In The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan agrues for the rights view of ethics, as opposed to contractarianism, which is fundamentally wrong in that it "allows us to view animals as our resources, here for us..."[p.77] "...as if their value is reducible to their usefulness. "[p.83] By contrast, the rights view holds that "all have inherent value, all possess it equally, and all have an equal right to be treated with respect, to be treated in ways that do not reduce them to the status of things, as if they exist as resources for others." [p.81] This seems a view that Rachels would share, but he did not argue for it directly--only against the view of human superiority. Regan, on the other hand, goes so far as to say that, "unlike (crude) contractarianism ...the rights view in principle denies the moral tolerability of any and all forms of racial, sexual, or social discrimination; and unlike utilitarianism, this view in principle denies that we can justify good results by using evil means that violate an individual's rights ...That would be to sanction the disrespectful treatment of the individual in the name of the social good, something the rights view will not--categorically will not--ever allow."[p.81] The rights view is, Regan says, "categorically abolitionist." [p.83] Thus, the goals of the animal rights movement involve the total abolition of the use of animals in scientific research, the dissolution of animal agriculture, and the elimination of all hunting and trapping. Just as Rachels would say our view of 'human dignity' implies, our ideas of contractarianism allows us to decide who will and who will not benefit from the contract; "there is nothing in contractarianism ...that guarantees or requires that everyone will have a chance to participate equitably in framing the rules of moral ...this approach to ethics could sanction the most blatant forms of social, economic, moral and political injustice..."[p.79]. We need revolution regarding these ills, says Regan, not just reformation, because no part way measures will do when it is systematic abuse at the hands of unjust institutions which is the issue. And the role of philosophy in this change is one of disciplined passion, he says, which alone can bring about the changes in our thinking and attitudes which are needed.
In Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism, James Rachels argues that Darwinism undermines our traditional morality by discrediting the supports we claim for the idea of 'human dignity', by which he means 'human superiority', and that this has practical consequences regarding such issues as suicide, euthanasia, and the nature of altruism. Philosophers have not sufficiently dealt with this issue, he says, and need to begin to grapple with it if we are ever to come to understand the true relation between evolution and ethics. In his Introduction, Rachels retraces the path of dialogue which has ensued, beginning with Marx, who took his own work to parallel Darwin's, who gave him insight into the nature of conflict relations, and provided the science which underlies social and political change. I Darwinism has also been used to justify competitive economics and has, perhaps consequently, come to seem contrary to morality and taken to undermine traditional religious values.2 Defenders of Darwinism say it does not, and that it is, in fact, value-neutral. Thus, according to this debate, there seems only two positions, Rachels says--either it undermines traditional religious values, or it does not. Rachel's position is that Darwinism does undermine traditional values, but that it is not value-neutral, as its defenders claim. Rather, evolutionary theory does suggest an ethic of its own, some of the values of which might be very much like our traditional values, but different in the reasons we have for believing in them. Rachels presents "a third alternative; that Darwinism is incompatible with traditional morality, and so provides reason for replacing it with something better."[p.3] This better ethic he calls "moral individualism", [p.S] by which he means, I think, that as individuals we have responsibility for our own actions, and are not special by virtue of membership in any naturally privileged group. This ethic is postulated in contrast with the little scrutinized assumption of 'human dignity', which the human ego takes too far. Public support for this idea generally comes from the religious tenets that humans are 'special' and animals are for our use, which is based on the ideas that (1) we are made in the image of god, and/or (2) we are uniquely rational- neither of which hold up in the face of evolutionary evidence. Rachels thinks, like Socrates, that we may very well have to give up our inflated opinion of ourselves, but that this does not necessarily mean that we must give up our values, because there may very well be other reasons to believe in them besides the reason of human superiority that we have adopted as our tradition.3 Evolutionary theory undermines this religious sense of superiority in favor of a kind of moral humility. A more academic skepticism comes from those who cite Hume's Guillotine,4 i.e. the claim that we cannot logically derive what should be from what is. Rachels' answer to this claim, arrived at at length, is that we do not need to logically conclude one from the other by strict entailment in order to see whether one does or does not give us reason to believe in the other.[p.93] Evolutionary theory gives us reason to doubt the claims of traditional morality to human superiority. He uses ovism, animaculism, and emboitement to show how we should know when to adjust our beliefs to the evidence. Evolution undermines, that is, takes away the traditional support for our belief in 'human dignity'; it gives us evidence against our superiority, and in this, reason to modify our beliefs, or at least find other reasons for them. As Stephen J. Gould argues, evolution only shows us what is potential, not what is determined, leaving us, therefore, the choice of which potentials to realize.[p.76] If it is merely a potential, then we can discourage it if we so choose. There is a big difference in having these attitudes among our choices (which is what the evidence suggests) and having them mandated by our genes (which is unsupported by the evidence).
