could be argued that Batson's own definitions leave open the possibility of self and other both being included in self as a dynamic system. As some commentators and others to whom Batson refers in his manuscript have pointed out (Archer, Hornstein, Lerner, and Krebs), a close relationship might eliminate the self-other distinction, making self and other psychologically one. For Lerner, the 'identity relationship' is such that "we are psychologically indistinguishable from the other and we experience that which we perceive they are experiencing."[67] In which case, "the question of whether the ultimate goal is to increase one's own or the other's welfare cannot meaningfully be asked; the two welfares have become one."[68] Batson rightly points out that, "If this occurs, then as these commentators note, the terms altruism and egoism as we have defined them do not apply. The goals of increasing the other's welfare and increasing one's own welfare are no longer distinguishable."[69]
Indeed, from a view of self and other in a system of interaction, "it makes no sense to ask" which is the ultimate goal, for both are combined in the system of one's whole best-interest. A self's values might be such that one includes the other into the weighing of ends--which allows the possibility of both self and other being ultimate. We sacrifice our own interest every time we set self aside long enough to put another first.
Batson admits to a suspicion that, "except perhaps in some mystical states" the breakdown of this distinction between self and others is rare in adults.[70] "Even mothers, we suspect, have a clear sense of the person of their child as distinct from self. Is this not part of the mystery of motherhood: From one's own body comes another, distinct human being?"[71] I think Batson is confusing the perception of the distinction between self and other with the importance of the distinction between self and other, for one can perfectly well know that self and other are distinct, and yet, not let that distinction matter in certain regards. In other words, one can see the difference between self and other without seeing that difference as important to whether we care for the other more or less. We see our children as individuals, but not necessarily as individuals who are in competition with our own interests. To say that the distinction between self and others disappears is not to say that it is not recognized at all, but only that it is not seen as important, not recognized as a reason to treat others with any less regard as you would have them treat us.
This sense of self as a unit, with others attached, whether linked or blended[72] in such a way that our interests are intertwined, is not so far fetched after all, especially in adults. It is, ideally, what happens to our self-concept every time we take responsibility for another human being, whether as parents, teachers, doctors, politicians, etc.. Some might call this egoistic, since our behaving altruistically in such cases seems to be good for us too, but this is, in an important way, quite irrelevant, since one chooses to begin with to include others within the scope of one's own well-being, such that self cannot thereafter be well without living up to one's responsibilities. It is the reason that we need to evaluate the difference in the strong and the weak form of psychological hedonism/egoism, because the weak form, from which good for self might flow from being good to others, is perfectly consistent with this conception of self as a system, a choice which would seem to require viewing other's interests as ends with which one's own interests are inextricably intertwined, not as means, but as part of the process of mental and moral health.
It is true, as Batson says, that we don't need to bring up morality, but we can, because, as he notes, "If altruistic motivation exists, then we must broaden our moral horizon once again. We can no longer excuse our callousness and insensitivity to the needs of others by explaining that it is unrealistic to expect more."[73] And the same would be true if such identification of self-interest with the interests of others exists. In his response to commentaries, Batson says that, "To keep motivational concepts distinct from moral concepts, we think it wise to avoid using the moral terms unselfish and selfish as synonyms for altruism and egoism."[74] But, "From a moral perspective (not, we believe, from a scientific one), it is possible to assert that altruistic motivation, if is exists, is morally good. This assertion cannot, however, be reversed: Moral goodness need not be altruistic."[75]
Batson also does not "deny that a person can have a goal of meeting the needs of a unit that includes self and others,"[76] but he conceives of this unit as being an entity separate from the individuals, like a marriage, which can operate independent of the good of the individuals involved. Also, he leaves open the question of whether the ultimate goal in such a case is "(a) the greatest good for the unit as a whole, [or] (b) upholding the principle to avoid feeling guilty about failing to live up to one's principle," which is egoistic, compared to (a) which is neither egoistic nor altruistic.[77]
At any rate, one cannot help but admire and appreciate the subtlety with which Batson explores these "conceptual briar patches and tangled thickets of data and alternative explanations."[78] Having recast altruism and egoism as motivational states with the ultimate goal of increasing either another's or one's own welfare as an end in itself and not as a means to some other goal, Batson is able to determine the existence of altruism by discerning between the strong and the weak forms of psychological egoism/hedonism, i.e. whether benefit to another is always an instrumental means to one’s own ends, or whether it is sometimes the ultimate goal from which any self-benefits flow by unintended consequence.[79] The crucial difference in these motivations then is, whose interests are the ultimate goal?[80]
Discerning which is in fact the ultimate goal is puzzling, Batson admits, but this is no reason to surrender prematurely, for not only can we ascertain people's ultimate goals, but that we do it all the time.[81] We draw reasonable inferences about other's motives and intentions from their behavior over varying conditions. The specific purpose of such a study as Batson and Shaw's is to vary the conditions in such a way as to "disentangle the relationship between potential ultimate goals."[82] Since "the behavior should always be directed toward the ultimate goal...these two steps provide an empirical basis for inferring the nature of a person's motivation."[83]
There are two steps necessary to infer the nature of a person's motivation from his or her behavior, according to Batson; they are, firstly, by a conceptual analysis of the various potential alternative goals. Batson accomplishes this by a three-path model which includes two egoistic routes (reinforcement and arousal reduction) and one altruistic one--"the most commonly suggested source" being empathic emotion, which begins with perception of need, and leads to adopting the other's perspective, which evokes altruistic motivation, not helping behavior[84] and which can be induced by instruction, including self-instruction, and may also be the result of prior similar experience and/or attachment.[85] And secondly, by systematic observation of the person's behavior, which is accomplished here by sketching the logic and results of some 20 experiments that have been conducted during the past decade to test one or more possible egoistic goals, including aversive-arousal reduction and empathy-specific punishment, both socially and self-administered, as well as empathy-specific reward, another major egoistic alternative to the empathy-altruism hypothesis, and it variations, empathic-joy and negative-state relief.[86]
The strong form of the empathy-altruism hypothesis, asserted here, "postulates not only that empathic emotion evokes altruistic motivation, but also that all motivation to help evoked by empathy is altruistic, and the weaker form, not asserted here, is that "empathic emotion evokes both egoistic and altruistic motivation."[87] Remembering that to determine the existence of altruism we must determine whether benefit to the other is ever the ultimate goal from which any self-benefits flow serendipidously, or whether it is always merely an instrumental means to the ultimate end of self-benefit,[88] we can see why this is an objective which the weak form of the empathy-altruism hypothesis will not help us reach.
