Deep Ecology is a school of thought that attempts to articulate and integrate the common principles underlying many diverse spiritual traditions, including Christianity, Zen Buddhism, Taoism, Native American and others, into a "comprehensive religious and philosophical world view" from which "certain outlooks on politics and public policy flow naturally." [p.216] Grounded in the Socratic method of asking ever deeper questions, deep ecology is idealized as a "meditative"[p.217] "way of life,"[p.216] which involves a discipline that enhances "insight into interconnectedness" [p.217], understandings which "cannot be fully grasped intellectually but are ultimately experiential." [p.218] And yet, this "sensitive openness"[p.216] is claimed to actually be "more objective."[p.216] "In spirit, the discipline is contemplative and therapeutic,"[p.216] as it allows us "to see through [the] erroneous and dangerous illusions" [p.216] that are created in our emphasis on separateness and self as a narrow entity. Self is seen as part of an organic whole in DE, which leads to respect for "all human and nonhuman individuals in their own right as parts of the whole." [p.217] Boundaries are thus recognized to be illusions, constructs, and valuable to a point, but which can get in the way of deep ecological consciousness when they obscure what Neass quotes Gandhi as calling "the oneness". [p.224, EEP] The DE conception of self-in-Self, as it is called, involves the recognition that "No one is saved until we are all saved." [p.217]1 Hence, the expressed need for "global action", that is, action across borders in order to override the limitations of interests involved in national concerns. [p.220]2
Arne Naess articulates two ultimate norms of DE arrived at by his own deep questioning; (1) self-realization, and (2) biocentric equality. Self-realization begins when we open ourselves to identity with other beings, from family to the larger community,[p.217] from a narrow to a broad conception of Self. Biocentric equality is understood when we recognize that "all things in the biosphere have an equal right to live and blossom and to reach their own individual forms of unfolding and self-realization ...the basic intuition that all organisms ...are equal in intrinsic worth ..." [p.217]'2.
There are problems with the implications of "mutual predation" for this view, that is. the fact that "all species use each other." [p.217] Many sidestep the issue, which involves, in Leopold's words, the recognition that we are "plain citizens", not lord and master of the biotic community.4
These two ideas taken together amount to the claim that, if we harm nature, we harm ourselves,[p.217] and this has the implication that we should live with minimum impact. Also central to this claim is that our "vital needs" are at once simpler and more abstract than we realize in the world such as it is, full of advertising and other economic propaganda which brings us to exaggerate our wants; besides our basic needs of food, shelter, and safety, we need love, play, creative expression, intimacy with people and places, and spiritual growth toward maturity. DE can offer suggestions, but there is no grand solution, its theorists warn, and they invite individuals to articulate their own view of these fundamental principles.
Naess and Sessions came up with eight of their own on a camping trip to Death Valley, hoping to state the basics which many from different traditions could agree on as
fundamental. (1) The intrinsic value of all live (in the broadest sense, e.g. rivers, watersheds, etc.) independent of all usefulness to human purposes. (2) That richness and diversity are values in themselves. (3) that the rights of human interference are limited to their "vital needs", which are deliberately left vague in order to leave room for evaluation on an individual basis. (4) That non-human life requires decrease in human population, and this is compatible with the flourishing of human life and culture. (5) That human interference with non-human life is excessive and worsening. (6) That policies must be changed. (7) That we need to learn to appreciate quality over quantity and spiritual growth over material growth. [p.218] And (8) that those who understand this have an obligation to implement the needed changes.
In closing, this article notes, but does not elaborate on the need for "ample room for different opinions about priorities to my mind, this does not go far enough to sufficiently emphasize the need for dialogue which unifies our understandings and checks our actions.
While the importance of dialogue is implicit in the integrative nature of DE, it is my feeling that only an explicit focus on this as a method would make DE truly Socratic, and without it, there is much room left for conflict and misunderstanding which comes of individual assessment without the interactive reconciliation that dialogue makes possible.
In chapter 3 of Respect for Nature, Paul Taylor argues to elucidate the rational grounds underlying an attitude of respect for nature, one which seems essentially similar to that which Deep Ecologists promote. "There are good reasons for any moral agent's accepting the biocentric outlook on nature," he says,[p.167] and when one is successful in this endeavor, "the whole biosphere of the earth and the role that human life plays in it are encompassed in one unified vision."[p.156] In this he shows, among other things, that the good grounds for respecting nature are based partly in a "special kind of knowledge" which concerns an inside-out understanding of "what it means to be that particular center of life." [p.165J And so he builds that rational justification for this attitude by a method which includes, but is not limited to, applying the tests of deductive validity and inductive probability to the issue. Ideally competent evaluators, i.e. those who are in the best position to consider and judge the matter, will use a standard criteria as their basis of evaluation, he explains. This criteria includes (a) comprehensiveness and completeness, (b) systematic order, coherence, and internal consistency, (c) freedom from obscurity, conceptual confusion, and semantic vacuity, and (d) consistency with known empirical truths. This is the traditional criteria for accepting a world view, he says, and it is found throughout the history of philosophy.[p.158] He says that, "To have such a grasp one must be able and disposed to think objectively, disinterestedly, logically, informedly, lucidly, critically, and autonomously,''[p.163] (but it seems clear that the ability to think empathically is at least as important, perhaps even key to his scheme.) The ideal conditions for being such an ideally competent evaluator are three; (1) rationality, (2) factual enlightenment, and (3) a developed capacity of reality awareness.
