Lifted from Sen's Rational Fools Addendum (in Political Theory & Rationality)
At the risk of shooting myself in the foot here, I'd like to take this opportunity to clarify the concept of self-as-a-system, referred to in several of my short papers recently, and rightly noted by readers to be too vague in this form to be of much help. Since I think it is lack of space for development, rather than intrinsic obscurity, which accounts for the subjects appearance of indefinacy, allow me to attempt to articulate this initially difficult, but, I think, ultimately worthwhile conception. I have claimed that it might accommodate such a meta-ranking as Sen advocates in his article, Rational Fools, Frank's commitment model, Batson's empirical account of empathic interrelations, and more. I hope to make more clear in this addendum how this conception of selfhood could accomplish such things.
From the fact that there are so many different paths toward any given end--which
seems as true in the realm of logical space as in the physical realm--it follows that the best route toward any object then is dependend upon one's starting point. Each of these theorists begins from a different point of origin, with a different level of focus, and asks a different question, and yet, they have the same object as their end--in this case, human motivation. This is likewise the object of my inquiry here; however, my angle of approach is apparently unique enough that it, sometimes surprisingly, reveal;relations between other approaches in what might be a fruitful way. Allow me to explain how this is so.
Hoping to assume as little as possible, consider to begin with the undeniably property which is intrinsic to consciousness, that of being inside a physical organism, looking out, with the presumably uncontroversial purpose of seeing to. the organisms survival and well-being. This level of approach, between organism and environment, seems as fundamental as we need to go to consider the deepest nature of the conscious self and its potential rational motivations. At that point where attention meets the world, from this view, there is at least this purpose, indeed, this responsibility. Survival and well-being provide reasons for action, and this makes the task of untangling the complex relations*' between self and world considerably easier. But it says nothing, as of yet, about egoism, per se, except possibly in the very broadest possible sense--for to say that it is an individuals duty to self to survive well is to say nothing of how that well-being is to be defined, and leaves room for the awareness that self's best-interest consists in taking others into one's circle of commitment and resonsibility, rather than fending for oneself against other's interests. It is my claim that consciousness functions in this way, that is, toward discerning the better form of being and surviving from the worse, and thus for defining those goals and potentials which allow some creatures to reach beyond themselves, potentials which remain blurry without the rational deliberation which is apparently unique, in this form, to our species. With this in mind, human motivations begin to appear rather systematic in their workings, complex, and yet simple, involving both objective and subjective aspects, and yet comprehensive in their interaction when this purpose, i.e. managing survival while reaching toward ever more authentic well-being. Our Prisoner's Dilemma thought experiments have begun to prove this complex interaction to us over the last ten years. In other of my papers I have argued that the distinction between the static and the dynamic forms of these interactions is the key to our seeing the limits to how we have seen human motivation, and the reaches of how we might.[*see thesis]. And one could argue that, while we cannot derive an ought from an is alone, we certainly could derive one from an is plus a could be.
It seems that these issues of egoism and altruism are especially hot topics these days precisely because this construct has brought into our focus how it is, logically and empirically, that it is in our own interests to be good to others; that, in effect, we are not
seperate in this regard. Good, from this view, shows itself to come in the form of symphonic realtions, rather than adversary ones. In such a conception, "self" is conceived of in broader and deeper terms because "good" is conceived of as something other than one's immediate material well-being. Now it is certain that people differ widely with regard to what they think good, and because they do, the controversy over whether humans are egoistic is fraught with the confusion which arises from our different senses of our own potentials, i.e. our differing self-concepts. We all seem aware that some sort of self_ interest is at heart in our motivations, and yet, because we understand our interests quite differently, communication can become confused enough to thwart our understanding ...of one another, and of the objective truth of what is actually good for human beings. This is not to suggest, however, that any given individual is necessarily better off by caring about others, for there are indeed times when caring exclusively about one's own narrow interests is necessary to survival, as when conditions are such that one's fellows are actual threats. The fact that such conditions are, and have long been, so widespread in human culture accounts, I think, for why we see so much of such narrow egoism at work in human motivation. But again, neither broad nor narrow self-interest in necessary to human motivation, both are only potential, that is, subject to our definition of what is good, i.e. toward survival and well-being, in a given context. This contingency does not change the fact that there is an objective good, I think, for we can reason quite universally about what is good for humans, cetera peribus, that is, in conditions of equal threat or security. Likewise, we can talk in universal terms about the conditions which provide for such security and/or threat as gives rise to different conceptions of self-interest, and thus, to different behaviors. From slightly different angles, we do this in child psychology, anthropology, and biology all the time. It seems quite strange to me that those of us in philosophy of mind do not talk about developmental psychology in adults, as if we are sure that development ends at some mysterious threashold around the age of 18. It is my view that the conception of self as a growing system of relations which can best be understood from the inside-looking-out, is just such a model as we need to accomplish the kind of inquiry that would allow us to examine human survival reasoning systematically, in order to see that and how even adults continue to change by self-direction toward and/or away from optimal maturity, i.e. enlightened self-interest.