It may seem that Batson jumps to a conclusion regarding the relationship between altruism and empathy in his article with Shaw. However, he explains in his response to commentaries, that "empathy has been the most frequently mentioned source of altruistic motivation since antiquity."[89] "It was named as a source--if not the source--of altruism by Thomas Aquinas, David Hume, Adam Smith, Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, and William McDougall."[90] Confucius held that “becoming a chun tsu, a fully realized human being,” comes of “expanding one’s empathy indefinitely.”[91] This transcendence of selfishness, he taught, is both a broadening and a deepening process, as the “inner world deepens and grows more refined as empathy expands.”[92]
The term empathy was "coined by Titchener in 1909 to translate the German Einfuhlung, which was used to Lipps in a perceptual context to refer to the process of intuiting one's way into an object or event to 'see' it from the inside (see Wispe, 1968, 1986, 1987."[93]
Adam Smith gave a good account of empathy when he said that:
"I consider what I should suffer if I was really you, and I not only change circumstances with you, but I change persons and characters. My grief, therefore, is entirely upon your account, and not in the least upon my own."[94]
This account shows how empathy: "involves more than simply focusing attention on the other. One may focus attention on another's need but maintain a relatively objective perspective, dispassionately observing the other's plight. In contrast, adopting the other's perspective involves imagining how that person is affected by his or her situation (Stotland, 1969)."[95]
Batson notes in his response to commentaries that "we view perspective taking as imagining how the other person is affected by his or her situation, not how I would be affected by that situation."[96] Batson thus uses empathy in a way that "is distinct from personal distress evoked by perceiving someone in need, but it is indistinguishable from what many philosophers and early psychologists called sympathy (Smith, Darwin, Spencer, James), compassion (Hume, Smith) pity (Aquinas, Hume, Smith), or tenderness (McDougall)."[97]
Results of empirical tests are summarized which provide strong support for the empathy-altruism hypothesis. In answer to his question "whether anyone ever, in any degree, transcends the bounds of self-benefit and helps out of genuine concern for the welfare of another...whether altruism is part of human nature,"[98] Batson concludes that, "the evidence to date provides surprisingly strong support for the hypothesis that empathic emotion evokes altruistic motivation."[99] "Improbable as it may seem, the empathy-altruism hypothesis appears to be true. It seems that we are capable of caring for the welfare of persons for whom we feel empathy for their sakes and not simply for our own."[100] In his manuscript, Batson provides quite convincing evidence that altruism, born of empathy, does exist--altruism which need not involve self-sacrifice, and may even involve self-benefit as a secondary effect.[101] As he notes, some self-benefits for helping actually increase as the costs increase, specifically because the costs are so great.[102]
Thus, as long as sometimes, under some circumstances, at least some people will act toward others as ends in themselves, egoism cannot account for all of human behavior. He concludes that "If altruism as defined here exists, then the widespread assumption that the ultimate goal of all human action is some more or less subtle form of self-benefit must be rejected."[103] "[I]f...individuals act, at least in part, with an ultimate goal of increasing the welfare of another, then the assumption of universal egoism must be replaced by a more complex view of prosocial motivation that allows for altruism as well as egoism."[104] Then there is also room here for prosocial motives that are not either altruistic or egoistic, such as Kant's categorical imperative or Kohlberg's principle of justice.[105] As Jane Mansbridge points out in her book, Beyond Self-Interest, "when people think about what they want, they think about more than just their narrow self-interest...they often give great weight both to their moral principles and to the interests of others."[106] "In fact," Mansbridge says, "evidence indicates that...people often take account of both other individuals interests and the common good when they decide what constitutes a 'benefit' that they want to maximize,"[107] including "long-run self interest, commitment to principle, and genuine we-feeling."[108] These all may be, in fact, in the best interest of the actor, but this fact alone does not qualify the motivation behind them to be egoistic in the narrow sense, as we have come to think of our drives to be. Such benefits may simply indicate what Socrates long ago argued to be the case,that our truest personal interest lies in interpersonal justice, which is nothing if not a proper balance between self and others.
Regarding parsimony, Batson holds that: "Advocates of universal egoism have elegance and parsimony on their side in this debate [because] it is far simpler to explain all human behavior in terms of self-benefit than it is to postulate a motivational pluralism that allows both self-benefit and another's benefit to serve as ultimate goals."[109] And "Prior to the evidence for the empathy-altruism hypothesis...parsimony clearly favors an exclusively egoistic explanation."[110]
However, "If...the empirical tests of the empathy-altruism hypothesis lead us to conclude the empathic emotion evokes altruistic motivation...then the situation is changed. Parsimony becomes irrelevant. There is no longer any logical reason to favor an egoistic interpretation of those cases in which the motivation might be egoistic, altruistic, both, or neither. Prudence no longer gives egoism exclusive credit for the large area of overlap of the two explanations."[111] "This more complex view of prosocial motives lacks the tidy parsimony of a view that assumes all motivation is egoistic."
He takes this attribution of pluralism from August Compte, who considered egoism and altruism to be "two distinct motives within the individual."[112] However, to pick up on earlier speculation regarding the nature of self, it seems fair to question whether parsimony would not actually be retained by a conception of self as a system, a conception which follows from Batson's evidence, if not from his definitions. Seen this way, from a self-as-system perspective, in which an equilibration between one's real and one's ideal self, between one's actual and one's potential, it doesn't look like dualism at all, but monism--in that a system is one whole, single, if complex thing.
Egoism is not more parsimonious than this dynamic conception. I think Batson actually gives evidence for a more parsimonious explanation for human behavior than egoism has ever been, for parsimony cannot mean oversimplification of the phenomenon by reduction to only certain aspects of it. It must rather mean a single simple explanation for a range of complex behaviors. Viewing self as a dynamic but united system of logical interactions between organisms and their environments provides as simple an explanation as could possibly be hoped for to account for the complexity of human motivation and behavior.
