On Brentano's Problem
FIX!
The correlation between intention and intension appears less mysterious, I think, when we think of the relationship between mind and world the way Brentano saw it. His intention, remember, was to distinguish the matters of psychology from the matters of physics, and he did this by emphasis on the "intentional in-extension" of mental events, which is to say, the existence of mental events which are distinguished by existing inside of consciousness. Brentano held that the mental is goal-directed, purposeful, but not in such a way as we might at first think, i.e. as in having a specific object, for if this were what he meant, he could hardly have held that nothing else exhibits this property; many aspects of nature are goal-directed and purposeful, without being consciously so. Perhaps 'self directed' is what 'intentional' meant for Brentano; then he could reasonably say that nothing nomnental exhibits it. Seen this way, intentions are directed less at an object, and more at an objective, that is, at an end state of affairs. I Thus, the intentional (meaning self directed) nature of psychological reality is also intensional (meaning meaningful), I think, for exactly the same reason--because consciousness is purposeful and because language is bound to reflect this purpose. In this way, persons can be seen to stand in intentional relations to propositions. "This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena," he said. "No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves. "(p.640)
Brentano thought that this difference called for a difference in method, and this
problem of method then is what has come to be called, Brentano's problem. However, this so-called problem, as far as I can tell, has really only been a problem for reductionist materialist behaviorists, for whom intention--which involves choosing, deciding, and
willing--presents a positive hindrance to scientific observation. By its habit, this form of science takes a strictly outside-looking-in approach to its subject matters; and the problem is that intentional states are inside, and one views them only from inside-looking-out. Now the difficulties presented by this approach are somewhat clear, and reservations about the value of the unobservable are acknowledged, and still, the importance of this difference between the matters of physics and the matters of the human sciences should not be too easily dismissed in a puff of assertion about scientific rigor. One can be as rigorous as one likes in quantifying each and every of the outside-looking-in perspectives one can find, and still be missing the heart of the matter. The difference between reality which is merely physical and that which exercises a psychological component is, just as Brentano emphasized, that inside-looking-out perspective which cannot be observed from outside-in, but can only be considered by actually being adopted. The fact of consciousness and all its complications, including intention and, I think, attention, makes the matters of the human sciences irreducible to physical matter to be observed from outside of itself. We might take in human beings and their various behaviors from every conceivable extrinsic perspective, and we will still have missed that point of view from which our subject knows him or herself, arguably the most important to a complete 'knowledge' of the matter. Here, from inside-out of the human subject is where the dynamics of attention and intention are comprehended.2 Perhaps an individuals interest in knowing is different, in this respect,
from that of such a science. At any rate, as a philosopher, I want to know what role my
self-knowledge plays in my scientific knowledge, that is, how it functions. I want to know how and why my consciousness works as it does, which is not exactly the project of the science of mind (though it might use the same tools and language) but is perhaps complementary to it. This approach might answer many questions of behaviorist science
by pointing out the limits to the questions themselves ....whenever a question sidesteps the agency of consciousness, which simply cannot be ignored by any sincere inquirer into the nature of mind.
In this light, it's hard for me to see the problem with Brentano's prescription. I
understand that it asks for more than physical conceptions of scientific knowledge can provide, but I don't see that this broadening of our method to include an inside looking-out point of view along with our outside-looking-in perspectives betrays realism or in any way hinders our knowledge. To me it seems an enhancement, rather a positive aid toward the end of understanding. This proves to be an extremely valuable perspective, for one thing, because the center is the only perspective from which there is no opposite; it has no bias. From the inside-looking-out, the "natural" system will perceive its needs and its knowledge in nested fashion, extending from center outward, from most immediate to most ultimate. When we are no longer looking at an object, but from it, we are no longer outside-looking-in, but rather situated ourselves "inside" with consciousness focused at the point of intersection, at the cutting edge of time, where attention/intention meets the world. To the extent that we are successful in perceiving from this insider's perspective, we become the object of study, not personally, but generically, as a human being in a survival context. Not as difficult a task for the poet as for the empiricist, it's true, but not necessarily difficult for either, or for anyone who has truly identified the needs of other living systems with their own. In this way, empathy requires self-knowledge. Understanding survival-minded systems requires little more than an honest appraisal of the logic of one's own motivations.[*from Interaction chapter]
When we are able to get beyond objectivity in the human sciences, and see from inside the systems we wish to know in a more participatory fashion, our method is no
longer observation, but consideration, and what's evident from this view is often something we have long known. As we stretch the imagination as a tool of human perception to understand the systems of our minds in our environments, we might also stretch our conception of what is "observable," and what is "evident," and therefore stretch the objective of science to include whatever else humans can observe by looking inside themselves. One would think the psychologist would consider himself lucky to be able to take this inside-looking-out view, but only in a world where the method of dead matter is the paradigm method for conscious matter would the limits of the physical seem desirable. This physics-envy makes no sense when consciousness is so accessible and communication verifies understanding so readily. But it has an undeniable grip on our understanding of proper method, and so Brentano's account presents what seems to be a real problem.