Taking seriously this subjective component of reality would help us to account for what goes on on this side of that point where attention meets the world. It seems clear that we know by the experience of conscious perception that that point where subject meets object is quite variable, and the objective world itself is wildly diverse. And so, as far as I can see, my job then (as both a conscious organism and a normative ethicist) is to discriminate between those courses of action which are actually toward survival and well_ being, and those which are not. Consciousness then is an adaptation which has as its function helping me in making choices which are best adaptive, i.e. most fit. It would seem that, no matter what kind of organism I am, if I am conscious, I am rational in at least this way, which is to say, I am able to reason (at whatever level of sophistocation) in my own self-interest. And what's more, if I am human, I am able to define that interest in such a way as to be ever approaching my best. With this capacity of intelligence we call "mind," (unique in form to my species [arguably composed of a symphonic arrangement of intellect/intuition/ emotion/sense] and in content to myself) I can reason from logic and experience about what actually is good for me, as distinct from what at first seems so, and so inform my choices toward keeping the system of my body alive and well. *
It is clear that, though not yet how, a mind exists in interaction with those many
other systems which make up the complex system of systems which is a self, and of which a body is the most fundamental part. One must be alive, after all, before one can live a good or just life. (Perhaps the one-way nature of this contingency is what gives egoism the "methodological priority" that Elster attributes to it.*) And since I am aware of this process in my own mind--the process by which I continue to refine my preferences as I gradually learn what is good, along with answers to other questions which I ask myself--! pay attention, so to speak, to the lessons of interaction that I experience; one learns, as it is the nature of conscious organisms to do.[*It has been argued that time is intrinsic to consciousness, which alone gives it meaning and is responsible for it's forward motion. *[Mead]] I am made aware by the very paying of attention that this is wherein choice is actually manifest--in my choice of where to pay my attention to. Here is where one's preferences, or values, reach critical efficacy, as I am driven by what I think is good to pay attention to some aspects of the objective world and to ignore others. Thus, this variable--what I think is good--is a choice I make by (better or worse) reasoning according to the lessons of experience and logic, and thus, is central to the process of the growth and development of self.
One interesting aspect of this analysis is the way in which the dynamics of attention can themselves be analyzed, even in Cartesian terms; for instance, consider one continuum of value which spans the extremes from, say, deep analysis to broad synthesis.
Subjectivity is more or less free to choose its way of looking at the objective world within its context, which is itself organized along various continuum, from concrete to abstract, for instance. To illustrate this, note how I can know this computer, say, from a wide variety of points of view; for instance, I can analyze it in terms of its mechanical parts, which involves laying my perception on its more concrete properties; or I might analyze it in terms of its theory of operation, which is quite abstract and requires I look at it as an idea with a history; likewise, I might synthesize it's more concrete potentials, such as it's outlining and nesting capacities, together with my growing network of programs and documents, which involves utilizing both it's and my own more abstract potentials. In this way, I 'know' this computer in a complex, interactive, way; interactive in that, at that point where attention meets the world, there is a comprehensive interaction occurring between the objective component that is my computer and the subjective component of my choice. And so, again, choice is especially important in understanding how knowledge is obtained, for we choose, more or less consciously, not only what we pay attention to, but from which angle and at which scale offocus.
Now, to analyze this a little more thoroughly, we might model the interaction between the continui which range from concrete to abstract, with that which ranges from analytic to synthetic, (or in fact any range of polar variables).[See Figure A] Allow they
axis to represent the objective world as it ranges from concrete to abstract, while the x axis represents the subjective human tendancy to view the world on any of many continuui, in this case, that ranging from analytic to synthetic. On the basis of such a model, it might be possible to meaningfully map the relations between mind and world in such a way that we could more clearly see how there can indeed be different subjective perspectives on the self_ same object of knowledge.
[put subject/object image*]
Consider attention as residing and fluctuating on this map, focusing on certain aspects of our object and ignoring others, looking from some angles and perhaps unable to see others, taking in different kinds of knowledge according to what matters to this particular subject This construct seems useful toward understanding how different people perceive different worlds. By it, the objects of the world appear more complex than our habitual materialism has them seeming. However, the mind develops habits, and our habit is to equate the concrete with the real, denying ourselves true understanding of much that is abstract.**1
Now one might tend to look at the more concrete aspects of the world, and to do so
in a more or less analytic way, such as most scientists do. We might say that, in terms of human capacities, this represents perception by sensory awareness, in significantly more physical terms than, say, the mystic, who looks at the world more abstractly and with more tendency to make connections and synthesize than to take apart and analyze, more intuitively than the more empirical scientist might. Likewise, one might tend to look at the more abstract aspects of the world, and to do so in a more or less analytic way, such as most philosophers do; in terms of the capacities of mind, and this would be the intellectual, as opposed to sensual or intuitive mode of understanding. And, per the model, this would be the complement of the view of one who sees the world concretely and synthetically, such as the more wholistic empiricist might. And so we have the scientist, who analyzes concretes, and the philosopher, who analyzes abstracts, and the mystic, who synthesizes abstracts, and the personal empiricist, who synthesizes concretes. With all this in mind, we can give account of the wholist, who recognizes the logical space of the mind to be its broad potentials which are, like the body, actualized by exercise. 1
[put science etc. image*]
[put sense etc. image*]
Note the argument from the fact that we can take different subjective points of view on the same object, to the fact that consciousness can thus grow by such accumulation, and what's more, that justice requires that it should, at least as far as its dependents interests are concerned. In fact, I think it is this range of knowledge, objectively real but subjectively experienced, which accounts for why we can meaningfully fret about the fact that the human mind uses only 10% of it's potential, or whatever the claim is these days.