Batson points out that "Sober expresses concern about our willingness to speak of 'the' ultimate goal of helping evoked by empathy," suggesting that it is "inconsistent with our proposal of pluralism of prosocial motives."[113] Batson response is that "The empathy-altruism hypothesis does not assume that the motivation evoked by empathy is the only motive an empathically aroused person is experiencing. As the three-path model...suggests, the conditions that evoke empathy-induced altruistic motivation are likely also to evoke a range of egoistic motives."[114]
However, we needn't talk about plurality of motives at all in order to understand altruism; we need only change the way we talk about the self itself. The person whose motivation falls within the weak form of psychological hedonism/egoism behaves in ways that are good for both self and others, and so does not necessarily have two opposing ends, but has a single broad goal of well-being. If 'self-concept' is reconsidered in deeper and broader terms, in which self is seen as a system, it is shown to be a single cognitive framework into which both self and other, egoism and altruism, fit--which seems to rival egoism in its parsimony. It is as simple in hypothesis, to be sure, and yet it is far more complex in its manifestations. Not dualistic in nature, but an interactive whole.
Thus, we need not "turn our back on the Eden of simplicity provided by the monism of universal egoism"[115] in order to accommodate Batson's findings.
We can do what we will with this proof that altruism is potential, and one wise thing we might do is to recognize that it is as rich in prescription, as in description. Altruism is not only among our choices but, by this evidence, it is a wise choice, meaning, in the best interest, not just of self, but of the all of whom self is a part.
As Batson notes, "If altruistic motivation exists, then we need to know it, even though this knowledge may play havoc with our assumptions about human motivation and, indeed, about human nature."[116] Perhaps we would see that it is a mistake to attempt to reduce us all to the same agent, as if we all have the same motivations, simply because we all have the same potentials to choose from. "We" are, in fact, many individual agents; and, what's more, we even change from time to time. It is futile to ask what people always do when in fact people don't always do anything. The complexity of human motivation and the multitude of our motivational choices makes most questions about so-called 'human nature' relatively meaningless to ask and impossible to answer, at least if we are talking about all as if they are the same. We choose from among many complex potential behaviors on the basis of our understanding of 'the good' as an end which our actions are the means towards. And, importantly, different people make different choices. We are similarly goal-directed and share the universal goals of survival and well-being as our purposes, and we do function more or less properly toward defining our being well and achieving those ends. The problem with human motivation is not that we have this 'nature' which provokes us to be greedy and selfish, it is that too often we simply don't understand what is actually good for us, and – forgetting we have a future and that our actions here and now will affect it (karma) -- we choose to act toward our best immediate, rather than our best ultimate good. Immediate good may be compatible with other's expense, but ultimate good, iterated experiences proves, is not.[117] Which is to say, our interests are proved to depend upon both the good of self and of others, seen clearly, it can be shown that, in wholistic terms, i.e. in terms of self-knowledge, there is no such thing as profit at someone else's expense. What comes of this intention is anything but 'good,' and it is only confused with good by a misunderstanding of the true meaning of the term.
This shift "requires considerable rethinking of our underlying assumptions about human nature and human potential,"[118] Batson says, for, in the words of Adam Smith, "there are evidently some principles in [our] nature, which interest [us] in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to [us]."[119] The possibility that a "genuine concern for another's welfare is within the human repertoire" has been ignored, he says, and this "valuable untapped natural resource" could cause us "to rethink what it means to be human."[120] Batson concludes that, "If we are capable of altruism, then virtually all of our current ideas about individual psychology, social relations, economics, and politics are, in an important respect, wrong."[121] And what's more, they are wrong in a way that has a self-fulfilling prophesy effect.[122]
This is important to remember because, while we are not responsible for what we cannot change (which is to say that, "If we are capable of seeking only our own benefit, then we can hardly be blamed for doing so"[123]), but we are responsible for what we can change (which is to say that, "If, on the other hand, it turns out that we are capable of altruism, then our moral horizon--and our potential for moral responsibility--broadens considerably"[124]) most especially to our own potential self. This is why we might choose altruism--not as a moral imperative, but as an opportunity; not from duty, but from inclination. As Batson points out, rather than a source of obligation, this seems a cause for celebration.[125]
"If our belief in universal egoism is wrong and we are actually capable of altruism, then possibilities arise for the development of more caring individuals and a more compassionate, humane society. And in a world so full of fear, insensitivity, suffering, and loneliness, such developments are sorely needed."[126]
What's more, Batson quotes another study which concluded that, "There is considerable evidence of various kinds to suggest that doing good may indeed by good for you."[127] One study suggests that the antidote to such life-threatening ailments as heart disease "is the development of a trusting heart."[128] The fact is, it is very easy to be good to others when we understand how bad it is for us to be anything but. And once we learn the lesson, it no longer matters why, whether because it’s good for us to be good to others, or simply that it is bad for us to be anything but, these are the same idea from different points of view. Once we break free of our zero-sum assumptions about what is good, (which are not necessarily materialistic, but simply assumes some quantity of good which one looses if the other gains) then the traditional dichotomy between self vs. other breaks down. Material goods do seem to require some either/or division, meaning, either I get this or you get it, and these zero sum conditions are very restricting. But, learning that these win/lose assumptions are conditions that obtain where they are assumed, that is, self-fulfilling prophesy, we can think again. They are also conditions that can be transcended by wholistic, meaning deeper and broader, considerations of what else, besides the tangible extrinsic rewards and punishments for which we have learned to strive, is lost and gained in the exchange.
The understanding that guides the steering mechanism that brings human beings to choose certain motivations from among the logical potentials that are all part of so-called human nature might be considerably advanced were the human sciences as dedicated to comprehending the self as a choosing system, with egoism as one potential among many moral options, as it has been dedicated to proving and disproving the truth of universal motivation. Therefore, for my part, at any rate, the question is, What does an individual self have to learn from the lessons of egoistic and altruistic dynamics about what actually is and is not in his or her best interest? and, How do we ameliorate our social conditions by the lessons of this research?
The answer to the question asked by Batson, Is altruism potential in human behavior? is that all options are still and always our potential, and the fact of moral autonomy is that, whether we actually behave one way or the other, altruistically or egoistically, is a matter of choice--choice within the constraints of context, it's true--but a choice, nonetheless. In that different choices have different effects, different karmic consequences, if you will, or call it, different fitness values, we still have much to learn about why we might choose one over the other. Which is to say, What is actually good for us?
[1] Daniel Batson, The Altruism Question: A Scientific Exploration of Why We Help One Another.{Manuscript:1991, p. 20.