These conditions will lead such an evaluator to a conclusion of species-impartiality, as opposed to human superiority, the "widely accepted but totally unfounded dogma of our culture." [p.153] This "means regarding every entity that has a good of its own as possessing inherent worth--the same inherent worth, since none is superior to another." [p.155] He traces part of the history of this idea of human superiority (Greek, Christian, Cartesian, and Louis G. Lombardi, who claimed that plants and animals have less inherent worth than humans, and so it is right for our good to override theirs[p.147]). None of these provide good grounds for accepting our human bias, he claims, and the Greeks do not even try to. More than just being groundless, he argues, human superiority can be denied by acceptance of the first three elements of the biocentric outlook; (1) the conception of humans as members of the
Earth's Community of Life, (2) the view of nature as a system of interdependence, and (3) "our awareness of the reality of the lives of individual organisms seen as teleological centers of life." [p.153] In this way "without denying our special abilities or our uniqueness, we nevertheless become fully aware that we are but one species of animal life. This biological aspect of our human existence places certain requirements and constraints on the manner in which we conduct ourselves in relation to the earth's physical environment and its living inhabitants. Our oneness with all the other members of the great Community of Life is acknowledged and confirmed." [p.157]
1 Is this the same, in principle, as "All for one and one for all"?
2 There are serious problems potentially involved in the this claim, wltich involves the apparent reluctance on the part of Third World Nations to put deep ecological principles before economic concerns [p.220] and a willingness on the part of DE to violate its own rule of noninterference in order to see its ends achieved,
e.g. reduction of world populations. It is my sense that the DE's failure to emphasize dialogue shows itself to be a problem in just such cases.
3 What "an equal right" means is difficult to say explicitly. Itis a right to noninterference? Leopold says it is "entitled to continuance" and a "right to preservation" in the Almanac, pp. 246-247. This is reprinted in Moline, p.l12-113, Environmental Ethics, Summer 1986.
4 To my mind, it is one thing to recognize this where such recognition involves the limits of our rights to privilege, but it is another thing when such recognition involves denial of the special responsiltilities that come with the power we humans wield; in this way, clearly, we are 'special', which is to say, we exercise power which creates hierarchies of dependence, that is, our consequences trickle down such that, superior or not, we are responsible to those who are dependent upon the consequences of our actions; this is the fact that makes for environmental ethics to begin with, i.e. because we make a difference to all who are under us on such power structures.
Arne Naess articulates two ultimate norms of DE arrived at by his own deep questioning; (1) self-realization, and (2) biocentric equality. Self-realization begins when we open ourselves to identity with other beings, from family to the larger community,[p.217] from a narrow to a broad conception of Self. Biocentric equality is understood when we recognize that "all things in the biosphere have an equal right to live and blossom and to reach their own individual forms of unfolding and self-realization ...the basic intuition that all organisms ...are equal in intrinsic worth ..." [p.217]'2.
There are problems with the implications of "mutual predation" for this view, that is. the fact that "all species use each other." [p.217] Many sidestep the issue, which involves, in Leopold's words, the recognition that we are "plain citizens", not lord and master of the biotic community.4
These two ideas taken together amount to the claim that, if we harm nature, we harm ourselves,[p.217] and this has the implication that we should live with minimum impact. Also central to this claim is that our "vital needs" are at once simpler and more abstract than we realize in the world such as it is, full of advertising and other economic propaganda which brings us to exaggerate our wants; besides our basic needs of food, shelter, and safety, we need love, play, creative expression, intimacy with people and places, and spiritual growth toward maturity. DE can offer suggestions, but there is no grand solution, its theorists warn, and they invite individuals to articulate their own view of these fundamental principles.
Naess and Sessions came up with eight of their own on a camping trip to Death Valley, hoping to state the basics which many from different traditions could agree on as
fundamental. (1) The intrinsic value of all live (in the broadest sense, e.g. rivers, watersheds, etc.) independent of all usefulness to human purposes. (2) That richness and diversity are values in themselves. (3) that the rights of human interference are limited to their "vital needs", which are deliberately left vague in order to leave room for evaluation on an individual basis. (4) That non-human life requires decrease in human population, and this is compatible with the flourishing of human life and culture. (5) That human interference with non-human life is excessive and worsening. (6) That policies must be changed. (7) That we need to learn to appreciate quality over quantity and spiritual growth over material growth. [p.218] And (8) that those who understand this have an obligation to implement the needed changes.