*[more up] We have both descriptive and normative lines of reasoning going on here, but I contend that in the context of this discussion, they come up in unison, with responsibility following directly from knowledge of dependence. In other words, knowing that something which needs doing will not get done if we ourselves do not do it leads, rationally, directly to the responsibility to do that which we can do. In this we can see a shift toward ever-broader responsibility with the growth of knowledge and power. When the growth of knowledge involves taking other's perspectives, we cannot deny the responsibility we feel for that which we see when we empathize. By this psychosocial interaction, I can account for why and how I can "care for" my dog, my daughter, my students, and my friends. Parenting is as good a term as any for this responsibility, for it incorporates all of the important connotations that come into the relationship between dependents and their respondents. This process of the growth of self is perhaps what Sen might call a form of sympathy, for "a person's well-being is psychologically dependent upon someone else's welfare," [p.32] and so the dependence is interactive. Looked at another way, it is also a form of commitment in as much as an informed decision is a form of commitment to the probable consequences. Whatever we call it, the specific manner in which this phenomenon of losing narrow self-interest is accomplished can best be specified, I think, by means of such inside-looking-out analysis as empathy allows. [*this portion is reworked from my paper on Sen's Rational Fools]
The idea of empathy as an instrument of growth deserves deeper analysis. Consider the way in which one "cares for" one's dog; the relationship is such that I cannot see the world without seeing it through his eyes too, meaning that I am aware when he has not been fed or let out, walked or played with, and I cannot easily ignore the fact of his
need well-being. Is this not what it means to have taken responsibility for him, to have made a commitment, with or without conscious choice? Now one may accomplish this act of 'caring for' another better or worse, more authentically or less, but the fact of one's responsibility comes with the knowledge that there is something which needs doing (for someone or something to whom one is committed) that will not get done if one does not do it oneself--in this case, if I don't take care of my dog's needs. It is the nature of responsibility, which comes both with commitment, and simply with the knowledge that one can do what needs doing, i.e. that one with it be accountable for getting needed things done, for others are in fact dependent upon us to perform that function well, and they suffer from our performing it poorly. This responsibility follows naturally and logically from both the general fact of our power over one another and the specific commitments we have made. As parents, we have overwhelming power, when viewed from our dependents eyes. It has been my claim that knowledge of others actual dependence upon us is tantamount to responsibility, and thus, empathy is a means by which their points of view are, ideally, incorporated into our own, in such a way that, in caring for them, we can meaningfully say that self itself has grown. Viewing the world through one's own as well as one's dependents eyes means taking their interests as one's own. In this acceptance of responsibility and intention of commitment, self grows in both breadth and depth. Some manage to divorce themselves from this responsibility through a process of desensitization, but the cost to one's self in this case is as high if not higher than the cost to one's dependents, for such a conception of the potentials of mind shows clearly who is more harmed by one's narrowness (and much more could be said on this).
The important thing is that the process itself has universal elements which can be examined and discussed, and from this examination, self-knowledge and responsibility grow. The fact of our power is the fact of our responsibility, whether we recognize it or not, and whether this responsibility=> our empathic consideration of those others to whom our decisions make a difference is a matter of moral interest, for we often have and exercise power, whether we take responsibility for it or not. It might be put into these terms: perception is quite easily confined to the here and now, ignorant of all that is available to be known; but since attention is such that it can be paid to other places and times, can remember what was and imagine what could be, can empathize with many experiences in widely varied circumstances having little or nothing to do with its own circumstance of reality, and can recognize its own potential knowledge and power which reaches far beyond the physical perimeter of the body--what then is the point in being narrow? From this view, it no longer seems as rational as we have long assumed it to be. It only seems reasonable from the view of self as oversimplified egoist, but not from the view of self as complex interpersonal system. In this way, one who has grown through the taking of responsibility and following through on commitment to others can meaningfully be seen to have, in a sense, a broader self than otherwise, just as one who has a rich and well developed subjective system of understanding in which communication with others plays an integral part can meaningfully be seen to have a deeper self than would otherwise be.
Empathy is clearly a part of all such dimensions of mind, that is, toward knowing the world, knowing others, and toward better knowing one's own self. When I speak of
empathy, in mind of this model, I can stretch my conception of it from my naive understanding, in which I considered it merely a means of taking another's view by feeling their feelings and imagining their circumstances, to a more developed sense of empathy which involves a more thorough analysis of a complex and detailed, individual system of mind. And, as argued elsewhere, it could be argued that it is less important that practitioners and researchers understand individuals than that individuals come to understand themselves and one another. Broadening our understanding of the minds complexities and complimentarities can only help us to use empathy as a means of understanding universals by studying individuals, from inside out.
And, as noted in my paper on Sen's Rational Fools, using the Prisoner's Dilemma as a thought experiment with regard to it puts this model into motion, for one can see how
we might employ this method toward better understanding how justice, in the form of selfishness and unselfishness, works to provide for DIKE, or balance, in the soul which is manifest in the social conditions that flow inevitably from self. Also, as Sen points out, this broad and complex structure can also be used to study ala-asia, or weakness of the will. Thus, the PD in conjunction with this structure, helps us to understand the social and psychological dynamics of give and take.
**By bringing yet another, and possibly many other, dimensions into play here (such as self vs. other-interest, intrinsic vs. extrinsic orientation, or internal vs. external
locus of control) we can see how other human beings themselves become objects of our knowledge, objects first if only because we perceive their physical and psychological surfaces first; but these are objects which we can transform into subjects by our coming to know them through taking their own view as best we can. And we do this, according to the model, first by choosing at what level of concreteness or abstractness we aim our attention toward, and then by choosing whether we will focus on small scale analysis or broad scale synthesis. The interaction between these makes for beautiful, yet precise, representational images of the relationship between the subjective mind and the objective world.
To conclude on a flight of fancy, we might well imagine how individual thinkers
whom we have known might fit onto this model of the relation between variables in the
interaction between subject and object.
[put image of relationship between philosophers*]
What does it mean to "know" then? Consider different kinds of knowers and the kinds of knowledge they produce; for example, empiricism as it opposes mysticism. It seems a consequent of this interaction that these two ways of looking at the world are opposed, being that empiricism falls squarely into the concrete-analytic mode of appreciation, as Hume and Skinner did, while mysticism falls into the mode of abstract synthesis, as would Blake and many religious thinkers. Likewise, logicians and mathematicians, such as Aristotle and Einstein, look at the abstract world in an analytic way, while personal empiricists and existentialists, like Marx and Thoreau, tend to focus on the concrete world but in a quite synthetic way. This arrangement leaves the empiricists differentiated from the logicians and mathematicians by the degree of concreteness in their subject matter, and differentiated from the personal empiricists and existentialists by the degree of analysis involved in the method of approach. Likewise, it separates the mystic from the mathematician by the analysis involved in the method, and from the existentialist by the level of objective reality upon which they focus. This leaves abstract Plato to complement concrete Machiavelli, and analytic Decartes opposite synthetic Buddha. Are these different truths then? Or just different ways of looking at the same truth? It seems a lesson in humility--for what does it mean to talk of truth?
1. One could imagine a new paradigm of eductiducational methods using this conception of mind as a growing systemic organism .
2. [maybe separate these into subjective view of the object and subjective view of the subject. [
3. [Notes for edit into body]--It is the limits of space which necessitate vague terms, not an intrinsic property of the subject, for we can examine it in as much detail as time and space allow.