[2] C. Daniel Batson and Laura L. Shaw, Evidence for Altruism: Toward a Pluralism of Prosocial Motives (Psychological Inquiry, 1991, Vol. 2, No. 2) p. 107.
[3] Batson, along with Mainsbridge, draws on historical and interdisciplinary research to show how this assumption becomes a self-depreciating bias which has a self-fulfilling effect, explaining at least in part why 'human nature' appears so narrow in our day. Which is to say that, institutions actually encourage narrow self-interest when they assume it to be the nature of humans to begin with. (Batson, Manuscript, p. 441.) Batson shows the dynamic of this self-fulfilling process: the assumption of universal egoism "permits us to unashamedly say no when given the opportunity to help someone else in the absense of clear self-benefits. There need be no remorse or guilt for failing to care for others if we know [read: believe*] that our caring is not really sincere, if it is only an attempt on our part to feel good about ourselves or to avoid feeling bad. Indeed, there is a sense of relief in knowing ourselves, selfish desires and all, and in not being suckered into trying to act good. This knowledge considerably narrows our moral scope. If we cannot really care for others, then surely there is no reason to try."(Batson, Manuscript, p. 442.)[emphasis added] "This self-depreciating bias may lead you to make a selfish attribution for your helping, even if this attribution is wrong."(Batson, Manuscript, p. 440.) As a consequent, you may come to see your visits to your grandmother as "little more than a self-serving charade," and "If you pursue this logic, much of the satisfaction from your visits is likely to disappear."(Batson, Manuscript, p. 440.) Realize it or not, one is likely to find oneself doing the right thing for the wrong reason from here on in, e.g because one has no choice, one is expected, or one has some interest in the visits. Moral degeneration cannot help but result. Perhaps worse, we may find ourselves not doing the right thing at all. Thus, assuming our own selfishness is likely to become a prophesy fulfilled. In this way, the assumption of universal egoism translates into a conception of human nature which serves to excuse a host of sins.
[4] (P1) Universal egoism predicts that people will never behave altruistically (e.g. go to aid lepers in their colonies)
(P2) People sometimes do behave altruistically (as evidenced in Batson, 1992)
(C1) Therefore, universal egoism is not true, and
(C2) Altruism is not ruled out as a source of human motivation.
[5] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry) p. 108.
[6] As noted elsewhere in this text, the line between those actions which are toward one's own self-preservation and those which seek more than one's fair share, and thus provoke others to act in their own self-preservative interests, is the distinction between defensive secondary defection and offensive primary defection, and the prisoner's dilemma can help us draw this distinction more clearly.
[7] The complex processes and comprehensive feedback dynamics by which systems interact with other systems, including human systems, is made clear and pragmatic in the work of T.F.H. Allen. Integration and generalism may not seem practical from the point of view of many scholars, but what could be more so than such a method of flexible perspectives as Allen introduces in his book, entitled (with slightly false humility) Toward a Unified Ecology. In fact, rather than merely moving toward the object of his inquiry, Allen gives us the full and deeply developed picture of a method that allows us to look at and into the world from the infinity of perspectives that are intrinsic to it, making order out of chaos, if we so choose. It is precisely the sort of tool we need to help us sort out the complexity of our knowledge. (For instance, some ideas have had extremely robust lives as forces of human activity, such as the golden rule, the conservation of energy, free-enterprise, and democracy. There is much to be considered regarding the dynamics at work in this interaction. (T.F.H. Allen, Toward a Unified Ecology (New York: Columbia Univeristy Press, 1992)) By using his method to first integrate his own discipline, Allen shows how all of these apparently competing schools of thought--organismic, community, exosystem, landscape, biome, and biosphere--are actually complementary, interactive, and flexible perspectives on the same complex but comprehensive object(s) of knowledge. In the process showing how every object of knowledge is similarly complex and comprehensive, and yet, knowable by the human mind. The possibilities are enough to make a philosopher salivate. It is clear that without considering as many of these perspectives as possible, we cannot meaningfully claim to ‘know’ the object of our study at all, not at least if we hold the whole truth as an ideal. Allen's unified ecology, supported by chaos theory, gives us the capacity to take all these and other views together in order to see, in effect, the whole picture--not merely of ecology, but of any object we might choose to know, no matter how concrete or abstract, how simple or complex. Taking this approach to the subject at hard challenges the egoist's claim to parsimony, for it leaves us with a perspective on self which is not pluralistic, as Batson claims, but monistic, in that self as a whole system is one thing, not two motivations in conflict.
[8] See "Toward a Theory of Self-Knowledge," J. Hunt, 1992, for a detailed analysis of the action/reaction dynamics involved in human motivation.
[9] Both ultimate aims remain potential in every act. It seems to me that the conclusion to this argument should be enough to show the question, Is egoism true? to be relatively meaningless, at least as long as we're talking about all individuals as if they are the same agent, the same chooser. While we recognize the object of our search to be understanding of those tendencies that are universal in the dynamics of human interaction, it is my claim that we might do this best by keeping close in mind that "we" are actually "many," and thus what is true of us, as a whole, that is, what is 'human nautre, one or the other, really can't be judged as long as individuals can make choices from among these natural potentials--good or evil, just or unjust, broad or narrow. Such a conception of human interaction asks what conditions provoke what survival strategies, egoism or altruism, or combinations of these elements. The assumption is that we are naturally selfish is a "guilty until proven innocent" position with respect to our underlying motivations: if we are assumed to be selfish, then we are treated by others as if we are...and since we pay the price whether we are or not, then we might as well get the benefits....and so we might as well behave selfishly, it seems. Thus, if we are simply assumed to be "sinners," we are robbed of much but not all of our choice in the matter.
This assumption thus seems to necessitate our unconditional defection in defensive response to other's defensive responses against us. The dynamic that follows violates the natural innocence of reason, and narrowness is the natural and just response to such a low expectation of human beings.
This wholesale reduction of all human behavior to narrow self-interest, which we far too often take for granted, can prove to be a causal force in the further narrowing of that behavior. But it cannot prevent our understanding of the subtle dynamics involved in our own moral reasonings. All it can really do is tell us how humans have seen fit to adapt to conditions thus far -- not how humans will inevitably choose to behave. Indeed, frequency of a given behavior does not imply necessity. If we change the conditions of human development, it stands to reason that we will have changed the frequency of certain human behaviors -- but it is unlikely that by this we would have changed human nature itself.