In Chapter Two, Rachels recounts "two noteworthy attempts to connect evolution and ethics."[p.62] The first involved Herbert Spencer, who called for "secularization of morals," arguing that conduct evolves in that some behaviors are more fit, which is to say, provide and advantage for the organism. Spencer went so far as to equate 'good' with 'more evolved', assuming (with Aristotle, Lamarak5 and (apparently) against Darwin6) that there is a purpose in human evolution, i.e. "permanent peace". G. E. Moore accused him of what would come to be called 'the naturalistic fallacy' on the grounds of Hume's guillotine, that an ought cannot be derived on the strength of an is alone. The thing is, Spencer had not made his claim solely on the strength of what is, but argued that conduct which is 'fit', that is, life-prolonging and life enhancing, will be seen to also be 'good' to anyone who thinks that life is worth living.[p.68]
After all, maybe Darwin's theory doesn't call for a purpose for change, but ethics does. However, when he seemed to also equate good with pleasure (even as Socrates and Aristotle had done) he was dismissed for the next 60 years with the idea that "naturalistic definitions of goodness must always be mistaken. "[p.69] But Spencer's view was different than it was taken to be, for (like Socrates) it was "a claim about what is infact good conduct...Spencer was offering a criterion, not a definition of good conduct." [p.69] Henri Bergson, who thought natural selection was too mechanistic, also preferred Lamarak's view of purpose. He took an evolutionary outlook, but not a Darwinian one, Rachels says, in that he thought that natural selection could not be due to chance variation, because this would upset the balance necessary to the 'lifeforce'.[p.71-72]
The second attempt to connect ethics and evolution came in the form of Sociobiology, which used the assumption that behavioral tendencies which promote advantage to the organism are carried in the genes (or memes, according to Richard Dawkins7) to explain aggressiveness, make dominance, and altruism. It was thought by some (W.D.Hamilton, 1964) that "If we could explain human behavior in this way...[then we would see] that "aspects of our behavior which we previously thought were matters of free choice are really the products of deep, genetically controlled forces,"[p.73-74] and hence, provide excuse for such sins as sexism, racism, classism, and animal abuse. Konrad Lorenz was among the 'better' of such theorists; E. 0. Wilson was, I think, among the 'worst', at least in as much as he gave authoritative voice to the narrowest of our rationalizations about the proper relation of 'inferiors' to their so-called evolutionary 'superiors•.8 With this attribution of genetic origin to behavior of oppressors everywhere, Wilson's scientific study-turned-conservative-political-agenda brought some to proclaim "that there must be no more 'kow-towing to feminism."[p.75] Rather than for its offensiveness, Wilson's theory was criticized for its insubstantial science, in as much as there were no studies with humans, only impressions, generalizations, and analogies, which is to say, wishful thinking. Rachels says that, whereas Wilson thought sociobiology could "replace" sociology and moral philosophy, that would be like saying that we could replace the study of math with mathbiology,just because we can show a connection between mathematical ability and the physical brain. Such a finding would be interesting, but irrelevant to the body of mathematical knowledge we have acquired by the workings of that ability.