--where lies my interest in this subject? It is the one thing that, if I don't do it, won't get done. Human potential is contingent upon human action, which is dependent upon the depth of thought and quality of human choice, in other words, it's dependent on me, i.e. my resp:msibilit
--footnote tim allen somewhere
--Thinking of ourselves as centers and the cross-hair intersection on the two-dimensional "mattering map" to be the point where attention comes to bear upon objective reality by bringing the object of our precept into focus, that is, the point at which our attention meets the world. Here countless circles and spheres would intersect, some of which are objects to us (outside of us) and others of which we are subject to (surround us) and all of which aligu themselves in such a way as to make every persons reality unique.
Another thing which this analysis of the human "object" might accomplish, and perhaps most relevant to the rest of this discussion, is that it allows us to shift our focus from the outside-looking-in perspective that the previous discussion about objects external to the observer entailed, to the inside looking-out point of view that any discussion of internal perception must entail. It tums the object into subject.
--The balance of human capacities, that is the modes of appreciation available to us, fall quite neatly into this interactive arrangement. This mattering-map might be fruitful as a representation of the whole individual, as well it is of the individual's relations to the whole.
--what it means to think of human beings as systems. The idea that we are physical bodies which effect one another only to the extent that we bump up against each other or each other's interests is a Newtonian conception that lingers even as we know better, if only because, in the middle dimensions of every day perceptionJ6 the image of our separateness is still sadly true. For the moment we continue to live, as we always have, in fear of one another, and often understandably so. We human beings are only now beginning to understand the meaning of "bonding," a concept which we must see ourselves as interacting systems in order to fully understand. We have not quite adjusted to the knowledge of quantum reality, mushy and mystical as it seems, hence have not yet found a common sense way to think of ourselves or the objects/subjects around us as dynamic, let alone organic, beings. But, in fact, we are, and we have much to learu by realizing it. Our effect upon one another and upon the environment is beyond the material effects of our use of resources and space; we are more thanjust physically consequential. We impact upon one another deeply, traumatically, in psychological terms; we pull and push each others' perceptions in ways that, while they may seem insignificant to a Newtouian materialist, are recognized in their full effect by nearly all post-Freudian psychology.
--And in as much as it is possible to understand "survival" and 11fitness" in different senses, and to reach an ever better understanding of the meaning of a good life, it is possible to be either foolish or wise about what these things mean; in a sense, to be right or wrong, closer or further from what actually is a human beings best-interest. We can be mistaken about what is good for us, even fooled deliberately.
--This cognitive map can thus help us to understand the function of our need in the focus of our attention. By this understanding, the meaning of right, free, good, true, equal, individual, community, responsibility, justice, commitment, and forgiveness become ever more clear.
--Here, in a systems analysis, we can see that all humans, not just "economic men, 11 are rational, in that they all reason and act toward their what they see as their own good--they differ only inwhat they define as "good. 11 This question of value is the central issue around which this book is organized. It is, I believe, at the heart of all human action and interaction, the functional response to both our automatic responses [Focus: On The Ontological implications of the New Physics: or Thoughts on Economic, Political, and Ethical Values: A Systems Approach to the Dynamics of Self-Interest, #29] and our choices. [Focus: On The Ontological hnplications of the New Physics: or Thoughts on Economic, Political, and Ethical Values: A Systems Approach to the Dynamics of Self-Interest, #30] And it underlies much if not ali past social, political, and economic theory. In this is deserves more thorough consideration than it receives from those who simply assume it in the material sense we have come to think of it
--The hierarchy of our knowledges is perhaps most apparent in the stage progression of children, but this may only be because as of yet we pay little attention to adult qualitative growth. This conception of cognitive stage progression is one we have been comfortable with since the Piagetian revolution began in the 1950's. In this regard, the systems approach has already been fruitful toward helping us understand the workings of the mind. According to Piaget, mental growth or change is based on encounters with new information, the impact of which causes an imbalance, an inconsistency between expectations and experience, which it is the job of the mind to reconcile by adapting one to the other. The equilibration process, by which the individual reestablishes balance of mind and body, is accomplished by assimilation or accommodation; i.e. by either adjusting the information to assimilate into our belief-knowledge structure, or by changing our belief-knowledge structure to be able to accommodate this new information. The cognitive dissonance between expectations and experience is the gap between image and actual. with self actualization as its end; whether we fit the actual to the image or the image to the actual is up to us; the challenge of idealism. The individual will either act to fulfill the images and expectations passed on to him by the world around him, or he will act on the world around him to fulfill the images and expectations of his own thought. Whether experience guides thought or thought gnides experience depends upon the balance between the strength of the environment and the strength of the individual will. An uneven match, to be sure, but not necessarily a doomed one.[Focus: On The Ontological Implications of the New Physics: or Thoughts on Economic, Political, and Ethical Values: A Systems Approach to the Dynamics of Self Interest, #31]
--There is something left uuknown when the scientific method is applied to human beings. Perceptive systems can be known from the inside-looking-out as well; they have a subjective point of view. This complication has presented great difficulty for researchers and theorists who deal with living systems by limiting themselves to the outside-looking-in perspective. These systems, such as human beings are, cannot be considered truly "known" until seen from this subjective point of view in balance with the objective.l4 The attempt to know men objectively without, as the Socratic dictrnn counseled, knowing ourselves subjectively has been the principle obstacle between the social scientist and the whole-truth all along. It seems odd indeed that one who could know his subject empathically, i.e. from its own point of view, simply by understanding his or her own self better--which would allow access to the subjects motivation from the side which perceives it--would forfeit that privilege and strive instead to be free of that valuable view for the sake of being taken seriously as ''hard science." One day, in retrospect, perhaps it will seem to be the outside-looking-in scientific method which had been the limited one, not the inside-looking out view of which the poets tell us.
It might be possible that the perspectives of individual thinkers could fall into some kind of order by this model. A sample is offered for contemplation which includes a possible set of relationships between some of history's perspectives on truth.