Human nature includes all that is potential; any particular adaptation is part reflex, and part choice. Note that to say that human nature is all potential is not to say that all selves are potential for all people, for the interactive effect between the individual and the social environment will reinforce, one way or another, the individual's intrinsic tendencies, encouraging or discouraging development in some directions more than others, and making some avenues of development practically impossible.
Where self-knowledge is concerned, futures are a matter of probability, with certain odds which change with the action of the agent as well as the actions of social forces. Seeing consciousness as the tool of survival that it is, with focus of attention at center, and with peripheral vision, as well as future and hindsight, shows a conception of Self that exercises and reaches to be as broad or narrow as a choosing agent sees necessary to fitness. It is the universal nature of all conscious beings to survive as well as possible, making survival choices universal, and yet a matter of the particular conditions of adaptive opportunity and limitations within the environment in which an organism is nested. In such a self-concept, one perceives oneself as somewhere in between here and there, now and then, actual and potential, real and ideal. Self-concept, in this conception of flexible perspectives, grows in terms of knowledge and power, that is, with the sense of one's reach of awareness and influence, from narrow to broad and sometimes back again.
Perception of self changes as perception of security or threat changes. It does not require a leap of faith or a betrayal of one's realism to agree that understanding these dynamics from the inside-out is a form of self-knowledge we need more of. What it does require is the ability to see the difference between the approaches taken in these two passages regarding the study of human interaction, the first of which is descriptive and predictive, and the second, prescriptive:
1."A young child who is exceptionally good-natured or responsive may draw more or better attention from his nursery school teacher than one who is unresponsive."(Kopp and Krakow, p.9.)
2. A young child who gets more and better attention from his nursery school teacher is more likely to be good-natured and responsive.
The difference in these approaches is that the second employs the moral which is taught by the first.
[10] Batson, Psychological Inqyiry, p.119.
[11] Jane Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) p. ix.
[12] Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.x.
[13] Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.xi.
[14] Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.20.
[15] Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.19. [See also Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, (New York: Basic Books, Inc.), and my thesis.] The prisoner's dilemma is a thought experiment that, along with a little empathy, can assist us in clearing up some of the confusion about the diverse survival challenges that humans routinely face. As argued earlier in this work, when the object of our study is also a subject, we cannot hope to "know" it if we do not take its own perspective into view, hence the reason that our desire for the whole truth must go beyond our scientific method, into those methods that employ empathy to compel us to ask ourselves, what would I do? The so-called Prisoner’s Dilemma is just such an introspective exercise. It can help show us the objective truth in the form of principles underlying the subjective diversity of our particular views of the world, allowing us to better see ourselves in context, as well as to put ourselves in the place of others. With the help of the prisoner's dilemma we might meaningfully consider the conditions of different environments so to understand why different people can come to believe and behave in different ways based on different reasoning, some better and some worse. It can also help us understand how the effects of good or bad reason are iterated over time and throughout populations. The PD shows the dynamics involved in such common circumstances, such as those wherein individuals reason through their survival strategies and lay out the circumstances of their choice, and then asking, in much the same sense that Nagel advises we do, "How would you feel?" or "What would you do?", (Thomas Nagel, "The Possibility of Altruism", (in Egoism and Altruism, ed. by Ronald D. Milo) p. 123.) The PD provides evidence, both empirically and a priori, of the logical and often misunderstood feedback dynamics of both egoism and altruism. And rather than supporting the traditional view of human self-interest as necessarily being narrow and of human beings as purely egoistic, this dynamic view of interacting selves shows altruism (or giving) as well as egoism (or taking) to be options, both available choice from among many more or less enlightened potentials. Recognizing this, we can see that egoism is more our habit than our 'nature,' and not such a wise move, considering Despite traditional reasoning about "rationality", the prisoner's dilemma can help us to see the consequences of such choices as we routinely and unreflectively make have ways of backfiring, and that when we think we are acting in our own interest, we are sometimes actually shooting ourselves in the foot. Thus, coming to see how the PD works can make clear how altruism has hidden benefits, and egoism has hidden costs. And herein lies its prescriptive potential. For the PD shows, among other things, that if action toward survival and well-being is what we mean by 'rational,' then a policy of unconditional defection, or generalized egoism, such as we have long considered rational, is not actually in our best interest. It also shows that a policy of unconditional cooperation is likewise not wise. As one can see by examination of this analysis, neither unconditional cooperation, (that is, extreme altruism), or unconditional defection (e.g. extreme egoism) is actually good for us in all cases, and what makes more sense involves healthy reasoning in particular cases according to what will improve the relationship and teach the other to treat us well. As we will see, the most rational interactive strategies of how we should treat others are, in the long run, conditional; which is to say, "there is no best strategy independent of the strategy used by the other player.” ("Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, (New York: Basis Books, Inc.) p.15.) Survival being contingent, individuals are sensitively dependent upon group and group upon individuals, and thus, neither 'always defect' or 'always cooperate' is rational, in and of itself. While the strategy to 'always defect' is the only rational policy in a population of all defectors, it is self-defeating among those who would reciprocate fairly if we would. Likewise, while "always cooperate" works fine in a population of cooperators or reciprocators, it collapses in a population of primary defectors, against whom only reciprocal defection is rational. Therefore, the extreme egoist, who always defects and thinks he is taking advantage of the extreme altruist, who always cooperates, is actually losing in the long run, even if he wins in the short run (and this tendency does seem to exist more in masculine than in feminine motivations). For while hawks can invade a group of doves, who are too nice for their own good, causing subversion from within to occur and making it so that a strategy of always cooperate can't evolve in a population (which is to say, it is not an evolutionarily stable strategy (ess) because the group is vulnerable to defectors against whom players can't or at any rate won't protect themselves, the cooperator who reciprocates (i.e. by way of a tit-for-tat strategy), and thus may lose the immediate game, has nonetheless won the advantage in the long run dynamic game, that is, they have increased the likelihood of drawing future cooperation from fair players, the advantage that the defecting egoist has lost. Thus, a group of players who always defects is collectively stable only if it is not invaded by clusters of such reciprocating others, who protect themselves from defectors while earning rewards from one another. Because tit-for-tat reciprocate both cooperation and defection, thus collects allies and repels enemies, and is therefore collectively stable (if and only if w, i.e. the importance of the future, is large enough, and if frequency of interaction is sufficient)[see Sober]. In this, it is the means by which altruism can evolve, even within populations which are composed of predominantly egoistic players.
