The Value of Empathy to a Wholistic Science
As a student of philosophy, I have long been interested in the study of empathy, specifically, the need for and the value of it as an approach to knowledge ...at least in any practice true to the ideal of what 'science' could and--if justice is a consideration--should be. From this approach, the concept of empathy can be understood simply as a tool to reach the inside-looking-out, that is, subjective point of view, as distinct from the outside looking-in approach to its objects which materialist science habitually takes. But in the context of feminist ethics, which is not unlike Socratic ethics in it objective of replacing tyranny with justice, the importance of empathy is better understood as listening without prejudice, which is to say, with a good will. Here, empathy need not be argued for, per se, as if against an exclusively outside-in approach; rather, the value of personal experience is learned from personal experience itself--perhaps the best empirical evidence.
However, the importance of empathy in feminist ethics, while obvious, is not actually 'given'. In fact, it is indeed argued for, and in much the way Paulo Freire argued in his classic 1968 work, Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Freire claimed that liberation is not a gift, nor is it merely self-achievement; rather it is a process of interactive re-education through empathic dialogue--itself the truest exercise of freedom. More recently, Maria Lugones seems to support this conclusion in her article, "Playfulness, 'World'-Traveling, and Loving Perception," claiming that "experience that has within it significant insights into non-imperialistic understanding between people" (p.l70) can best be had, as the title suggests, by playful and loving "world"-traveling--a way or practice of knowing by which "we discover that there are 'worlds' in which those who are the victims of arrogant perception [in the mainstream construction of reality] are really subjects, lively beings, resistors, [and] constructors of visions" themselves.(p.178)
While empathy is arguably a broader, or from some views perhaps even narrower, conceptual method than that which Freire and Lugones prescribe, understood flexibly, I think it suffices in this context to represent the general method both of these theorists advocate. What's more, I think empathy and the lessons learned by it give feminist ethics a distinct edge over other approaches to 'truth', most especially it's more objective counterpart in materialist science. This is true, at least, if understanding, not prediction and control, is the end of true science. For allowing subjectivity to matter means so much more than might at first seem the case. It is arguable that this deep human capacity, taken seriously, might allow us the potential to reconcile our otherwise desperate perspectives, in effect, to connect or, at any rate, understand the inherent connection between subject and object, and perhaps more importantly, between subject and subject.
We have, after all, long lamented the inability of the method of objectification, which we have come to think of as science, to function properly as a social science tool. And so much physics-envy has prevented our understanding of, among other things, political reality. This outside looking-in method, which works perfectly well for dead and even some living matter, simply cannot help us to understand consciousness and human being. For even if we could accumulate every outside-looking-in perspective on any given object of our intended knowledge, jf that object is conscious, and jf we ignore this view from inside-looking-out, then we simply cannot claim whole knowledge of that organism. We simply cannot understand human beings, or any other conscious beings, this way--much less the dynamics of our nestedness within social institutions, or their nestedness within one another. These institutions are to us like water to fish, i.e. impossible to distinguish from non-water for lack of the proper perspective; and yet we pretend to be able to 'understand' this complex system exclusively from outside-looking-into the fishbowl, so to speak.
One could easily find incentive and even evidence for conspiracy here, for after all, we cannot find what we are not looking for, and those among us who most predominantly exercise their science this way have more than a little to gain from keeping political reality nebulous and obscure. But it seems to suffice as excuse, or at any rate, as reason enough for mainstream science to leave the inside-looking-out point of view out of its equations, that this subjective side of the subject/object interaction tends to distort the object it observes. And so it seems to hold with philosophical reason that ever greater objectivity is the goal of truth. Which sounds reasonable--until one recognizes that by this method we can never, even in principle, understand human relationships, or for that matter anything else we are inside of, e.g. consciousness, love, or injustice. We simply cannot objectify any such subjects by perceiving their perimeters as distinct from something else; we cannot get the proper perspective from outside-looking-in. In order to even perceive the injustice we are steeped in as such, we need the "perspective" that empathy for inside-looking-out views can provide. We cannot objectify human experience, much as some would like to. Only from this inside-out-view are we able to see our own experience as both distinct from and interconnect with that of others. And I would argue that the edge provided to any feminist thinking which keeps this in mind is that these perspectives, taken together, show clearly the political reality which materialist methods of science cannot reveal.
If feminist ethics needs an argument for this integration at all, it has an obvious analogy in the reason that each of us has two eyes instead of only one--i.e. to give us depth in our vision. Materialist science may be wonderful at discovering and/or defining surfaces, as Michel Foucault observed, but only a method which recognizes social science's objects as subjects can authentically lay claim to that objectivity which so many seem to crave. As John Stuart Mill long ago argued, our differing experiences give us different perspectives from which to view the world, and thus, none of us has the privileged perspective from which reality can be defined. In fact, it is exactly when any of us claims this privilege that we can see clearly the construction, as distinct from the discovery, of reality. The abuse of power that goes into such arrogant construction violates objective reality, not to mention justice, and prevents us from understanding what Mill, like Socrates, referred to as the whole of truth.! Only empathy is the antidote to such arrogance.