However, it cannot be denied that that which has causal efficacy is real. And the
mind is proved (in quantum physics, not to mention interactive psychology3) to have causal efficacy. Therefore, the mind is real in a way that cannot be reduced to physical
phenomenon.4 If reduction is merely allegorical, then there is no problem, but from this it does not follow that only material is real. If ideas can have momentum, then it's not the case that materialism alone is true, and it!§_the case that realism requires a kind of wholistic approach (which is not dualistic or pluralistic, by the way, but monistic, i.e ene_whole organism. Hence, the "unity of consciousness" about which Brentano wrote.( (p. As 56-v"C-• .7 the functionalist would say, functional properties are 'real' beyond the physica:!properties. •- Functions are intentional, they show the purposeful causal chain, the causal power of meaning. We can dismiss them only if they play no causal role, but in fact, they are critically important in the process. Pain, like other mental states, has a self-preservative function, and while it may be accounted for in physical terms, what is lost in this account?
Answer: an understanding of the function of mental states, i.e. of consciousness, in the
development of reality5 Functional accounts need not ignore meanings, subjectivity, consciousness, or intensions; for intentionality, in this view, means having an object, which is equal to intensionality, which means having a meaning; these are bound to be connected in the mind of the active subject, for it is this subject who determines the object by meaning it in the first place, that is, intends intensionally, or actively means, that is, the director toward the goal. Consciousness has intention, i.e. is directed at an object, and it has intension, that is, a meaning. What gives us the idea that these are even different things at all? When one's attention is intended toward a given object, is this not for the purpose of determining meaning? We meet an objective world, but we make choices about the way we will attend to it, i.e. the approach, or sense, or intension; thus, we mean something by intending our attention to a given object; that is, we have an intention, a purpose, a function to perform as we actively perceive the world, and it causes u to come at the objects of our attention from certain conceptual angles, or intensions./Thus, Oedipus wants to marry Jocasta, meaning the concrete beauty who stimulates hiS" libido, the queen of Thebes, and the kings widow, but not, presumably, his mother, because this is not_the_tl_ellsein which Oedipus understands the meaning of Jocasta. As far as Oedipus knew, Jocasta was not his mother. These terms are differenLsenses_fm:tb_e_same.Jhing, different meanings, where meaning is contingent upon the intentions of the agent, i.e. what he is attending to in knowing his object. Any of many variables can effect how we see the world, i.e. what we are looking for.
We come at different objects from different angles, not necessarily spatially, but conceptually. And it is this variation within the subject perceiving, choosing from an infinite number of perspectives, which causes the same intention to carry different intensions. It would not be surprising to find that every intention has intension, for it is this meaning which connects attention to it's object in a particular way. Attention is active toward adaptation, purposeful, and therefore, perception which has intention (an object) also has intension (meaning, sense). The parts played by attention and intention in such a process are critical variables which deserve rigorous analysis in our philosophical considerations of minds knowing minds.
1. Then the question fr9m B>iofeiso 1 (hamlotit) becomes to identify the objective of believing in God, the reason (which is presumably comfort or reassurance of some sort), which is not the object of believing, i.e. the what, but the objective, i.e. the why, the purpose or reason. Thus, -as asked-in Exueise 4, believing is a matter of one's relation to a proposition because believing a given proposition furthers one's objectives. We believe false propositions if there is, shall we say, fitness value in such beliefs, survival and well-being being our chief objective.
2It's impossible in a two-page paper to do more than merely reiterate the importance of this perspective. but for a more detailed and thorough discussion of the importauce of and potential for empathy in our scientific understanding. see "Toward a Method of Self-Knowledge," (Juliana Hunt, Senior Thesis, 1992)
3 Again, see J. Hunt, Thesis; 1992.
4..while it can perhaps be reduced to the language of physics, for these causal processes cau be uuderstaood in the lenguage of the laws of motion or of thermodynamics, or even of relativity aud quantum theory. with little or no distortion; consider Putnam's flow-charts.
5see ''fhe Emporer's New Mind". Roger Penrose (Oxford University Press, 1990)
I..'