At the risk of shooting myself in the foot here, I'd like to take this opportunity to clarify the concept of self-as-a-system, referred to in several of my short papers recently, and rightly noted by readers to be too vague in this form to be of much help. Since I think it is lack of space for development, rather than intrinsic obscurity, which accounts for the subjects appearance of indefinacy, allow me to attempt to articulate this initially difficult, but, I think, ultimately worthwhile conception. I have claimed that it might accommodate such a meta-ranking as Sen advocates in his article, Rational Fools, Frank's commitment model, Batson's empirical account of empathic interrelations, and more. I hope to make more clear in this addendum how this conception of selfhood could accomplish such things.
From the fact that there are so many different paths toward any given end--which
seems as true in the realm of logical space as in the physical realm--it follows that the best route toward any object then is dependend upon one's starting point. Each of these theorists begins from a different point of origin, with a different level of focus, and asks a different question, and yet, they have the same object as their end--in this case, human motivation. This is likewise the object of my inquiry here; however, my angle of approach is apparently unique enough that it, sometimes surprisingly, reveal;relations between other approaches in what might be a fruitful way. Allow me to explain how this is so.
Hoping to assume as little as possible, consider to begin with the undeniably property which is intrinsic to consciousness, that of being inside a physical organism, looking out, with the presumably uncontroversial purpose of seeing to. the organisms survival and well-being. This level of approach, between organism and environment, seems as fundamental as we need to go to consider the deepest nature of the conscious self and its potential rational motivations. At that point where attention meets the world, from this view, there is at least this purpose, indeed, this responsibility. Survival and well-being provide reasons for action, and this makes the task of untangling the complex relations*' between self and world considerably easier. But it says nothing, as of yet, about egoism, per se, except possibly in the very broadest possible sense--for to say that it is an individuals duty to self to survive well is to say nothing of how that well-being is to be defined, and leaves room for the awareness that self's best-interest consists in taking others into one's circle of commitment and resonsibility, rather than fending for oneself against other's interests. It is my claim that consciousness functions in this way, that is, toward discerning the better form of being and surviving from the worse, and thus for defining those goals and potentials which allow some creatures to reach beyond themselves, potentials which remain blurry without the rational deliberation which is apparently unique, in this form, to our species. With this in mind, human motivations begin to appear rather systematic in their workings, complex, and yet simple, involving both objective and subjective aspects, and yet comprehensive in their interaction when this purpose, i.e. managing survival while reaching toward ever more authentic well-being. Our Prisoner's Dilemma thought experiments have begun to prove this complex interaction to us over the last ten years. In other of my papers I have argued that the distinction between the static and the dynamic forms of these interactions is the key to our seeing the limits to how we have seen human motivation, and the reaches of how we might.[*see thesis]. And one could argue that, while we cannot derive an ought from an is alone, we certainly could derive one from an is plus a could be.
It seems that these issues of egoism and altruism are especially hot topics these days precisely because this construct has brought into our focus how it is, logically and empirically, that it is in our own interests to be good to others; that, in effect, we are not
seperate in this regard. Good, from this view, shows itself to come in the form of symphonic realtions, rather than adversary ones. In such a conception, "self" is conceived of in broader and deeper terms because "good" is conceived of as something other than one's immediate material well-being. Now it is certain that people differ widely with regard to what they think good, and because they do, the controversy over whether humans are egoistic is fraught with the confusion which arises from our different senses of our own potentials, i.e. our differing self-concepts. We all seem aware that some sort of self_ interest is at heart in our motivations, and yet, because we understand our interests quite differently, communication can become confused enough to thwart our understanding ...of one another, and of the objective truth of what is actually good for human beings. This is not to suggest, however, that any given individual is necessarily better off by caring about others, for there are indeed times when caring exclusively about one's own narrow interests is necessary to survival, as when conditions are such that one's fellows are actual threats. The fact that such conditions are, and have long been, so widespread in human culture accounts, I think, for why we see so much of such narrow egoism at work in human motivation. But again, neither broad nor narrow self-interest in necessary to human motivation, both are only potential, that is, subject to our definition of what is good, i.e. toward survival and well-being, in a given context. This contingency does not change the fact that there is an objective good, I think, for we can reason quite universally about what is good for humans, cetera peribus, that is, in conditions of equal threat or security. Likewise, we can talk in universal terms about the conditions which provide for such security and/or threat as gives rise to different conceptions of self-interest, and thus, to different behaviors. From slightly different angles, we do this in child psychology, anthropology, and biology all the time. It seems quite strange to me that those of us in philosophy of mind do not talk about developmental psychology in adults, as if we are sure that development ends at some mysterious threashold around the age of 18. It is my view that the conception of self as a growing system of relations which can best be understood from the inside-looking-out, is just such a model as we need to accomplish the kind of inquiry that would allow us to examine human survival reasoning systematically, in order to see that and how even adults continue to change by self-direction toward and/or away from optimal maturity, i.e. enlightened self-interest.