Feminist politics, on the other hand, with justice as its end, recognizes at the outset
that anything that might rightly qualify as truth emerges in the dialogue which is imperative to an interactive and eclectic conception of reality. From our idiosyncrasy of experience and variability of reference frames, it follows that, while no one ever completely understands anything, everything can always be understood better; better, that is, in the sense of more completely and objectively. By ever fuller consideration of ever more subjective perspectives, we come to admit to the mind as a growing organism, and to understanding as both a personal and a social act, connecting subject with subject in a way the materialist never could. No matter how much we know, there is always something left to be learned, always balance and better "perspective" to be had, and therefore, always incentive to listen.
Such a conception of wholistic science would indeed require a re-evaluation of our conceptions of knowledge and of teaching, not to mention of self-interest, and perhaps even of self itself. And what's more, it would compel us to conflict resolution and perhaps reconciliation as we recognize that--one person's knowledge being another person's blind spot--probably our worst enemy would be our very best teacher, and likewise, we would be theirs.
And so what does this tell us about science and truth--except what we already knew, i.e. that empathic dialogue is imperative to a more wholistic understanding? Perhaps it also reminds us of what Socrates long ago taught, i.e. that those who profess to know
the most are quite likely to know the least, at least where knowledge of human beings is concerned. It would seem to be our first task then to--humbly and with good will, or as Lugones would say, playfully and lovingly--reteach the teachers of materialist social science how wholistic truth really is, and how much it has to do with pure and simple honesty. It comes clear that only such an eclectic conception of knowledge could qualify as 'understanding' at all. Bearing witness to other's perspectives on reality both dignifies the many oft'-ignored views and brings them into our own growing reality in such a way as to make the interests of others our own. Feminist politics means many things, among them, taking responsibility for the political part we play in the interaction of nested hierarchies. If, as feminists, we have in common our various experiences of the world as it appears from under the weight of one of these hierarchies, i.e. patriarchy, then it behooves us to recognize--by way of that sympathetic sense for which women are both hailed and feared--where and how we are putting our own weight on others, sometimes just by pretending to know more about them and what's good for them than we possibly can--at least not without bringing their own voices into our so-called scientific data. We are forced to this method of empathy by our commitment to justice. And by it we might reconstruct a broader and more inclusive vision of reality ...together.
As a student of philosophy, I have long been interested in the study of empathy, specifically, the need for and the value of it as an approach to knowledge ...at least in any practice true to the ideal of what 'science' could and--if justice is a consideration--should be. From this approach, the concept of empathy can be understood simply as a tool to reach the inside-looking-out, that is, subjective point of view, as distinct from the outside looking-in approach to its objects which materialist science habitually takes. But in the context of feminist ethics, which is not unlike Socratic ethics in it objective of replacing tyranny with justice, the importance of empathy is better understood as listening without prejudice, which is to say, with a good will. Here, empathy need not be argued for, per se, as if against an exclusively outside-in approach; rather, the value of personal experience is learned from personal experience itself--perhaps the best empirical evidence.
However, the importance of empathy in feminist ethics, while obvious, is not actually 'given'. In fact, it is indeed argued for, and in much the way Paulo Freire argued in his classic 1968 work, Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Freire claimed that liberation is not a gift, nor is it merely self-achievement; rather it is a process of interactive re-education through empathic dialogue--itself the truest exercise of freedom. More recently, Maria Lugones seems to support this conclusion in her article, "Playfulness, 'World'-Traveling, and Loving Perception," claiming that "experience that has within it significant insights into non-imperialistic understanding between people" (p.l70) can best be had, as the title suggests, by playful and loving "world"-traveling--a way or practice of knowing by which "we discover that there are 'worlds' in which those who are the victims of arrogant perception [in the mainstream construction of reality] are really subjects, lively beings, resistors, [and] constructors of visions" themselves.(p.178)
While empathy is arguably a broader, or from some views perhaps even narrower, conceptual method than that which Freire and Lugones prescribe, understood flexibly, I think it suffices in this context to represent the general method both of these theorists advocate. What's more, I think empathy and the lessons learned by it give feminist ethics a distinct edge over other approaches to 'truth', most especially it's more objective counterpart in materialist science. This is true, at least, if understanding, not prediction and control, is the end of true science. For allowing subjectivity to matter means so much more than might at first seem the case. It is arguable that this deep human capacity, taken seriously, might allow us the potential to reconcile our otherwise desperate perspectives, in effect, to connect or, at any rate, understand the inherent connection between subject and object, and perhaps more importantly, between subject and subject.