Many outspoken proponents of Darwinism, including Thomas Huxley and Asa Gray, argued for the specialness of 'human divinity' despite the appearances of Darwin theory. Huxley, in his lectures for working men, argued that our special powers of knowledge, conscience? affections, and language, raise us above animals, even as evolution shows us otherwise related. Gray, addressing a council of high priests regarding the relationship between science and religion, went beyond Huxley to claim that "true religion ...has nothing to fear from Darwin ..."[p.84] He agreed that humans are special because we can abstract and talk, which gives us a soul, and thus, the potential for immortality through perfection of the soul in "the final struggle for life"--eternal life. He then added this thought, that "there is a sort of meanness in the wish to ignore the tie" between ourselves and animals. [p.86]
In Chapter Four, Rachels argues that this "meanness" comes from our defensiveness about practices we intend to continue. We conceptualize animals in such a way that we can reassure ourselves that our habits are moral. But, against Decartes, who thought that animals are machines,lO Darwin offered countless examples and strong arguments to the belief that all "animals possess some power of reasoning. Animals may constantly be seen to pause, deliberate, and resolve." [p.133] And "anyone who is not convinced by such facts as these, and by what he may observe with his own dog, that animals can reason, would not be convinced by anything I could add." [p.133]
Some warned against anthropomorphizing in science, emphasizing our difference from animals, e.g. language, which is said to be necessary to rationality.
But Darwin denied both claims, i.e. that our language is special and that language is necessary for rationality. II Human language differs only in degree, he said, not in kind. [p.137]12 And animals show use of reason even where no language is involved; animals have desires and beliefs, "which form reasons for action. "[p.l41] "It is enough that they be able to form expectations about one another's behavior,
and adjust their own behavior accordingly. "[p.l57] In dedicating his last work to the intelligence of worms, Darwin shows the strength of his conviction that we must avoid human chauvinism when he argues that even worms "deserve to be called intelligent...for they...act in nearly the same manner as would a man under similar circumstances." [p.136] So, says Rachels, "man is not the rational animal; he is merely more rational than the other animals, who have 'a certain amount of reason' also."[p.136]13 And efforts to understand the evolutionary underpinnings of altruism seem "to confirm Darwin's speculation that the development of general altruism might go hand-in hand with the development of intelligence." [p.157]
Rachels concludes that, since the evidence or our likeness to animals really does exist (after all, the whole of experimental psychology assumes it), we might worry less about anthropomorphizing, that is, overestimating the likenesses between ourselves and animals, and worry more about its "companion sin", i.e. that of underestimating the similarities between ourselves and animals. [p.170]
Endnotes:
1 Contrary to the claims of some who dismiss Darwin as 'merely' a scientis Darwin "offers a definition of morality, a conception of how moral knowledge is acquired, an account of the nature of the human conscience, a description of what makes a man good or bad, and an estimate of the path that must be taken if moral progress is to be made. "[p.158]
2 "Darwin says, those philosophers who have advocated 'the Greatest Happiness principle' are closer to the mark [than those who find 'the foundation of morality lay in a form of Selfishness']--although he thinks it would be better to speak of the general good or welfare of the community, rather than the general happiness ...the social interests arise only because they confer an advantage in the struggle for survival, and so in some sense the drive for self-preservation is more fundamental. But morality comes into existence only with the social instincts. Hence Darwin's insistence that 'the Greatest Happiness principle more aptly expresses the basic moral rule."[p.158] So 'broad enough to be compatible with the basic ideas of both utilitarian and Kantian conceptions. Darwin assumes that moral beha ior promotes the general welfare, but he also stresses that a moral agent is an individual with a conscience--a sense of duty--not unlike that envisioned by Kant. The two notions are wedded in Darwin's assumption that a person of conscience will standarely approve of behavior that promotes the general welfare. The task he sets himself is to explain, compatibility with the principles of natural selection, how hu,ans could have come to be moral agents of this sort."[p.159]
3 It seems to me that Rachels analysis suffers from a lack of the distinction between traditional morality and true morality, which is the vision behind the practices that may or may not adhere to it. Unlike strict Christian doctrine, Jesus himself did not seem to emphasize that we are in any way better than animals, but that we are equal to and like the beasts. His appeal was to the Stoic ideal of natural law, which empahsized the equality of reasoning beings, and is exemplified by his appeal to the golden rule. I think many so-called religious people understand this well, and do not, despite doctrine, base their faith on an appeal to human superiority, but rather to human responsibility to one another, a kindness which does not always fall off where animals are concerned (despite Aquinas, who prescribed no charity to animals). This difference between 'true morality' and 'traditional religious values' is, I think, the reason that only the vary strictest of fundamentalists seems to firid evolutionary theory incompativle with their moral beliefs. As Asa Gray argued, "true religion ...has nothing to fear from Darwin..." [p.84]
4 It makes one wonder how those who come up with such analogys view themselves and the activity of their professions--as heroic defenders (of what?) who fight off views that oppose theirs by chopping off their heads...? What a self-defeating way to approach truth. Dialogue gets further, J.S.Mill agrued, when no one is trying to win the war, and all are, instead, trying to understand each other. The fact that there are an infinite number of perspectives on any given object of knowledge makes it so that our worst enemy may be our best teacher, and this gives much incentive for honest dialogue...a potential some seem to have given up on. Tools such as Hume's Guillotine can become excuses for not thinking our positions through from all angels, i.e. excuses for ignorance, which is to say, for ignoring what we don't want to hear.
