On Chalmer's Theory of Niave Inductivism
FIX!*
The theory-dependence of observation is a problem for naive inductivism, firstly, because this individual variability makes induction fallible, since at least some theory (even if it's only the theory of survival and well-being) underlies all observation, and so knowledge is never objective in the sense of absolutely value-free; and secondly, because it leads to an incommensurability in theories that makes them difficult to compare.
As A. F. Chalmers argues in his provocative little book, What is this thing called science?, that this institution which is so highly, perhaps inordinately, esteemed, is basedon a little understood method. The claim of naive inductivists, that science is based on the principle of induction (which, according to Bacon, involves accepting the facts and building the theory to fit them [p.2]) is, according to Chalmers, "dangerously misleading." It is mistaken, to begin with, in the idea that singular observation statements can lead to universal laws and theories,l and secondly, in the assumption that observation involves unprejudiced use of the senses. The theory-dependence of observation makes this claim problematic. For underlying the assumptions, 1. that science starts with observation and 2. that observation is secure, are the even deeper assumptions, 1. that we have direct access to the external world, and 2. "that two normal observers viewing the same object or scene from the same place will 'see' the same thing. "[p.23]
And yet, examples where foreground/background discrimination is employed to show that whether the same objective picture is seen as one way or the other "seems to depend on something other than the image on the retina of the viewer. "[p.25] "What an observer sees...depends in part on his past experience, his knowledge and his expectations." [p.25] "It's not difficult to produce examples from the practice of science," he points out, "that illustrate the same point, namely, that what observers see, the subjective experience that they undergo, when viewing an object or scene is not determined solely by the images on their retinas but depends also on the experience, knowledge, expectations and general inner state of the observer." [p.26] While Chalmers accepts and presupposes throughout his book "that a single, unique, physical world exists independently of observers, "[p.28] there is also a sense, he claims, "in which they are all confronted by, look at, and so, in a sense, 'see' the same thing. But it does not follow from this that they have identical perceptual experiences. There is a very important sense in which they do not see the same thing, and it is this latter sense upon which my criticism of the inductivist position has been based." [p.28](emphasis added) Contrary to the naive inductivists' claim, it is evident that "theory of some kind must precede all observation statements and observation statements are as fallible as the theories they presuppose." [p.28] And, what's more, "it is significant that the more stringent the test the more theory is called upon, and further, absolute certainty is never attained. "[p.30] And neither is commensurability between theories--as between relativity and classical mechanics, or classical mechanics and quantum mechanics. [p.137]Z
But the claims of "priority of theory over observation run counter to an inductivist thesis that the meanings of many basic concepts are acquired through [mere] observation." [p.29] However, "The dependence of what we see on the state of our minds or brains is not so sensitive as to make communication, and science, impossible." [p.27] Subjectivity can be distorting, but as the theory-dependence of observation shows, it has always been the system of lenses and filters through which we have come to know the world, and since we seem to be doing fairly well in that regard, perhaps there is more to be gained than lost in the realization that subjective bias plays a part in our perceptions and
even the development of our reality. 3
Perhaps ...but Chalmers doesn't think so. After having just argued the critical role
of subjectivity in the perception of reality, since the choice of criteria will always be
ultimately subjective (as Feyerabend notes in the name of scientific freedom4), Chalmers apparently does not agree that it plays a role it the development of that reality. "I am prepared to admit that there will be some subjective element involved when a scientist chooses to adopt or work on one theory rather than another...,"[p.138] he says. However, "The objectivist thrust of my remarks tells against extreme brands of relativism, according to which one theory is as good as any other, that it is all a matter of opinion or all a matter of our subjective wishes, as Feyerabend has suggested in unguarded moments. From a realist point of view, interpreted in a broad sense, the point of theories is to attempt to come to grips with some aspect of the world. "[p.168] And so, against the view that "anything goes," taken to be Feyerabend's message of intellectual anarchy,S Chalmers concludes that, "It is not the case that any view is as good as any other. "[p.170]
In fact, he goes so far as to insist that "No personal subjective elements should be
permitted to intrude." [p.l0] It is a conclusion which is not supported by his argument, I