In closing, this article notes, but does not elaborate on the need for "ample room for different opinions about priorities to my mind, this does not go far enough to sufficiently emphasize the need for dialogue which unifies our understandings and checks our actions.
While the importance of dialogue is implicit in the integrative nature of DE, it is my feeling that only an explicit focus on this as a method would make DE truly Socratic, and without it, there is much room left for conflict and misunderstanding which comes of individual assessment without the interactive reconciliation that dialogue makes possible.
In chapter 3 of Respect for Nature, Paul Taylor argues to elucidate the rational grounds underlying an attitude of respect for nature, one which seems essentially similar to that which Deep Ecologists promote. "There are good reasons for any moral agent's accepting the biocentric outlook on nature," he says,[p.167] and when one is successful in this endeavor, "the whole biosphere of the earth and the role that human life plays in it are encompassed in one unified vision."[p.156] In this he shows, among other things, that the good grounds for respecting nature are based partly in a "special kind of knowledge" which concerns an inside-out understanding of "what it means to be that particular center of life." [p.165J And so he builds that rational justification for this attitude by a method which includes, but is not limited to, applying the tests of deductive validity and inductive probability to the issue. Ideally competent evaluators, i.e. those who are in the best position to consider and judge the matter, will use a standard criteria as their basis of evaluation, he explains. This criteria includes (a) comprehensiveness and completeness, (b) systematic order, coherence, and internal consistency, (c) freedom from obscurity, conceptual confusion, and semantic vacuity, and (d) consistency with known empirical truths. This is the traditional criteria for accepting a world view, he says, and it is found throughout the history of philosophy.[p.158] He says that, "To have such a grasp one must be able and disposed to think objectively, disinterestedly, logically, informedly, lucidly, critically, and autonomously,''[p.163] (but it seems clear that the ability to think empathically is at least as important, perhaps even key to his scheme.) The ideal conditions for being such an ideally competent evaluator are three; (1) rationality, (2) factual enlightenment, and (3) a developed capacity of reality awareness.
These conditions will lead such an evaluator to a conclusion of species-impartiality, as opposed to human superiority, the "widely accepted but totally unfounded dogma of our culture." [p.153] This "means regarding every entity that has a good of its own as possessing inherent worth--the same inherent worth, since none is superior to another." [p.155] He traces part of the history of this idea of human superiority (Greek, Christian, Cartesian, and Louis G. Lombardi, who claimed that plants and animals have less inherent worth than humans, and so it is right for our good to override theirs[p.147]). None of these provide good grounds for accepting our human bias, he claims, and the Greeks do not even try to. More than just being groundless, he argues, human superiority can be denied by acceptance of the first three elements of the biocentric outlook; (1) the conception of humans as members of the
Earth's Community of Life, (2) the view of nature as a system of interdependence, and (3) "our awareness of the reality of the lives of individual organisms seen as teleological centers of life." [p.153] In this way "without denying our special abilities or our uniqueness, we nevertheless become fully aware that we are but one species of animal life. This biological aspect of our human existence places certain requirements and constraints on the manner in which we conduct ourselves in relation to the earth's physical environment and its living inhabitants. Our oneness with all the other members of the great Community of Life is acknowledged and confirmed." [p.157]
1 Is this the same, in principle, as "All for one and one for all"?
2 There are serious problems potentially involved in the this claim, wltich involves the apparent reluctance on the part of Third World Nations to put deep ecological principles before economic concerns [p.220] and a willingness on the part of DE to violate its own rule of noninterference in order to see its ends achieved,
e.g. reduction of world populations. It is my sense that the DE's failure to emphasize dialogue shows itself to be a problem in just such cases.
3 What "an equal right" means is difficult to say explicitly. Itis a right to noninterference? Leopold says it is "entitled to continuance" and a "right to preservation" in the Almanac, pp. 246-247. This is reprinted in Moline, p.l12-113, Environmental Ethics, Summer 1986.
4 To my mind, it is one thing to recognize this where such recognition involves the limits of our rights to privilege, but it is another thing when such recognition involves denial of the special responsiltilities that come with the power we humans wield; in this way, clearly, we are 'special', which is to say, we exercise power which creates hierarchies of dependence, that is, our consequences trickle down such that, superior or not, we are responsible to those who are dependent upon the consequences of our actions; this is the fact that makes for environmental ethics to begin with, i.e. because we make a difference to all who are under us on such power structures.