5 Lamarak had argued "that within every organism there is a force propelling it towards greater complexity and perfection,"[p.14] such that it followed an "upward path"[p.14] toward its highest potentials.
6 And yet, Rachels points out that "Darwin was an optimist who believed ...that the human race is advancing towards ever greater moral perfectio...He envisioned an ever-sidening circle of moral concern, that would spread beyond self and family to include neighbors and countrymen and eventually all mankind ...In this, Darwin anticipated the moral vision that has animated twentieth-century liberalism, with its emphasis on equal rights for all people. But he thought that the final extension of the human social instinct would go a step beyond even that, to include within its sphere of concern the other animals as well."[pp.163-164] Cognitive error made through immature narrow mindedness can lead to mistaken beliefs and "baneful customs" which are then rejected as understanding of consequences grows and sympathy is extended.[p.l60]
7 If Dawkins is right, that there exists such things as memes, which are essentially idea genes, then dialogue is the mechanism of cultural evolution. Perhaps this, as Aristotle and Huxley claimed, is what makes us different from most, if not all, animals i.e. the fact that talking allows us to grow in our understanding of ever more complex aspects of reality ..
8 If one goes far enough on any hierarchy of supremacy, it would seem that these will always come down to rich, white men. 9 Consicence, according to Darwin, judges past actions and arises in conflict situations.[p.161]
10Rachels offers a horrifying example which shows how far Cartesian thinking has been carried in scientific practice. "In 1978 the Government of India stopped exporting rhesus monkeys to the United States because the U S had violated a provision of the export agreement which forbade using the animals in nuclear weapons research. The Defense Nuclear Agency confirmed that, over a five-year-period, 1,379 primates--nearly all of them rhesus monkeys--had been used in its tests. In one set of tests, the animals had been subjected to lethal doses of radiation and then forced by electric shock to run on a treadmill until they collapsed. Before dying, the unanaesthetized monkeys suffered the predictable effects of excessive radiation, including vomiting and diarrhoea. After acknowledging all this, a D N A spokesman commented; 'To the best of our knowledge, the animals experienced no pain.'[p.l32] Such practice is only possible because we define 'knowledge' in such a way that even "the best of our knowledge" allows us to ignore all animal consciousness and communication, and our own sensitive empathic capacities as well.
11 Rachels notes two kinds of rationality; deductive abilities, and choice made according to self-interest.[p.l40]
12It seems to me that attempts to show how animals can communicate with humans focus on their ability to use a language we create for them, not on our attempt to understand the language they themselves have created. So the claim that "After more than twenty years of work, there is still no animal that can converse with humans in any meaningful sense," is better said, I think, that "After twenty years of work, there is still no human who can converse with animals ..." After all, anyone who has ever loved a dog knows that animals understand humans just fine; they are easily taugh to catch our meaning. The really surprising thing is how little we understand theirs.
13 One objection to this kind of explanation comes from B. F. Skinner, who would have us accept no "mentalistic" explanations for human behavior. But Rachels points out that mentalistic and mechanistic explanations are not imcompatible,[p.142] and in fact may both be true, in as much as we may have the belief and desire we have apecifically because we have been conditioned to have them.