think, which seems to indicate, rather, a complex interaction of object and subject involved in perception. It appears problematic, specifically, because he has just shown (for the purpose of showing induction inadequate to qualify as knowledge) how it is that our perception of, say, a rainbow, involves a complex interaction between objects with respect to subjects. [p.8-9] My guess is that, were we actually to succeed in purging our science of the effects of our consciousness, as he prescribes, we would have thrown out the baby with the bath water. Could we ever really "know" rainbows then? Much less anything else about the depth and breadth of full human experience? Which is to give voice the fear that, if we do not come to recognize and admit the value of subjective variation in perspective with regard to the objective world, which is to say, in Freges' terms, the relation between sense, we might never be able to truly understand our subjective experience of the world, in either it's passive or its active sense. And yet, we continue to deny the evidence in the hope that it does indeed make a difference. Against a choice between either subjectivism or objectivism, we might be challenged to discover the ways in which this interactionism is true.6
As the rainbow example shows, some things well worth knowing are perceptible only from certain points of view, and then sometimes, only briefly, and only for the properly initiated. Are these thresholds what accounts for the bursts of creative genius
[which Feyerabend wants to claim rights for? Perhaps the same reason that we cannot objectify rainbows--i.e. because they are part subject and our method only allows us to
view what we can see from outside-looking-in--is the reason that we should be careful not to objectify knowledge so far as to thwart our own purpose, i.e. understanding. Some things we would like to know cannot, even in principle, be objectified--such as those "things" which are not outside of us at all, such that we cannot perceive the perimeters of them, and seeing surfaces, grasp their dimensions. Rather, we are inside of them, as one would expect nested systems to be; e.g. gravity, electromagnetism, consciousness, love, etc. (if these are even different things). We would never go so far as to suggest that these so-called things do not have objective existence, even though they cannot be objectified in the reductionist sense that we most often use. If these are objects at all, they are objects we are inside of, such that, like fish to water, we cannot tell the difference between it and not it; we simply have the wrong vantage from which to perceive it as something outside of us. And since this is so, these are objects which must be understood from the inside-looking out, or not at all. Which is to say, with those tools of knowledge which compliment out ability to discriminate objects and discern surfaces, i.e. the ability to explore depths and to feel from the inside out. Therefore, I think it is somewhat wrong minded to attempt to get rid of the subject in our quest for knowledge, as if such a thing could be done. It is not necessary to deny the subject all together (which I realize is more than Chalmers is doing) in order to affirm the object.
On the other hand, this is certainly not to suggest that we should not try to rid our
knowledge of the distorting effects of subjective bias and narrowness. As Chalmers early on gave for the reason we cannot trust what is obvious, because it is simply "dependent on and relative to" so much. Our biases have so much more actual efficacy than I suspect wei usually recognize--for here is where the theory-dependence of observation really shows up, I think, in the actual development of conscious reality. Bias and distortion can best be overcome, I think, not by ignoring subjectivity and pretending it does not exist, but by coming to understand the subjective elements of knowledge through thorough exploration. And we might be careful not to develop any new biases in the process--such as by playing along with the extreme objectivists' insistence on a mind-independent world, any more than/ we should have agreed with the extreme subjectivists' claim to a world-independent mind.\
A bias is a bias, after all.7 The complex and comprehensive role of subjectivity in our discovery/creation of the' objective world is a philosophical problem which I expect will get some airplay in my professional lifetime. I think it is important to think through the role of subjectivity in our science, especially in the face of so much other theorizing with regard to our changing understanding of what it means to "know" something. 8 Subjectivity only distorts our knowledge of objective reality when it is mistaken, which is perhaps less often than some I might suspect. And from t.·hose times when human consciousness is seeing clearly, so to\ speak, come those bursts of creative energy which bring us to record connections which turn into theories by which a re · · our experiences in order together and through which we understand, not merely construct our world. Thus, the human subject has always played a critical role in the development of so-called reality, however one defines it, and we cannot get closer to understanding consciousness by denying not only its importance, but sometimes even its existence.