Thus, among tit-for-tatters, who would reciprocate giving, the defector defeats his or her own self-interest, for he will elicit taking. So, even though a tit-for-tat strategy of reciprocity never wins in any given single interaction, it wins in the long run (called Simpson's Paradox). Egoists would therefore be wise to take a lesson from reciprocators here. The iterated PD illustrates how taking advantage of an opponent for short-term gain can earn one a long-term loss, because the egoist makes a choice that invites defection back from others toward themselves, for he or she is thereafter subject to retributive reaction from players in future games, even those who would be willing to reciprocate giving and could be trusted to behave altruistically toward giving other's. Thus, the altruist invites the trust of others, drawing out their altruistic response, even from those who would defect against less trusted others.
A strategy of reciprocity amounts to treating individuals as individuals, and this is both fair and, as the iterated PD illustrates, toward survival and well being, which makes reciprocity more rational than unconditional strategies of either egoism or altruism. Besides being nice [never the primary defector], a wise response to either or any strategy played by others, such as tit-for-tat seems to be, is also retaliatory [always responds with secondary defection to a primary defection by the other], then forgiving [does not hold a grudge], and is always clear [consistent].
[*see thesis for discussion of action/reaction dynamics involved here; pp.13=>] Again, this approach to human interaction introduces a new area of discussion -- such as the distinction between, the function of, and consequences which follow from, both primary and secondary defection in our strategic choices. The line between those actions which are toward one's own self-preservation and those which seek more than one's fair share, and thus provoke others to act in their own self-preservative interests, is the distinction between defensive secondary defection and offensive primary defection, and the prisoner's dilemma can help us draw this distinction more clearly. Perhaps even Thomas Hobbes might have been convinced by its logic, both empirical and a priori, that the fine but critical distinction between the "will to hurt" and the "will to keep from being hurt, ("Thomas Hobbes, "Self-love and Society", (in Egoism and Altruism, edited by Ronald D. Milo) p. 12.) which he himself took account of but did not take seriously, is the line between "selfishness" and "self-preservation" -- morally, a very big difference. We will also ask whether this also accounts for the difference between psychological and evolutionary egoism as well. If we are going to keep asking about the tendency toward 'egoism' in 'human nature,' we ought to be clear on these different types of self-interest, on their different ends, different levels of justification, and different consequences.
The economic-man concept of human rationality is based on the logic of the static prisoner's dilemma game – that is, those instances when only one interaction is considered. But the thing is, life is not a one shot game, which limits the usefulness of this static analysis in broader applications. The paradox presented by the iterated PD (as well as Arrow's Theorem, and other contemporary issues which are outside the scope of this work) teaches that our conception of what is rational actually proves itself to be quite irrational when the variable of time and future consequences is taken into consideration. For when we are likely play the game again with the same opponent, we are less likely to reason that it makes sense to trade another’s trust (which Batson distinguishes from what he calls the value of the future) for quick gain. Rather we are more likely to feel that trust, a variable not considered valuable in the static analysis, is in fact the only way to win in the long run. Which is to say that, when we play this partner again in the future, we will have earned defection against ourselves if we have defected against this opponent in the past, and likewise, cooperation if we have cooperated.
Thus, by reasoning out the interaction between survival strategies over time, we see that self-interest councils us to consider the effect of our present actions on the future, or be willing to lose what we seek to win there. While a static analysis excludes future consequences and psychological significances from the payoff we receive, that is, from the conception of "good" upon which reason acts, the iterated PD clarifies the dynamics of reasoning involved in an interactive and dynamic analysis of choice situations. For when choice involves value in future consequences, "maximizing one's interests" indicates different preferences than those we typically assume to be rational.
[16] Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.17.
[17] Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.19.
[18] Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.19.
[19] Batson qualifies his definition of altruism with these eight implications: 1. that it is qualitative; 2. that a single motive cannot be both altruistic and egoistic; 3. that both can exist in a single organism at the same time, but the organism will experience motivational conflict; 4. that it does not apply to reflexive or automatic behavior, only to goal-directed behavior; 5. that a person is not necessarily the best judge of his or her own motivation*; 6. that it need not necessarily lead to action; 7. that it need not involve self-sacrifice, and may even involve self-benefit as an unintended consequence; and 8. that there may be other prosocial motives that are not either altruistic or egoistic. [p.109]
[20] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 109.
[21] This makes room for an interactive conception of self as a dynamic system of complex interactions in which self's and other's interests are balanced by just such a principle of justice. See my Senior Thesis* (1992) for a detailed discussion of such a Self conception.
[22] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 109. In the biological sciences, sociobiologists who once asked the question, why don't self-interested genes perpetuate themselves and altruistic genes die out, have been answered by reference to Simpson's Paradox, which explains how groups can select for altruism, even while individuals select for egoism...which is still not to say that individuals necessarily do... The question that Batson asks "is about precisely those motives that Dawkins and other sociobiologists exclude from their analysis."(Batson, Manuscript, p.25)
[23] Batson, Manuscript, p. 27.
[24] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 108. Also, in Batson, Manuscript, [*put earlier] "Altruism is a motivational state with the ulitmate goal of increasing another's welfare."[p. 11] "Egoism is a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing one's own welfare."[p.14]
[25] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.107.
[26] Batson, Manuscript, p. 29.
[27] Batson, Manuscript, p. 29.
[28] This is a connection I have explored in detail in a paper entitled, Toward a Theory of Self-Knowledge, 1992.
[29] Thomas Nagel, "The Possibility of Altruism", (in Egoism and Altruism, ed. by Ronald D. Milo) p. 123. As Mansbridge notes, developmental psychologists have found empathy in newborns (MacClean 1973, Krebs 1971, 1982), and biologists have found empathic menstruation, or "menstral synchrony," among women of many species (McClintok 1981, 1987).(Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.18.)
[30] *Refer back here, in the final version, to those chapters where the substance of my senior thesis has landed.
[31] Batson, Manuscript, p. 18.
[32] Batson, Manuscript, p. 442.
[33] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 107.
[34] Batson, Manuscript, p. 441.