Taking seriously this subjective component of reality would help us to account for what goes on on this side of that point where attention meets the world. It seems clear that we know by the experience of conscious perception that that point where subject meets object is quite variable, and the objective world itself is wildly diverse. And so, as far as I can see, my job then (as both a conscious organism and a normative ethicist) is to discriminate between those courses of action which are actually toward survival and well_ being, and those which are not. Consciousness then is an adaptation which has as its function helping me in making choices which are best adaptive, i.e. most fit. It would seem that, no matter what kind of organism I am, if I am conscious, I am rational in at least this way, which is to say, I am able to reason (at whatever level of sophistocation) in my own self-interest. And what's more, if I am human, I am able to define that interest in such a way as to be ever approaching my best. With this capacity of intelligence we call "mind," (unique in form to my species [arguably composed of a symphonic arrangement of intellect/intuition/ emotion/sense] and in content to myself) I can reason from logic and experience about what actually is good for me, as distinct from what at first seems so, and so inform my choices toward keeping the system of my body alive and well. *
It is clear that, though not yet how, a mind exists in interaction with those many
other systems which make up the complex system of systems which is a self, and of which a body is the most fundamental part. One must be alive, after all, before one can live a good or just life. (Perhaps the one-way nature of this contingency is what gives egoism the "methodological priority" that Elster attributes to it.*) And since I am aware of this process in my own mind--the process by which I continue to refine my preferences as I gradually learn what is good, along with answers to other questions which I ask myself--! pay attention, so to speak, to the lessons of interaction that I experience; one learns, as it is the nature of conscious organisms to do.[*It has been argued that time is intrinsic to consciousness, which alone gives it meaning and is responsible for it's forward motion. *[Mead]] I am made aware by the very paying of attention that this is wherein choice is actually manifest--in my choice of where to pay my attention to. Here is where one's preferences, or values, reach critical efficacy, as I am driven by what I think is good to pay attention to some aspects of the objective world and to ignore others. Thus, this variable--what I think is good--is a choice I make by (better or worse) reasoning according to the lessons of experience and logic, and thus, is central to the process of the growth and development of self.
One interesting aspect of this analysis is the way in which the dynamics of attention can themselves be analyzed, even in Cartesian terms; for instance, consider one continuum of value which spans the extremes from, say, deep analysis to broad synthesis.
Subjectivity is more or less free to choose its way of looking at the objective world within its context, which is itself organized along various continuum, from concrete to abstract, for instance. To illustrate this, note how I can know this computer, say, from a wide variety of points of view; for instance, I can analyze it in terms of its mechanical parts, which involves laying my perception on its more concrete properties; or I might analyze it in terms of its theory of operation, which is quite abstract and requires I look at it as an idea with a history; likewise, I might synthesize it's more concrete potentials, such as it's outlining and nesting capacities, together with my growing network of programs and documents, which involves utilizing both it's and my own more abstract potentials. In this way, I 'know' this computer in a complex, interactive, way; interactive in that, at that point where attention meets the world, there is a comprehensive interaction occurring between the objective component that is my computer and the subjective component of my choice. And so, again, choice is especially important in understanding how knowledge is obtained, for we choose, more or less consciously, not only what we pay attention to, but from which angle and at which scale offocus.
Now, to analyze this a little more thoroughly, we might model the interaction between the continui which range from concrete to abstract, with that which ranges from analytic to synthetic, (or in fact any range of polar variables).[See Figure A] Allow they
axis to represent the objective world as it ranges from concrete to abstract, while the x axis represents the subjective human tendancy to view the world on any of many continuui, in this case, that ranging from analytic to synthetic. On the basis of such a model, it might be possible to meaningfully map the relations between mind and world in such a way that we could more clearly see how there can indeed be different subjective perspectives on the self_ same object of knowledge.
[put subject/object image*]
Consider attention as residing and fluctuating on this map, focusing on certain aspects of our object and ignoring others, looking from some angles and perhaps unable to see others, taking in different kinds of knowledge according to what matters to this particular subject This construct seems useful toward understanding how different people perceive different worlds. By it, the objects of the world appear more complex than our habitual materialism has them seeming. However, the mind develops habits, and our habit is to equate the concrete with the real, denying ourselves true understanding of much that is abstract.**1
Now one might tend to look at the more concrete aspects of the world, and to do so
in a more or less analytic way, such as most scientists do. We might say that, in terms of human capacities, this represents perception by sensory awareness, in significantly more physical terms than, say, the mystic, who looks at the world more abstractly and with more tendency to make connections and synthesize than to take apart and analyze, more intuitively than the more empirical scientist might. Likewise, one might tend to look at the more abstract aspects of the world, and to do so in a more or less analytic way, such as most philosophers do; in terms of the capacities of mind, and this would be the intellectual, as opposed to sensual or intuitive mode of understanding. And, per the model, this would be the complement of the view of one who sees the world concretely and synthetically, such as the more wholistic empiricist might. And so we have the scientist, who analyzes concretes, and the philosopher, who analyzes abstracts, and the mystic, who synthesizes abstracts, and the personal empiricist, who synthesizes concretes. With all this in mind, we can give account of the wholist, who recognizes the logical space of the mind to be its broad potentials which are, like the body, actualized by exercise. 1
[put science etc. image*]
[put sense etc. image*]
Note the argument from the fact that we can take different subjective points of view on the same object, to the fact that consciousness can thus grow by such accumulation, and what's more, that justice requires that it should, at least as far as its dependents interests are concerned. In fact, I think it is this range of knowledge, objectively real but subjectively experienced, which accounts for why we can meaningfully fret about the fact that the human mind uses only 10% of it's potential, or whatever the claim is these days.