1The first question for inductivists then is, "If science is based on experience. then by what means is it possible to get from the singular statements that result from observation to the universal statements that make up scientific knowledge?"[p.3] Inductivists answer that "it is legitimate to generalize from a finite list of singular observation statements to a universal law" jf the sample is large enough, varied enough, and no observable evidence conflicts with the law.[p.4] These qualifying conditions have their shortcomings too, he notes, in vagueness and the fact that "the numbers of observations necessary to render an inductive inference legitimate will be infinitely large. "[p.16] And even if it could do this. it would still only be a partial account though, for theories must also explain and predict. On this, the inductivist retreats to probability, he says, claiming that, while not 100% sure or perfectly true, predictions made by induction are said to be probably true. But this does not overcome the problem, for it still involves drawing a universal conclusion from particular observations, and we cannot reason logically from "some", or even "many", to "all" To do so would be to commit the wrong that Socrates deplored--to pretend to know more than we actually do. The so-called problem of induction is that one cannot use an inductive argument (e.g. that it has always worked in the past) to justify the principle of induction which is itself in question, and thus claim to unknown on the basis of mere appearances. And neither can we avoid the problem by claiming that inductive reasoning is obvious, because "What we regard as obvious is much too dependent on and relative to our education, onr prejudices and our culture to be a reliable guide to what is reasonable. "[p.20] **And thus, deductive reasoning is also needed. Unlike induction, deduction is conditional, such that, if the premises are true, then the conclusion is true, making for logical validity that induction cannot claim, since in induction, true premises can lead to a false conclusion without any contradiction.
2. But, as Chalmers notes, this does not mean that they cannot be compared in other ways, such as linear/nonlinear, static/dynamic, etc.
3If reality is defined as that point where attention meets the world, then it is clear how it is partly determtined by the object, partly by the subject; for we do choose, at least to some degree, what to pay attention to. For, even as so much of objective reality is simply "there" in front of us, to be dealt with one way or another as we move quickly through life, like it or not, it is also the case that, once we achieve some semblance of competent navigating, we can and do begin to steer, such that are indeed "acting", whereas once we only reacted.
4p_ Feyerabend, arguing for more individual freedom in science, notes that "those episodes in the history of science that are commonly regarded as most characteristic of major advances...have not come about by anything like the methods typically described by philosophers. "[p.p.xvii] Given complexity, unpredictability, and the important role that creative genius plays in the progress of science, "scientists should not be constrained by the rules of the methodologist. "[p.l35] Interpreted as an endorsement of intellectual anarchy, as if to say "anything goes," but really seems to mean the less radical claim: "be grateful that there is at least somebody who has unusual ideas...looking at old problems from a new point of view ...and do not try to stop him in advance with irrelevant and misguided arguments. "[p.l36]
5. Somewhat mistakenly, I think, as Feyerabend seemed to be claiming a right of individual freedom in the discovery processes involved in science, not that simply any reality one wants to claim is equally real; an admission of subjective variation on objective reality does not lead to a denial of objective reality itself, only to a claim that there are, logically, an infinite number of perspectives from which that reality can and perhaps should be seen.
6Although, while Chalmers and I seem to agree that some form of interaction between subject and object is going on, I have to say that, from his description, we seem to see things in reverse form. Whereas he concedes a position, called unrepresented univerealism, which is "relativist in the sense that I deny there is some absolute criterion with respect to which those judgments are to be made...no general category 'science,' and no concept of truth which is up to the task of characterizing science as a search for truth, "[p.l66] I see this as the objective aspect of the interaction. And while he says that, "The objectivist thrust of my own stance stresses" that "in the domain of knowledge, individuals are confronted by an objective situation" in terms of methods and theoretical materials, I would take this to be what is involved on the subjective side of the interaction. I see no incompatibility between a wide variability in relative points of view on the self-same objective reality.
7Biases and prejudices can be seen to come of values and need, which operate through the dynamics of attention, which notices according to the general theory of survival and well-being. For a more complete discussion of these dynamics, see "Addendum ..."Juliana Hunt, for Elliott Sober, Falll992.