[35] But if we are truly to take Batson's work as seriously as we might, it would seem to require an inclusive shift in the angle of our approach to studying this most familiar of subject matters, a shift from outside-looking-in to inside-looking-out, as well as a shift from descriptive to prescriptive theory. For this evidence says more than that we have cause to believe that altruism exists--it indicates that such a belief is a cause in itself--a self-fulfilling prophesy. This being the case gives us reason to consider the vast magnitude of the potential damage done when an entire economic system assumes a war of all against all, when a legal system puts children into such wars through the failure of family law to seek resolution of conflict due to the assumption that such contracts are necessarily adversary nature, and throughout an entire educational system no one seeks to end the myriad ongoing wars as long as everyone is trying to win them. As Virginia Held points out in her essay, Mothering versus Contract, "a society resting on no more than bargains between self-interested or mutually disinterested individuals will not be able to withstand the forces of egoism and dissolution pulling such societies apart,"(Virginia Held, Mothering versus Contract, in Beyond Self Interest, ed. Jane Mansbridge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1990)) such as our "adversary democracy" does.(Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.3. (Indeed, "...the battle of interest against interests decided by, say, the procedure of majority rule--may fail to meet the criteria for democracy implicit in the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court."(Mansbridge on Sustein, p.9)) We must come to understand that subversion from within is always potential in human populations, and this danger exists wherever egoism, even to the point of evil, is assumed. Of course it is always an option, that is, one from among many human potentials, but too often it is assumed and even encouraged to be the preferred option, but only where its self-destructive effect is ignored. But this option, being only potential, can either be reinforced or discouraged, and so those the responsibility falls to those with power (parents, teachers, etc) in the contexts in which individual children learn to survive. This is a choice made at by individuals at the personal level, and while it may reflect the morality of the group as a whole, the responsibility lies in individual choice. The assumptions upon which institutions are built – such as that children are ‘naturally’ bad and thus must be punished and controlled to be ‘good’, play out in the actions of individuals, who are free to act on their better reasoning, rather than to react to assumptions based on flawed reasoning.
[36] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 120.
[37] Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.x.
[38] Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.21.
[39] Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.xiii,
[40] As Virginia Held points out, "The child in relation to the mothering person is permanently in the best possible position from which to recognize that might is not equivalent to right, that power, including the power to teach and enforce a given morality, is not equivalent to morality itself. Becoming a person is not so much learning a morality that is being taught as it is developing the ability to decide for oneself what morality requires of one."(Held, Mothering, pp.302-303.) "[W]e should probably none of us ever forget what it is like to lack power...[we must] remember the point of view of those who cannot rely on the power of arms to uphold their moral claims."(Held, Mothering, p.303.) "Morality...must guide us in our relations with actual particular children, enabling them to develop their own lives and commitments. For mothering-persons," Held notes, "morality can never seem adequate if it offers no more than ideal rules for hypothetical situations; morality must connect with the actual context of real, particular others in need."(Held, Mothering, p.302.) "It would be a morality based on caring and concern for actual human others, and it would have to recognize the limitations of both egoism and perfect justice." (Held, Mothering, p.302.) We have imagined relations between parent and child "as somehow outside human society altogether in a region labled 'nature'," but parenting "is at the heart of human society."(Held, Mothering, p.304.) Of such feminist theories some ask the hostile question about culture at large, who are the mothers and who are the children? It is a good question, Held and I both think, and not as difficult to answer as some inquirers might suppose. While we adults are sometimes one and sometimes the other,(Held, Mothering, pp.303-304) regarding responsibility and dependence, there is no doubt that we are, at least, the adults--and in this regard, responsible at least to the children. (An attempt to answer this question is made in my senior thesis (chapter *), where the subject of responsibility/dependence, action/reaction, offense/defense behavior is discussed at length. Altruism and egoism exist as options, and in my analysis, I have focused on the logical dynamics of cause and effect which help answer the next question, why should one choose altruism over egoism, or vice versa. The prisoner's dilemma can help us see the iterated consequences of our assumptions. The question of whose interests are the ultimate goal, and what consequences follow from such motivations, are especially instructive...on the level of self-knowledge and of institutional assumptions. We can use empathy on principle here, as a method of knowing, along with the prisoner's dilemma, to reason through the logical consequences of our motivations and the actions they lead to, which shows clearly the wisdom or foolishness of given choices.)
[41] Batson, Manuscript, p.20.
[42] Batson, Manuscript, p.21. "If we are capable of seeking only our own benefit, then we can hardly be blamed for doing so..."
[43] Batson, Manuscript, p.22. "If, on the other hand, it turns out that we are capable of altruism, then our moral horizon--and our potential for moral responsibility--broadens considerably."
[44] Batson, Manuscript, p.22.
[45] Batson, Manuscript, p.442.
[46] (Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.xii.) The "underlying prescriptive thrust" (Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.xii.) of this research reinforces the words of Nobel Prize winner, James Buchanan (1986), who rightly noted that "There has not been enough attention paid to the interdependence between the predicted patterns of political outcomes and the rules or institutions that constrain the political actors."(Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.21.) As Mansbridge notes, James Madison emphasized that the constitution "would have large and terrible consequences if it embodied inadequate assumptions regarding human motivations." (Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, pp.6-7.) Plato worried himself to great lengths about the dangers of a mythology which reflected the gods as capable of great evils, knowing humans would have no incentive to be otherwise without ideals of good to aim at. In The Repbulic, when Thrasymachus argues that “might makes right”, and Glaucon urge Socrates to agree that “appearing just is enough,” Socrates replies at length (the entire rest of the text, in fact) that on the contrary, it is “right that makes might,” and no mere facade of justice can suffice to put the soul in order and thus to bring happiness to human beings. In his account of the philsopher king inside us all, Socrates shows that when we are driven by reason adhering to justice, human beings can transcend self-interest, caring for others for the other's sake alone. Paradoxically, it is this that beings true good and happiness to the giver. As many of the ancient sages tried to teach us, pursuit of one’s own good at others expense actually chases true happiness away, whereas pursuit of the good of others for their sake alone actually draws it near. Go figure. Adam Smith tried to teach us this as well, for contrary to the popular conception of his thoughts on human motivation; he was well aware that "there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interests him in the fortune of others, and renders their happiness necessary to him."(Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.120.)
[47] Charles Darwin, Voyage of the Beagle, reprinted in Stephen J. Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (New York: Norton & Company, 1981.)
[48] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, (Vol. 2., No. 2. 1991) p.107
[49] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.107.
[50] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.107.
[51] Batson, Manuscript, ( ) p.20.
[52] Batson, Manuscript, ( ) p.20.