We have, after all, long lamented the inability of the method of objectification, which we have come to think of as science, to function properly as a social science tool. And so much physics-envy has prevented our understanding of, among other things, political reality. This outside looking-in method, which works perfectly well for dead and even some living matter, simply cannot help us to understand consciousness and human being. For even if we could accumulate every outside-looking-in perspective on any given object of our intended knowledge, jf that object is conscious, and jf we ignore this view from inside-looking-out, then we simply cannot claim whole knowledge of that organism. We simply cannot understand human beings, or any other conscious beings, this way--much less the dynamics of our nestedness within social institutions, or their nestedness within one another. These institutions are to us like water to fish, i.e. impossible to distinguish from non-water for lack of the proper perspective; and yet we pretend to be able to 'understand' this complex system exclusively from outside-looking-into the fishbowl, so to speak.
One could easily find incentive and even evidence for conspiracy here, for after all, we cannot find what we are not looking for, and those among us who most predominantly exercise their science this way have more than a little to gain from keeping political reality nebulous and obscure. But it seems to suffice as excuse, or at any rate, as reason enough for mainstream science to leave the inside-looking-out point of view out of its equations, that this subjective side of the subject/object interaction tends to distort the object it observes. And so it seems to hold with philosophical reason that ever greater objectivity is the goal of truth. Which sounds reasonable--until one recognizes that by this method we can never, even in principle, understand human relationships, or for that matter anything else we are inside of, e.g. consciousness, love, or injustice. We simply cannot objectify any such subjects by perceiving their perimeters as distinct from something else; we cannot get the proper perspective from outside-looking-in. In order to even perceive the injustice we are steeped in as such, we need the "perspective" that empathy for inside-looking-out views can provide. We cannot objectify human experience, much as some would like to. Only from this inside-out-view are we able to see our own experience as both distinct from and interconnect with that of others. And I would argue that the edge provided to any feminist thinking which keeps this in mind is that these perspectives, taken together, show clearly the political reality which materialist methods of science cannot reveal.
If feminist ethics needs an argument for this integration at all, it has an obvious analogy in the reason that each of us has two eyes instead of only one--i.e. to give us depth in our vision. Materialist science may be wonderful at discovering and/or defining surfaces, as Michel Foucault observed, but only a method which recognizes social science's objects as subjects can authentically lay claim to that objectivity which so many seem to crave. As John Stuart Mill long ago argued, our differing experiences give us different perspectives from which to view the world, and thus, none of us has the privileged perspective from which reality can be defined. In fact, it is exactly when any of us claims this privilege that we can see clearly the construction, as distinct from the discovery, of reality. The abuse of power that goes into such arrogant construction violates objective reality, not to mention justice, and prevents us from understanding what Mill, like Socrates, referred to as the whole of truth.! Only empathy is the antidote to such arrogance.
Feminist politics, on the other hand, with justice as its end, recognizes at the outset
that anything that might rightly qualify as truth emerges in the dialogue which is imperative to an interactive and eclectic conception of reality. From our idiosyncrasy of experience and variability of reference frames, it follows that, while no one ever completely understands anything, everything can always be understood better; better, that is, in the sense of more completely and objectively. By ever fuller consideration of ever more subjective perspectives, we come to admit to the mind as a growing organism, and to understanding as both a personal and a social act, connecting subject with subject in a way the materialist never could. No matter how much we know, there is always something left to be learned, always balance and better "perspective" to be had, and therefore, always incentive to listen.
Such a conception of wholistic science would indeed require a re-evaluation of our conceptions of knowledge and of teaching, not to mention of self-interest, and perhaps even of self itself. And what's more, it would compel us to conflict resolution and perhaps reconciliation as we recognize that--one person's knowledge being another person's blind spot--probably our worst enemy would be our very best teacher, and likewise, we would be theirs.
And so what does this tell us about science and truth--except what we already knew, i.e. that empathic dialogue is imperative to a more wholistic understanding? Perhaps it also reminds us of what Socrates long ago taught, i.e. that those who profess to know
the most are quite likely to know the least, at least where knowledge of human beings is concerned. It would seem to be our first task then to--humbly and with good will, or as Lugones would say, playfully and lovingly--reteach the teachers of materialist social science how wholistic truth really is, and how much it has to do with pure and simple honesty. It comes clear that only such an eclectic conception of knowledge could qualify as 'understanding' at all. Bearing witness to other's perspectives on reality both dignifies the many oft'-ignored views and brings them into our own growing reality in such a way as to make the interests of others our own. Feminist politics means many things, among them, taking responsibility for the political part we play in the interaction of nested hierarchies. If, as feminists, we have in common our various experiences of the world as it appears from under the weight of one of these hierarchies, i.e. patriarchy, then it behooves us to recognize--by way of that sympathetic sense for which women are both hailed and feared--where and how we are putting our own weight on others, sometimes just by pretending to know more about them and what's good for them than we possibly can--at least not without bringing their own voices into our so-called scientific data. We are forced to this method of empathy by our commitment to justice. And by it we might reconstruct a broader and more inclusive vision of reality ...together.