8For a more complete discussion of this subject, see "Courageous Idealism in Ancient Greece and Modem America": Juliana Hunt, Summer 1992
FIX!*
The theory-dependence of observation is a problem for naive inductivism, firstly, because this individual variability makes induction fallible, since at least some theory (even if it's only the theory of survival and well-being) underlies all observation, and so knowledge is never objective in the sense of absolutely value-free; and secondly, because it leads to an incommensurability in theories that makes them difficult to compare.
As A. F. Chalmers argues in his provocative little book, What is this thing called science?, that this institution which is so highly, perhaps inordinately, esteemed, is basedon a little understood method. The claim of naive inductivists, that science is based on the principle of induction (which, according to Bacon, involves accepting the facts and building the theory to fit them [p.2]) is, according to Chalmers, "dangerously misleading." It is mistaken, to begin with, in the idea that singular observation statements can lead to universal laws and theories,l and secondly, in the assumption that observation involves unprejudiced use of the senses. The theory-dependence of observation makes this claim problematic. For underlying the assumptions, 1. that science starts with observation and 2. that observation is secure, are the even deeper assumptions, 1. that we have direct access to the external world, and 2. "that two normal observers viewing the same object or scene from the same place will 'see' the same thing. "[p.23]
And yet, examples where foreground/background discrimination is employed to show that whether the same objective picture is seen as one way or the other "seems to depend on something other than the image on the retina of the viewer. "[p.25] "What an observer sees...depends in part on his past experience, his knowledge and his expectations." [p.25] "It's not difficult to produce examples from the practice of science," he points out, "that illustrate the same point, namely, that what observers see, the subjective experience that they undergo, when viewing an object or scene is not determined solely by the images on their retinas but depends also on the experience, knowledge, expectations and general inner state of the observer." [p.26] While Chalmers accepts and presupposes throughout his book "that a single, unique, physical world exists independently of observers, "[p.28] there is also a sense, he claims, "in which they are all confronted by, look at, and so, in a sense, 'see' the same thing. But it does not follow from this that they have identical perceptual experiences. There is a very important sense in which they do not see the same thing, and it is this latter sense upon which my criticism of the inductivist position has been based." [p.28](emphasis added) Contrary to the naive inductivists' claim, it is evident that "theory of some kind must precede all observation statements and observation statements are as fallible as the theories they presuppose." [p.28] And, what's more, "it is significant that the more stringent the test the more theory is called upon, and further, absolute certainty is never attained. "[p.30] And neither is commensurability between theories--as between relativity and classical mechanics, or classical mechanics and quantum mechanics. [p.137]Z
But the claims of "priority of theory over observation run counter to an inductivist thesis that the meanings of many basic concepts are acquired through [mere] observation." [p.29] However, "The dependence of what we see on the state of our minds or brains is not so sensitive as to make communication, and science, impossible." [p.27] Subjectivity can be distorting, but as the theory-dependence of observation shows, it has always been the system of lenses and filters through which we have come to know the world, and since we seem to be doing fairly well in that regard, perhaps there is more to be gained than lost in the realization that subjective bias plays a part in our perceptions and
even the development of our reality. 3
Perhaps ...but Chalmers doesn't think so. After having just argued the critical role
of subjectivity in the perception of reality, since the choice of criteria will always be
ultimately subjective (as Feyerabend notes in the name of scientific freedom4), Chalmers apparently does not agree that it plays a role it the development of that reality. "I am prepared to admit that there will be some subjective element involved when a scientist chooses to adopt or work on one theory rather than another...,"[p.138] he says. However, "The objectivist thrust of my remarks tells against extreme brands of relativism, according to which one theory is as good as any other, that it is all a matter of opinion or all a matter of our subjective wishes, as Feyerabend has suggested in unguarded moments. From a realist point of view, interpreted in a broad sense, the point of theories is to attempt to come to grips with some aspect of the world. "[p.168] And so, against the view that "anything goes," taken to be Feyerabend's message of intellectual anarchy,S Chalmers concludes that, "It is not the case that any view is as good as any other. "[p.170]
In fact, he goes so far as to insist that "No personal subjective elements should be