*[more up] We have both descriptive and normative lines of reasoning going on here, but I contend that in the context of this discussion, they come up in unison, with responsibility following directly from knowledge of dependence. In other words, knowing that something which needs doing will not get done if we ourselves do not do it leads, rationally, directly to the responsibility to do that which we can do. In this we can see a shift toward ever-broader responsibility with the growth of knowledge and power. When the growth of knowledge involves taking other's perspectives, we cannot deny the responsibility we feel for that which we see when we empathize. By this psychosocial interaction, I can account for why and how I can "care for" my dog, my daughter, my students, and my friends. Parenting is as good a term as any for this responsibility, for it incorporates all of the important connotations that come into the relationship between dependents and their respondents. This process of the growth of self is perhaps what Sen might call a form of sympathy, for "a person's well-being is psychologically dependent upon someone else's welfare," [p.32] and so the dependence is interactive. Looked at another way, it is also a form of commitment in as much as an informed decision is a form of commitment to the probable consequences. Whatever we call it, the specific manner in which this phenomenon of losing narrow self-interest is accomplished can best be specified, I think, by means of such inside-looking-out analysis as empathy allows. [*this portion is reworked from my paper on Sen's Rational Fools]
The idea of empathy as an instrument of growth deserves deeper analysis. Consider the way in which one "cares for" one's dog; the relationship is such that I cannot see the world without seeing it through his eyes too, meaning that I am aware when he has not been fed or let out, walked or played with, and I cannot easily ignore the fact of his
need well-being. Is this not what it means to have taken responsibility for him, to have made a commitment, with or without conscious choice? Now one may accomplish this act of 'caring for' another better or worse, more authentically or less, but the fact of one's responsibility comes with the knowledge that there is something which needs doing (for someone or something to whom one is committed) that will not get done if one does not do it oneself--in this case, if I don't take care of my dog's needs. It is the nature of responsibility, which comes both with commitment, and simply with the knowledge that one can do what needs doing, i.e. that one with it be accountable for getting needed things done, for others are in fact dependent upon us to perform that function well, and they suffer from our performing it poorly. This responsibility follows naturally and logically from both the general fact of our power over one another and the specific commitments we have made. As parents, we have overwhelming power, when viewed from our dependents eyes. It has been my claim that knowledge of others actual dependence upon us is tantamount to responsibility, and thus, empathy is a means by which their points of view are, ideally, incorporated into our own, in such a way that, in caring for them, we can meaningfully say that self itself has grown. Viewing the world through one's own as well as one's dependents eyes means taking their interests as one's own. In this acceptance of responsibility and intention of commitment, self grows in both breadth and depth. Some manage to divorce themselves from this responsibility through a process of desensitization, but the cost to one's self in this case is as high if not higher than the cost to one's dependents, for such a conception of the potentials of mind shows clearly who is more harmed by one's narrowness (and much more could be said on this).
The important thing is that the process itself has universal elements which can be examined and discussed, and from this examination, self-knowledge and responsibility grow. The fact of our power is the fact of our responsibility, whether we recognize it or not, and whether this responsibility=> our empathic consideration of those others to whom our decisions make a difference is a matter of moral interest, for we often have and exercise power, whether we take responsibility for it or not. It might be put into these terms: perception is quite easily confined to the here and now, ignorant of all that is available to be known; but since attention is such that it can be paid to other places and times, can remember what was and imagine what could be, can empathize with many experiences in widely varied circumstances having little or nothing to do with its own circumstance of reality, and can recognize its own potential knowledge and power which reaches far beyond the physical perimeter of the body--what then is the point in being narrow? From this view, it no longer seems as rational as we have long assumed it to be. It only seems reasonable from the view of self as oversimplified egoist, but not from the view of self as complex interpersonal system. In this way, one who has grown through the taking of responsibility and following through on commitment to others can meaningfully be seen to have, in a sense, a broader self than otherwise, just as one who has a rich and well developed subjective system of understanding in which communication with others plays an integral part can meaningfully be seen to have a deeper self than would otherwise be.
Empathy is clearly a part of all such dimensions of mind, that is, toward knowing the world, knowing others, and toward better knowing one's own self. When I speak of
empathy, in mind of this model, I can stretch my conception of it from my naive understanding, in which I considered it merely a means of taking another's view by feeling their feelings and imagining their circumstances, to a more developed sense of empathy which involves a more thorough analysis of a complex and detailed, individual system of mind. And, as argued elsewhere, it could be argued that it is less important that practitioners and researchers understand individuals than that individuals come to understand themselves and one another. Broadening our understanding of the minds complexities and complimentarities can only help us to use empathy as a means of understanding universals by studying individuals, from inside out.
And, as noted in my paper on Sen's Rational Fools, using the Prisoner's Dilemma as a thought experiment with regard to it puts this model into motion, for one can see how
we might employ this method toward better understanding how justice, in the form of selfishness and unselfishness, works to provide for DIKE, or balance, in the soul which is manifest in the social conditions that flow inevitably from self. Also, as Sen points out, this broad and complex structure can also be used to study ala-asia, or weakness of the will. Thus, the PD in conjunction with this structure, helps us to understand the social and psychological dynamics of give and take.
**By bringing yet another, and possibly many other, dimensions into play here (such as self vs. other-interest, intrinsic vs. extrinsic orientation, or internal vs. external
locus of control) we can see how other human beings themselves become objects of our knowledge, objects first if only because we perceive their physical and psychological surfaces first; but these are objects which we can transform into subjects by our coming to know them through taking their own view as best we can. And we do this, according to the model, first by choosing at what level of concreteness or abstractness we aim our attention toward, and then by choosing whether we will focus on small scale analysis or broad scale synthesis. The interaction between these makes for beautiful, yet precise, representational images of the relationship between the subjective mind and the objective world.
To conclude on a flight of fancy, we might well imagine how individual thinkers
whom we have known might fit onto this model of the relation between variables in the
interaction between subject and object.
[put image of relationship between philosophers*]
What does it mean to "know" then? Consider different kinds of knowers and the kinds of knowledge they produce; for example, empiricism as it opposes mysticism. It seems a consequent of this interaction that these two ways of looking at the world are opposed, being that empiricism falls squarely into the concrete-analytic mode of appreciation, as Hume and Skinner did, while mysticism falls into the mode of abstract synthesis, as would Blake and many religious thinkers. Likewise, logicians and mathematicians, such as Aristotle and Einstein, look at the abstract world in an analytic way, while personal empiricists and existentialists, like Marx and Thoreau, tend to focus on the concrete world but in a quite synthetic way. This arrangement leaves the empiricists differentiated from the logicians and mathematicians by the degree of concreteness in their subject matter, and differentiated from the personal empiricists and existentialists by the degree of analysis involved in the method of approach. Likewise, it separates the mystic from the mathematician by the analysis involved in the method, and from the existentialist by the level of objective reality upon which they focus. This leaves abstract Plato to complement concrete Machiavelli, and analytic Decartes opposite synthetic Buddha. Are these different truths then? Or just different ways of looking at the same truth? It seems a lesson in humility--for what does it mean to talk of truth?
1. One could imagine a new paradigm of eductiducational methods using this conception of mind as a growing systemic organism .
2. [maybe separate these into subjective view of the object and subjective view of the subject. [
3. [Notes for edit into body]--It is the limits of space which necessitate vague terms, not an intrinsic property of the subject, for we can examine it in as much detail as time and space allow.