FIX!
The correlation between intention and intension appears less mysterious, I think, when we think of the relationship between mind and world the way Brentano saw it. His intention, remember, was to distinguish the matters of psychology from the matters of physics, and he did this by emphasis on the "intentional in-extension" of mental events, which is to say, the existence of mental events which are distinguished by existing inside of consciousness. Brentano held that the mental is goal-directed, purposeful, but not in such a way as we might at first think, i.e. as in having a specific object, for if this were what he meant, he could hardly have held that nothing else exhibits this property; many aspects of nature are goal-directed and purposeful, without being consciously so. Perhaps 'self directed' is what 'intentional' meant for Brentano; then he could reasonably say that nothing nomnental exhibits it. Seen this way, intentions are directed less at an object, and more at an objective, that is, at an end state of affairs. I Thus, the intentional (meaning self directed) nature of psychological reality is also intensional (meaning meaningful), I think, for exactly the same reason--because consciousness is purposeful and because language is bound to reflect this purpose. In this way, persons can be seen to stand in intentional relations to propositions. "This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena," he said. "No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves. "(p.640)
Brentano thought that this difference called for a difference in method, and this
problem of method then is what has come to be called, Brentano's problem. However, this so-called problem, as far as I can tell, has really only been a problem for reductionist materialist behaviorists, for whom intention--which involves choosing, deciding, and
willing--presents a positive hindrance to scientific observation. By its habit, this form of science takes a strictly outside-looking-in approach to its subject matters; and the problem is that intentional states are inside, and one views them only from inside-looking-out. Now the difficulties presented by this approach are somewhat clear, and reservations about the value of the unobservable are acknowledged, and still, the importance of this difference between the matters of physics and the matters of the human sciences should not be too easily dismissed in a puff of assertion about scientific rigor. One can be as rigorous as one likes in quantifying each and every of the outside-looking-in perspectives one can find, and still be missing the heart of the matter. The difference between reality which is merely physical and that which exercises a psychological component is, just as Brentano emphasized, that inside-looking-out perspective which cannot be observed from outside-in, but can only be considered by actually being adopted. The fact of consciousness and all its complications, including intention and, I think, attention, makes the matters of the human sciences irreducible to physical matter to be observed from outside of itself. We might take in human beings and their various behaviors from every conceivable extrinsic perspective, and we will still have missed that point of view from which our subject knows him or herself, arguably the most important to a complete 'knowledge' of the matter. Here, from inside-out of the human subject is where the dynamics of attention and intention are comprehended.2 Perhaps an individuals interest in knowing is different, in this respect,
from that of such a science. At any rate, as a philosopher, I want to know what role my
self-knowledge plays in my scientific knowledge, that is, how it functions. I want to know how and why my consciousness works as it does, which is not exactly the project of the science of mind (though it might use the same tools and language) but is perhaps complementary to it. This approach might answer many questions of behaviorist science
by pointing out the limits to the questions themselves ....whenever a question sidesteps the agency of consciousness, which simply cannot be ignored by any sincere inquirer into the nature of mind.
In this light, it's hard for me to see the problem with Brentano's prescription. I
understand that it asks for more than physical conceptions of scientific knowledge can provide, but I don't see that this broadening of our method to include an inside looking-out point of view along with our outside-looking-in perspectives betrays realism or in any way hinders our knowledge. To me it seems an enhancement, rather a positive aid toward the end of understanding. This proves to be an extremely valuable perspective, for one thing, because the center is the only perspective from which there is no opposite; it has no bias. From the inside-looking-out, the "natural" system will perceive its needs and its knowledge in nested fashion, extending from center outward, from most immediate to most ultimate. When we are no longer looking at an object, but from it, we are no longer outside-looking-in, but rather situated ourselves "inside" with consciousness focused at the point of intersection, at the cutting edge of time, where attention/intention meets the world. To the extent that we are successful in perceiving from this insider's perspective, we become the object of study, not personally, but generically, as a human being in a survival context. Not as difficult a task for the poet as for the empiricist, it's true, but not necessarily difficult for either, or for anyone who has truly identified the needs of other living systems with their own. In this way, empathy requires self-knowledge. Understanding survival-minded systems requires little more than an honest appraisal of the logic of one's own motivations.[*from Interaction chapter]
When we are able to get beyond objectivity in the human sciences, and see from inside the systems we wish to know in a more participatory fashion, our method is no
longer observation, but consideration, and what's evident from this view is often something we have long known. As we stretch the imagination as a tool of human perception to understand the systems of our minds in our environments, we might also stretch our conception of what is "observable," and what is "evident," and therefore stretch the objective of science to include whatever else humans can observe by looking inside themselves. One would think the psychologist would consider himself lucky to be able to take this inside-looking-out view, but only in a world where the method of dead matter is the paradigm method for conscious matter would the limits of the physical seem desirable. This physics-envy makes no sense when consciousness is so accessible and communication verifies understanding so readily. But it has an undeniable grip on our understanding of proper method, and so Brentano's account presents what seems to be a real problem.