permitted to intrude." [p.l0] It is a conclusion which is not supported by his argument, I
think, which seems to indicate, rather, a complex interaction of object and subject involved in perception. It appears problematic, specifically, because he has just shown (for the purpose of showing induction inadequate to qualify as knowledge) how it is that our perception of, say, a rainbow, involves a complex interaction between objects with respect to subjects. [p.8-9] My guess is that, were we actually to succeed in purging our science of the effects of our consciousness, as he prescribes, we would have thrown out the baby with the bath water. Could we ever really "know" rainbows then? Much less anything else about the depth and breadth of full human experience? Which is to give voice the fear that, if we do not come to recognize and admit the value of subjective variation in perspective with regard to the objective world, which is to say, in Freges' terms, the relation between sense, we might never be able to truly understand our subjective experience of the world, in either it's passive or its active sense. And yet, we continue to deny the evidence in the hope that it does indeed make a difference. Against a choice between either subjectivism or objectivism, we might be challenged to discover the ways in which this interactionism is true.6
As the rainbow example shows, some things well worth knowing are perceptible only from certain points of view, and then sometimes, only briefly, and only for the properly initiated. Are these thresholds what accounts for the bursts of creative genius
[which Feyerabend wants to claim rights for? Perhaps the same reason that we cannot objectify rainbows--i.e. because they are part subject and our method only allows us to
view what we can see from outside-looking-in--is the reason that we should be careful not to objectify knowledge so far as to thwart our own purpose, i.e. understanding. Some things we would like to know cannot, even in principle, be objectified--such as those "things" which are not outside of us at all, such that we cannot perceive the perimeters of them, and seeing surfaces, grasp their dimensions. Rather, we are inside of them, as one would expect nested systems to be; e.g. gravity, electromagnetism, consciousness, love, etc. (if these are even different things). We would never go so far as to suggest that these so-called things do not have objective existence, even though they cannot be objectified in the reductionist sense that we most often use. If these are objects at all, they are objects we are inside of, such that, like fish to water, we cannot tell the difference between it and not it; we simply have the wrong vantage from which to perceive it as something outside of us. And since this is so, these are objects which must be understood from the inside-looking out, or not at all. Which is to say, with those tools of knowledge which compliment out ability to discriminate objects and discern surfaces, i.e. the ability to explore depths and to feel from the inside out. Therefore, I think it is somewhat wrong minded to attempt to get rid of the subject in our quest for knowledge, as if such a thing could be done. It is not necessary to deny the subject all together (which I realize is more than Chalmers is doing) in order to affirm the object.
On the other hand, this is certainly not to suggest that we should not try to rid our
knowledge of the distorting effects of subjective bias and narrowness. As Chalmers early on gave for the reason we cannot trust what is obvious, because it is simply "dependent on and relative to" so much. Our biases have so much more actual efficacy than I suspect wei usually recognize--for here is where the theory-dependence of observation really shows up, I think, in the actual development of conscious reality. Bias and distortion can best be overcome, I think, not by ignoring subjectivity and pretending it does not exist, but by coming to understand the subjective elements of knowledge through thorough exploration. And we might be careful not to develop any new biases in the process--such as by playing along with the extreme objectivists' insistence on a mind-independent world, any more than/ we should have agreed with the extreme subjectivists' claim to a world-independent mind.\
A bias is a bias, after all.7 The complex and comprehensive role of subjectivity in our discovery/creation of the' objective world is a philosophical problem which I expect will get some airplay in my professional lifetime. I think it is important to think through the role of subjectivity in our science, especially in the face of so much other theorizing with regard to our changing understanding of what it means to "know" something. 8 Subjectivity only distorts our knowledge of objective reality when it is mistaken, which is perhaps less often than some I might suspect. And from t.·hose times when human consciousness is seeing clearly, so to\ speak, come those bursts of creative energy which bring us to record connections which turn into theories by which a re · · our experiences in order together and through which we understand, not merely construct our world. Thus, the human subject has always played a critical role in the development of so-called reality, however one defines it, and we cannot get closer to understanding consciousness by denying not only its importance, but sometimes even its existence.