[53] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.107.
[54] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.108.
[55] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.108. In fact, evidence indicates that there "Self-actualization cannot be attained if it is made an end in itself, but only as a side effect of self-transcendence."(Frankl, 1959, p.175; in Batson, Manuscript, p. 432] "The more one aims at pleasure, the more this aim is missed...The very 'pursuit of happiness' is what thwarts it"[1969, p. 33, in Batson, Manuscript, p. 432]
[56] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.109.
[57] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.108.
[58] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.108.
[59] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.108.
[60] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 109.
[61] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 109.
[62] As he notes in his manuscript, if we care for others from instinct or habit or other reflexive impulses, "then terms like selfish and selfless, egoistic and altruistic, do not apply."[p.66]
[63] My intuition here is different, for while I agree that people do not always attend to it, and they do not always admit to it, I cannot help but feel that somewhere, on some level, we do 'know' our own motivation, but it does require an honest appraisal to be sure. So we’re not always honest, but we can't say we do not actually know our true motivation--if we don't, who does?
[64] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 109.
[65] See my Senior Thesis for a detailed examination of the dynamics of such a system of interaction.
[66] Batson, Response to Commentaries, p.160.
[67] Batson, Manuscript, p.102.
[68] Batson, Manuscript, p.104.
[69] Batson, Response to Commentaries, p.160.
[70] Batson, Response to Commentaries, p.161.
[71] Batson, Response to Commentaries, p.161.
[72] Batson, Response to Commentaries, p.161.
[73] Batson, Manuscript, p.442.
[74] Batson, Response to Commentaries, p.160.
[75] Batson, Response to Commentaries, p.160. One especially interesting aspect of Batson study is the evidence turned up regarding Kohlberg's vs. Gilligan's models of moral development. The results suggested that "high scores for women may not be associated with altruistic motivation so much as with an egoistic desire to conform to the sex-role ideal."[p.375-76] "This was not the pattern of results we expected to find, but it was a pattern we found intriguing. It suggests that high scores on sex-role congruent measures of 'altruism' may reflect an egoistic desire to present oneself as appropriately moral, as a good girl or good boy. On the other hand, high scores on the sex-role incongruent measures, less subject to contamination by self-presentation...may tap a truly altruistic personality."[p.376] "Personality assessment instruments designed to measure altruistic motives stereotypic for one gender may actually measure egoistic motives for that gender but altruistic motives for the other gender. Like swapping towels, 'her' altruistic personality may be more clearly revealed by what shows through on 'his' morality, and vice versa."[p.377] "To have an 'altruistic' self-image or public persona is dramatically different from actually possessing altruistic attributes."[p.379]
[76] Batson, Response to Commentaries, p.161.
[77] Batson, Response to Commentaries, p.161.
[78] Batson, Manuscript, p. 27.
[79] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 109. In the biological sciences, sociobiologists who once asked the question, why don't self-interested genes perpetuate themselves and altruistic genes die out, have been answered by reference to Simpson's Paradox, which explains how groups can select for altruism, even while individuals select for egoism...which is still not to say that individuals necessarily do... The question that Batson asks "is about precisely those motives that Dawkins and other sociobiologists exclude from their analysis."(Batson, Manuscript, p.25)
[80] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 108. Also, in Batson, Manuscript, "Altruism is a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing another's welfare."[p. 11] "Egoism is a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing one's own welfare."[p.14]
[81] Batson and Shaw, Response to the Commentaries, p.163.
[82] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.110.
[83] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.110.
[84] See Sober, Psychological Inquiry, p.145, and author's response to Sober, p.163.
[85] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 113.
[86] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.114-118.
[87] Batson and Shaw, Response to the Commentaries, p.163.
[88] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 109.
[89] Batson and Shaw, Response to the Commentaries, p.162.
[90] Batson and Shaw, Response to the Commentaries, p.162.
[91] Huston Smith, Illustrated World’s Religions, p.114.
[92] Smith, p 114.
[93] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 113.
[94] Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, VII.iii.1.4
[95] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.112.
[96] Batson and Shaw, Response to the Commentaries, p.162.
[97] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.114.
[98] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p.107.
[99] Batson, Manuscript, p. 29.
[100] Batson, Manuscript, p. 29.
[101] Batson qualifies his definition of altruism with these eight implications: 1. that it is qualitative; 2. that a single motive cannot be both altruistic and egoistic; 3. that both can exist in a single organism at the same time, but the organism will experience motivational conflict; 4. that it does not apply to reflexive or automatic behavior, only to goal-directed behavior; 5. that a person is not necessarily the best judge of his or her own motivation*; 6. that it need not necessarily lead to action; 7. that it need not involve self-sacrifice, and may even involve self-benefit as an unintended consequence; and 8. that there may be other prosocial motives that are not either altruistic or egoistic. [p.109]
[102] Batson and Shaw, Psychological Inquiry, p. 109.
[103] Batson, Manuscript, p.18.
[104] Batson, Psychological Inquiry, p.119.
[105] This makes room for an interactive conception of self as a dynamic system of complex interactions in which self's and other's interests are balanced by just such a principle of justice. See my Senior Thesis (1992) for a detailed discussion of such a Self conception.
[106] Jane Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) p. ix.
[107] Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.x.
[108] Mansbridge, Beyond Self-Interest, p.xi.
[109] Batson, Psychological Inquiry, p.107.
[110] Batson, Psychological Inquiry, p.119.
[111] Batson, Psychological Inquiry, p.120.
[112] Batson, Psychological Inquiry, p.108.
[113] Batson, Psychological Inquiry, p.163.
[114] Batson, Psychological Inquiry, p.163.
[115] Batson, Psychological Inquiry, p.119.
[116] Batson, Psychological Inquiry, p.107.
[117] See my Senior Thesis for an account of how the prisoner's dilemma helps us analyze such data.
[118] Batson, Psychological Inquiry, p.120.
[119] Batson, Psychological Inquiry, p.120.
[120] Batson, Psychological Inquiry, p.120.
[121] Batson, Manuscript, p.20.
[122] Batson, Manuscript, p.441.
[123] Batson, Manuscript, p.21.
[124] Batson, Manuscript, p.22.
[125] Batson, Manuscript, p.442.
[126] Batson, Manuscript, p.22.
[127] Batson, Manuscript, p.428.
[128] Batson, Manuscript, p.430.