However, it cannot be denied that that which has causal efficacy is real. And the
mind is proved (in quantum physics, not to mention interactive psychology3) to have causal efficacy. Therefore, the mind is real in a way that cannot be reduced to physical
phenomenon.4 If reduction is merely allegorical, then there is no problem, but from this it does not follow that only material is real. If ideas can have momentum, then it's not the case that materialism alone is true, and it!§_the case that realism requires a kind of wholistic approach (which is not dualistic or pluralistic, by the way, but monistic, i.e ene_whole organism. Hence, the "unity of consciousness" about which Brentano wrote.( (p. As 56-v"C-• .7 the functionalist would say, functional properties are 'real' beyond the physica:!properties. •- Functions are intentional, they show the purposeful causal chain, the causal power of meaning. We can dismiss them only if they play no causal role, but in fact, they are critically important in the process. Pain, like other mental states, has a self-preservative function, and while it may be accounted for in physical terms, what is lost in this account?
Answer: an understanding of the function of mental states, i.e. of consciousness, in the
development of reality5 Functional accounts need not ignore meanings, subjectivity, consciousness, or intensions; for intentionality, in this view, means having an object, which is equal to intensionality, which means having a meaning; these are bound to be connected in the mind of the active subject, for it is this subject who determines the object by meaning it in the first place, that is, intends intensionally, or actively means, that is, the director toward the goal. Consciousness has intention, i.e. is directed at an object, and it has intension, that is, a meaning. What gives us the idea that these are even different things at all? When one's attention is intended toward a given object, is this not for the purpose of determining meaning? We meet an objective world, but we make choices about the way we will attend to it, i.e. the approach, or sense, or intension; thus, we mean something by intending our attention to a given object; that is, we have an intention, a purpose, a function to perform as we actively perceive the world, and it causes u to come at the objects of our attention from certain conceptual angles, or intensions./Thus, Oedipus wants to marry Jocasta, meaning the concrete beauty who stimulates hiS" libido, the queen of Thebes, and the kings widow, but not, presumably, his mother, because this is not_the_tl_ellsein which Oedipus understands the meaning of Jocasta. As far as Oedipus knew, Jocasta was not his mother. These terms are differenLsenses_fm:tb_e_same.Jhing, different meanings, where meaning is contingent upon the intentions of the agent, i.e. what he is attending to in knowing his object. Any of many variables can effect how we see the world, i.e. what we are looking for.
We come at different objects from different angles, not necessarily spatially, but conceptually. And it is this variation within the subject perceiving, choosing from an infinite number of perspectives, which causes the same intention to carry different intensions. It would not be surprising to find that every intention has intension, for it is this meaning which connects attention to it's object in a particular way. Attention is active toward adaptation, purposeful, and therefore, perception which has intention (an object) also has intension (meaning, sense). The parts played by attention and intention in such a process are critical variables which deserve rigorous analysis in our philosophical considerations of minds knowing minds.
1. Then the question fr9m B>iofeiso 1 (hamlotit) becomes to identify the objective of believing in God, the reason (which is presumably comfort or reassurance of some sort), which is not the object of believing, i.e. the what, but the objective, i.e. the why, the purpose or reason. Thus, -as asked-in Exueise 4, believing is a matter of one's relation to a proposition because believing a given proposition furthers one's objectives. We believe false propositions if there is, shall we say, fitness value in such beliefs, survival and well-being being our chief objective.
2It's impossible in a two-page paper to do more than merely reiterate the importance of this perspective. but for a more detailed and thorough discussion of the importauce of and potential for empathy in our scientific understanding. see "Toward a Method of Self-Knowledge," (Juliana Hunt, Senior Thesis, 1992)
3 Again, see J. Hunt, Thesis; 1992.
4..while it can perhaps be reduced to the language of physics, for these causal processes cau be uuderstaood in the lenguage of the laws of motion or of thermodynamics, or even of relativity aud quantum theory. with little or no distortion; consider Putnam's flow-charts.
5see ''fhe Emporer's New Mind". Roger Penrose (Oxford University Press, 1990)
I..'