1The first question for inductivists then is, "If science is based on experience. then by what means is it possible to get from the singular statements that result from observation to the universal statements that make up scientific knowledge?"[p.3] Inductivists answer that "it is legitimate to generalize from a finite list of singular observation statements to a universal law" jf the sample is large enough, varied enough, and no observable evidence conflicts with the law.[p.4] These qualifying conditions have their shortcomings too, he notes, in vagueness and the fact that "the numbers of observations necessary to render an inductive inference legitimate will be infinitely large. "[p.16] And even if it could do this. it would still only be a partial account though, for theories must also explain and predict. On this, the inductivist retreats to probability, he says, claiming that, while not 100% sure or perfectly true, predictions made by induction are said to be probably true. But this does not overcome the problem, for it still involves drawing a universal conclusion from particular observations, and we cannot reason logically from "some", or even "many", to "all" To do so would be to commit the wrong that Socrates deplored--to pretend to know more than we actually do. The so-called problem of induction is that one cannot use an inductive argument (e.g. that it has always worked in the past) to justify the principle of induction which is itself in question, and thus claim to unknown on the basis of mere appearances. And neither can we avoid the problem by claiming that inductive reasoning is obvious, because "What we regard as obvious is much too dependent on and relative to our education, onr prejudices and our culture to be a reliable guide to what is reasonable. "[p.20] **And thus, deductive reasoning is also needed. Unlike induction, deduction is conditional, such that, if the premises are true, then the conclusion is true, making for logical validity that induction cannot claim, since in induction, true premises can lead to a false conclusion without any contradiction.
2. But, as Chalmers notes, this does not mean that they cannot be compared in other ways, such as linear/nonlinear, static/dynamic, etc.
3If reality is defined as that point where attention meets the world, then it is clear how it is partly determtined by the object, partly by the subject; for we do choose, at least to some degree, what to pay attention to. For, even as so much of objective reality is simply "there" in front of us, to be dealt with one way or another as we move quickly through life, like it or not, it is also the case that, once we achieve some semblance of competent navigating, we can and do begin to steer, such that are indeed "acting", whereas once we only reacted.
4p_ Feyerabend, arguing for more individual freedom in science, notes that "those episodes in the history of science that are commonly regarded as most characteristic of major advances...have not come about by anything like the methods typically described by philosophers. "[p.p.xvii] Given complexity, unpredictability, and the important role that creative genius plays in the progress of science, "scientists should not be constrained by the rules of the methodologist. "[p.l35] Interpreted as an endorsement of intellectual anarchy, as if to say "anything goes," but really seems to mean the less radical claim: "be grateful that there is at least somebody who has unusual ideas...looking at old problems from a new point of view ...and do not try to stop him in advance with irrelevant and misguided arguments. "[p.l36]
5. Somewhat mistakenly, I think, as Feyerabend seemed to be claiming a right of individual freedom in the discovery processes involved in science, not that simply any reality one wants to claim is equally real; an admission of subjective variation on objective reality does not lead to a denial of objective reality itself, only to a claim that there are, logically, an infinite number of perspectives from which that reality can and perhaps should be seen.
6Although, while Chalmers and I seem to agree that some form of interaction between subject and object is going on, I have to say that, from his description, we seem to see things in reverse form. Whereas he concedes a position, called unrepresented univerealism, which is "relativist in the sense that I deny there is some absolute criterion with respect to which those judgments are to be made...no general category 'science,' and no concept of truth which is up to the task of characterizing science as a search for truth, "[p.l66] I see this as the objective aspect of the interaction. And while he says that, "The objectivist thrust of my own stance stresses" that "in the domain of knowledge, individuals are confronted by an objective situation" in terms of methods and theoretical materials, I would take this to be what is involved on the subjective side of the interaction. I see no incompatibility between a wide variability in relative points of view on the self-same objective reality.
7Biases and prejudices can be seen to come of values and need, which operate through the dynamics of attention, which notices according to the general theory of survival and well-being. For a more complete discussion of these dynamics, see "Addendum ..."Juliana Hunt, for Elliott Sober, Falll992.
8For a more complete discussion of this subject, see "Courageous Idealism in Ancient Greece and Modem America": Juliana Hunt, Summer 1992