--where lies my interest in this subject? It is the one thing that, if I don't do it, won't get done. Human potential is contingent upon human action, which is dependent upon the depth of thought and quality of human choice, in other words, it's dependent on me, i.e. my resp:msibilit
--footnote tim allen somewhere
--Thinking of ourselves as centers and the cross-hair intersection on the two-dimensional "mattering map" to be the point where attention comes to bear upon objective reality by bringing the object of our precept into focus, that is, the point at which our attention meets the world. Here countless circles and spheres would intersect, some of which are objects to us (outside of us) and others of which we are subject to (surround us) and all of which aligu themselves in such a way as to make every persons reality unique.
Another thing which this analysis of the human "object" might accomplish, and perhaps most relevant to the rest of this discussion, is that it allows us to shift our focus from the outside-looking-in perspective that the previous discussion about objects external to the observer entailed, to the inside looking-out point of view that any discussion of internal perception must entail. It tums the object into subject.
--The balance of human capacities, that is the modes of appreciation available to us, fall quite neatly into this interactive arrangement. This mattering-map might be fruitful as a representation of the whole individual, as well it is of the individual's relations to the whole.
--what it means to think of human beings as systems. The idea that we are physical bodies which effect one another only to the extent that we bump up against each other or each other's interests is a Newtonian conception that lingers even as we know better, if only because, in the middle dimensions of every day perceptionJ6 the image of our separateness is still sadly true. For the moment we continue to live, as we always have, in fear of one another, and often understandably so. We human beings are only now beginning to understand the meaning of "bonding," a concept which we must see ourselves as interacting systems in order to fully understand. We have not quite adjusted to the knowledge of quantum reality, mushy and mystical as it seems, hence have not yet found a common sense way to think of ourselves or the objects/subjects around us as dynamic, let alone organic, beings. But, in fact, we are, and we have much to learu by realizing it. Our effect upon one another and upon the environment is beyond the material effects of our use of resources and space; we are more thanjust physically consequential. We impact upon one another deeply, traumatically, in psychological terms; we pull and push each others' perceptions in ways that, while they may seem insignificant to a Newtouian materialist, are recognized in their full effect by nearly all post-Freudian psychology.
--And in as much as it is possible to understand "survival" and 11fitness" in different senses, and to reach an ever better understanding of the meaning of a good life, it is possible to be either foolish or wise about what these things mean; in a sense, to be right or wrong, closer or further from what actually is a human beings best-interest. We can be mistaken about what is good for us, even fooled deliberately.
--This cognitive map can thus help us to understand the function of our need in the focus of our attention. By this understanding, the meaning of right, free, good, true, equal, individual, community, responsibility, justice, commitment, and forgiveness become ever more clear.
--Here, in a systems analysis, we can see that all humans, not just "economic men, 11 are rational, in that they all reason and act toward their what they see as their own good--they differ only inwhat they define as "good. 11 This question of value is the central issue around which this book is organized. It is, I believe, at the heart of all human action and interaction, the functional response to both our automatic responses [Focus: On The Ontological implications of the New Physics: or Thoughts on Economic, Political, and Ethical Values: A Systems Approach to the Dynamics of Self-Interest, #29] and our choices. [Focus: On The Ontological hnplications of the New Physics: or Thoughts on Economic, Political, and Ethical Values: A Systems Approach to the Dynamics of Self-Interest, #30] And it underlies much if not ali past social, political, and economic theory. In this is deserves more thorough consideration than it receives from those who simply assume it in the material sense we have come to think of it
--The hierarchy of our knowledges is perhaps most apparent in the stage progression of children, but this may only be because as of yet we pay little attention to adult qualitative growth. This conception of cognitive stage progression is one we have been comfortable with since the Piagetian revolution began in the 1950's. In this regard, the systems approach has already been fruitful toward helping us understand the workings of the mind. According to Piaget, mental growth or change is based on encounters with new information, the impact of which causes an imbalance, an inconsistency between expectations and experience, which it is the job of the mind to reconcile by adapting one to the other. The equilibration process, by which the individual reestablishes balance of mind and body, is accomplished by assimilation or accommodation; i.e. by either adjusting the information to assimilate into our belief-knowledge structure, or by changing our belief-knowledge structure to be able to accommodate this new information. The cognitive dissonance between expectations and experience is the gap between image and actual. with self actualization as its end; whether we fit the actual to the image or the image to the actual is up to us; the challenge of idealism. The individual will either act to fulfill the images and expectations passed on to him by the world around him, or he will act on the world around him to fulfill the images and expectations of his own thought. Whether experience guides thought or thought gnides experience depends upon the balance between the strength of the environment and the strength of the individual will. An uneven match, to be sure, but not necessarily a doomed one.[Focus: On The Ontological Implications of the New Physics: or Thoughts on Economic, Political, and Ethical Values: A Systems Approach to the Dynamics of Self Interest, #31]
--There is something left uuknown when the scientific method is applied to human beings. Perceptive systems can be known from the inside-looking-out as well; they have a subjective point of view. This complication has presented great difficulty for researchers and theorists who deal with living systems by limiting themselves to the outside-looking-in perspective. These systems, such as human beings are, cannot be considered truly "known" until seen from this subjective point of view in balance with the objective.l4 The attempt to know men objectively without, as the Socratic dictrnn counseled, knowing ourselves subjectively has been the principle obstacle between the social scientist and the whole-truth all along. It seems odd indeed that one who could know his subject empathically, i.e. from its own point of view, simply by understanding his or her own self better--which would allow access to the subjects motivation from the side which perceives it--would forfeit that privilege and strive instead to be free of that valuable view for the sake of being taken seriously as ''hard science." One day, in retrospect, perhaps it will seem to be the outside-looking-in scientific method which had been the limited one, not the inside-looking out view of which the poets tell us.
It might be possible that the perspectives of individual thinkers could fall into some kind of order by this model. A sample is offered for contemplation which includes a possible set of relationships between some of history's perspectives on truth.